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ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the economic conditions of the American apparel industry, as well 
as the complex interactions of apparel industry members, trade organizations, and the U. S. 
government to better understand the reasons cited for supporters of apparel style protection 
versus those who accepted design piracy. The purpose is to examine the concept of piracy 
within the historical context of the American ready-to-wear apparel industry. Through an 
analysis of journalistic coverage in trade and popular fashion periodicals, pertinent legal 
records, economic and census data, governmental hearings, archival sources, and the case 
study of the Fashion Originators Guild of America, this research analyzes the 
interrelationships among American access to fashion, the ready-to-wear industry, and design 
piracy. The precise time boundaries of this research are 1910 though 1941. These years 
encompassed the rise of the American ready-to-wear industry and coincided with the 
beginning of the trade publication Women's Wear Daily. The year 1941 marked the end of 
the Fashion Originators Guild of America's program of self-regulation against piracy. 
Protection of women's apparel against piracy was controversial and difficult. First, protection 
of styles against piracy was contradictory to the concept of fashion. Without the social 
process of imitation, the lucrative business of the women's ready-to-wear apparel industry 
could not exist. Second, an objective criterion for determining product originality was 
difficult. These problems were multiplied in the women' ready-to-wear apparel industry 
which placed thousands of different styles in production each season, each conforming to the 
prevailing fashion in varying price and quality levels. While the apparel industry continues to 
debate the rubric of "referencing," the FOGA was an important early case highlighting the 
ethical, economic, and social considerations of a program of industry-wide self-regulation. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The concept of copying or "knocking-off ' another designer's idea was an accepted 
and even institutionalized practice of the apparel industry. Although design piracy was most 
often used to turn high-end designs into less expensive goods, couture designers also copied 
the works of other designers and artists.1 Some in the apparel industry believed that "today's 
knock-off houses provide good value and style," while others suggested the possibility that at 
least some apparel firms producing pirated apparel "fund organized crime and terrorism."2 
Today, many designers aggressively protect elements of their merchandise through 
trademarks or patents, but apparel designs are virtually impossible to protect. Legally, 
designers and manufacturers have had tenuous success in proving their work "original and 
novel" as required by United States (U.S.) patent laws, and copyright laws have not applied 
to apparel. The speed of fashion change, and the apparel industry's reliance on repetition of 
ideas at various price points makes design protection difficult and controversial. 
Individuals within the apparel industry have consistently expressed ambiguity about 
the issue of design piracy. This is illustrated by the vastly different connotations of terms 
used to describe the products of piracy, including knock-offs, adaptations, and copies. In the 
past, some believed there was a clear-cut ethical problem with copying apparel designs, 
1 
"Knock-off' is a common term used in the apparel industry to describe exact or near-exact copies of 
pre-existing garments. The knock-off process is taught in clothing courses and is a component of 
some pattern making textbooks. See for example, Norma R. Hollen and Carolyn M. Kundel, Pattern 
Making by the Flat-Pattern Method (Upper Saddle River N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1993), and Ruth E. 
Clock and Grace I. Kunz, Apparel Manufacturing: Sewn Products Analysis (Upper Saddle River N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 2000), 55. In 1994, a French commercial court ordered Polo/Ralph Lauren to pay 
$383,000 to Yves Saint Laurent for plagiarizing a tuxedo dress design. Teri Agins, "Fashion 
Knockoffs Hit Stores before Originals as Designers Seethe," The New York Times, August 8, 1994, 1. 
2 Agins, 1; Cathy Horyn, "Is Copying Really a Part of the Creative Process?" The New York Times, 
April 9, 2002, 1; Staci Wood, "Buying Knockoffs is a Slippery Slope," USA Weekend, July 27-29, 
2003, 17. 
2 
while others defended the practice as essential in providing fashion to consumers at all 
income levels.3 Historically, retailers, designers and manufacturers all presented arguments 
both for and against measures to control the copying of apparel. These arguments most 
frequently involved tangible and immediate issues about cost and quality of the dresses 
marketed, and less so any ethical issues related to plagiarism. That copying was and is an 
essential component in fashion diffusion was the most frequent justification for design 
piracy. 
While the concept of piracy is an old and even accepted practice, it is a controversial 
tradition. One of the major reasons for, and results of, design piracy was the succession of 
popular garment styles into lower price points. Some within the apparel industry attributed 
the practice of price-lining, offering merchandise at specified prices that reflected differences 
in quality of goods, to piracy.4 Due to technical advancements in the ready-to-wear apparel 
industry, firms were able to reproduce copies of pre-existing garments quickly and 
efficiently. Price-lining resulted in selling similar items at various price points. According to 
some, this resulted in an emphasis on style rather than quality, loss of profits and prestige for 
original clothing designers, a decreased life span of specific styles resulting in increased 
markdowns and economic loss of profit to retailers, and blurred lines of social class 
distinction as distinguishable by dress. Manufacturers, designers, retailers, consumers, and 
3Margaretta Stevenson (ed.), How the Fashion World Works: Fit Yourself for a Fashion Future, 
Addresses given at The Fashion Group's Training Courses (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1938), 6; Helen Everett Meiklejohn, Dresses: Impact of Fashion on a Business (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938), 20. Meiklejohn used class issues to support the practice, 
stating that "the copying of dress styles gives legitimate aid and comfort to the underprivileged." 
4 Price lining also grew out of manufacturer and retailer motivations for clearer distinctions among 
products and fewer variations in products. Price lining was a "rationalizing" tendency reinforced by 
the War Industries Board established during World War I. Jane Farrell-Beck, and Colleen Gau, 
Uplift: The Bra in America (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 66. 
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laborers debated the economic and social implications of equal access to fashion.5 The 
design plagiarism debate within the historical context of the developing American ready-to-
wear industry is important for a broader understanding of the apparel industry, and of 
economic and social life in the early twentieth century. 
This research investigates the economic conditions of the American apparel industry, 
as well as the complex interactions of apparel industry members, trade organizations, and the 
U. S. government, to better understand the reasons cited by supporters of apparel style 
protection versus those who accepted design piracy. The purpose is to examine the concept 
of piracy within the historical context of the American ready-to-wear apparel industry. The 
study of the arguments for and against piracy within the early U.S. ready-to-wear apparel 
industry provides crucial ethical, economic, and social implications relative to protecting 
works of fashion for their originality. 
The history of design piracy in the United States apparel industry has been largely 
overlooked by textile and apparel historians. Many writers have commented on the 
proliferation and prevalence of design piracy in the apparel industry and have mentioned the 
FOGA as a self-help organization in the attempt to control design piracy. Legal scholars have 
examined the government's attitudes regarding piracy from the standpoints of intellectual 
property rights, collective bargaining agreements, and anti-trust legislation. These legal 
commentaries lack, however, the apparel industry's perspective concerning U.S. ready-to-
wear design piracy. The data that informed the research in this dissertation was primarily 
from the industry perspective. The apparel consumer's perspective is most difficult to 
5 William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
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discern, due to a lack of existing evidence. Industry executives often spoke on behalf of 
consumer interests, yet consumer voices are most often missing from these arguments. 
Through an analysis of journalistic coverage in trade and popular fashion periodicals, 
pertinent legal records, economic and census data, governmental hearings, archival sources, 
and the case study of the Fashion Originators Guild of America, this research analyzes the 
interrelationships among American access to fashion, the ready-to-wear industry and trade 
organizations, and design piracy. The precise time boundaries of this research are 1910 
though 1941. These years encompassed the rise of the ready-to-wear industry and coincided 
with the beginning of the trade publication Women's Wear Daily6. The year 1941 marked the 
end of the Fashion Originators Guild of America court case that decided their program of 
industry self-regulation against design piracy was illegal. In addition, numerous trade 
organizations that represented the diverse apparel interests of manufacturers, workers, 
designers, retail establishments, and consumers, in regards to design piracy, formed during 
this period. 
One of the more controversial trade organizations of this period was the Fashion 
Originators Guild of America (FOGA), in existence from 1932 to 1941. A history of the 
FOGA served as an important source and case study in this research. The FOGA was a trade 
association of leading dress manufacturers and retailers who cooperated to eliminate design 
piracy. Although the Guild was highly effective at safeguarding against piracy and at 
establishing other trade regulations, the Federal Trade Commission and the United States 
Supreme Court deemed the group's actions monopolistic. The procedures and strategies of 
6 Women's Wear Daily was originally titled Women's Wear. On January 3, 1927 the name of this 
trade newspaper was changed to Women's Wear Daily. 
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the FOGA were debated and discussed in trade publications, popular press articles, and the 
legal system. These sources provide extensive detail as to the legal, social, and economic 
effects (both positive and negative) of design piracy on manufacturers, retailers, laborers, and 
consumers in the United States. 
Research Questions 
1. What were the interrelationships between design piracy and the developing American 
ready-to-wear industry? 
2. What were the arguments for and against protection of designs and how were they 
mediated by a perceived need for unrestricted access to fashion across all socio-economic 
levels? 
3. What role did the FOGA play in controlling design piracy in the period 1932 to 1941? 
Methods 
To collect, analyze, and interpret the historical data utilized in this research, artifact 
analysis was conducted. Secondary sources directed the search for primary data. The 
primary data was "synthesized into a meaningful pattern of reconstructed truth, an 
interpretation, using both imaginative insight and scholarly objectivity."7 Interpretation as 
proposed by Fleming "focuses on the relation between some fact learned about the artifact 
and some key aspect of our current value system."8 Before the 1940s, design plagiarism and 
the ability of American designers to create original creative fashion was heavily debated, but 
today, design plagiarism in the fashion world seems to be a given and American fashion is 
7 Sandra S. Buckland, "Promoting American Fashion 1940 through 1945: From Understudy to Star" 
(Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1996), 46. 
8 E. McClung Fleming, "Artifact Study: A Proposed Model," Winterthur Portfolio (1974): 153-173. 
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celebrated and valued. An analysis of the data from this pivotal period 1910 to 1941 
demonstrated the values and ideologies of the time. 
This study relied on a comprehensive review of journals, newspapers, trade 
publications, and magazine articles from 1910 to 1941. The New York Times index was 
scanned for articles in The New York Times concerning the FOGA, design piracy, and 
copying of clothing and textiles. The Reader's Guide to Periodicals index was examined for 
pertinent articles in Business Week, Time, Newsweek, and Printer's Ink Monthly. Women's 
Wear Daily was systematically searched and read for mention of design piracy, the topic of 
American fashions for American women, and the FOGA. Legal documentation, including 
the incorporation papers of the FOGA and the docket of FOGA cases argued in the United 
States District Court in southern New York were examined. The twelve briefs of the United 
States Supreme Court case, FOGA v. the Federal Trade Commission were analyzed for 
recurring themes. Governmental reports from the period, including the Working Papers of 
the National Recovery Administration's Division of Review on Design Piracy of 1935 and the 
National Recovery Administration's Hearings on the Codes of Fair Competition for the 
Dress Manufacturing Industry assisted greatly in understanding the arguments both for and 
against design piracy. Editorial issues pertaining to the controversies of design piracy and 
design protection in the 1930s and 1940s in the Journal of the Patent Office Society, the 
Harvard Law Review, and the Journal of Retailing were taken into account in the analysis of 
the arguments for and against design piracy. 
Primary research relating to the FOGA was conducted in museums, archives, 
libraries, and special collections in New York City. Dresses registered with the FOGA were 
found in the Costume Institute of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Costume 
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Collection of the Fashion Institute of Technology. FOGA registered dresses were also found 
at the Fashion Institute of Design and Merchandising, California, The Ohio State University 
Costume and Textiles Collection, Kent State University Museum, Ohio, Cincinnati Art 
Museum, Ohio, The Textile and Fashions Arts of the Museum of Fine Arts, Massachusetts, 
and the Minnesota Historical Society. Memoirs of Maurice Rentner from varying 
perspectives and the sketches submitted for registration with the Guild by the FOGA vice-
president Herbert Sondheim were located in the Special Collections, Gladys Marcus Library, 
Fashion Institute of Technology. A pamphlet published by the FOGA in collaboration with 
the New York Dress Institute was found in the Art Library of the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art. Other information concerning the Guild's procedures was found in the Bergdorf 
Goodman Family Records located in the Special Collections of the Fashion Institute of 
Technology. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter One introduces the topic and 
provides the research questions, methods, organization of the dissertation, and definition of 
terms. Chapter Two reviews literature relevant to the field of research that initiated the study: 
the burgeoning structure of the apparel industry and the development of design piracy within 
the U.S. women's ready-to-wear. Legal and apparel industry perspectives regarding piracy 
are also discussed in chapter two. Chapter Three describes the context for the study, 
specifically a history of the ready-to-wear women's apparel industry in the early twentieth 
century leading up to the beginning of the FOGA and provides ideas as to how the concept of 
American fashions for American women developed. Chapter Four discusses U.S. ready-to-
wear apparel industry arguments concerning piracy and attempts to establish style protection. 
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Chapter Five analyzes the methods of the FOGA to eliminate style piracy, and discusses the 
societal arguments both for and against the protection of apparel designs. Chapter Six 
summarizes the study. 
Definition of Terms 
An interpretation of an already existing garment. Much contested in 
the apparel industry was the point at which an adaptation ceased being 
a copy and became an original garment in and of itself. The 
delineation between an adaptation, a copy, and an original were highly 
subjective. This ambiguity became the crux of the argument 
concerning the acceptability of design piracy. The concept of 
adaptations made protection of styles nearly unenforceable. 
Contractors were paid by apparel manufacturers to complete certain 
tasks of garment assembly. Responsibilities of these "outside shops" 
included sewing garments, pressing, finishing, and shipping garments 
to manufacturers or jobbers according to specifications supplied by the 
manufacturer. Contractors usually had to bid for work from 
manufacturers. They hired and paid for their own labor force. 
Clothing that was made specifically according to a client's wishes. The 
style of custom made clothing was often based on a popular fashion 
trend, but elements of the garment were altered to satisfy a particular 
client's needs and desires. Dressmakers and tailors altered garments to 
accommodate client's aesthetic tastes, body type, color preferences, 
etc. Custom made clothing was more expensive than personal 
production of clothing in ones' home. 
Authorized Copies The French haute couture allowed for some authorized copies of their 
designs. Retailers and manufacturers paid these haute couture houses a 
stipulated sum for the rights of reproduction. An authorized copy was 
an endorsed reproduction of an original design and could be labeled as 
such. 
Copy Copies were unauthorized replications of garments. 
Design During the period 1910 to 1941 the words design and style were often 
used interchangeably. To this day, the word design is difficult to 
define as it has many different connotations and meanings. The word 
design as used in Women's Wear Daily during 1910 to 1941 frequently 
connoted specific elements of garment, such as sleeve type, as well as 
describing a general look or silhouette of a garment. The word design 
Adaptation 
Contractors 
Custom Made 
9 
was also used to describe the process of creating a garment. In this 
dissertation, design is primarily used to describe the above mentioned 
ideas. 
Designer A person who generates ideas for garment styles. 
Fashion An accepted and much-utilized style. Something that is fashionable 
may be beautiful or ugly, new or old. A style does not become 
fashionable until it has popular use and it remains a fashion only so 
long as it is so accepted. Fashion changes create a high rate of 
obsolescence for goods. Fashion is always a collective behavior since 
it means that a particular style has become aesthetically pleasing to 
a large group of people within the society or culture. Fashion both 
maintains order through uniformity because people desire to integrate 
themselves and belong within a society and promotes change because 
individuals' desire differentiation and novelty. Fashionable dress is in 
one sense never flattering to the natural human form since each unique 
body must wear the same style in order to be fashionable, and no one 
style can look equally attractive on a wide variety of bodies. Yet, the 
majority will adopt the fashionable style, which is what makes it 
fashionable, regardless of how flattering that style is to the individual. 
Frequent fashion changes artificially shorten the period during which a 
style prevails.9 
Haute Couture The leading establishments located in Paris, France that created the 
most exclusive fashions for a specific clientele. Haute couture clothing 
was made-to-order specific to an individual, but not necessarily one of 
a kind in terms of style. 
Inside manufacturer Inside manufacturers performed all the operations connected with the 
designing and production of clothing and also supervised the 
distribution and marketing of their merchandise. 
Jobber Jobbers did their own styling or adapted styles to their particular price 
lines as well as cutting the materials for their garments. These cut 
materials were sent out to contract shops where they were sewn and 
then returned to the jobbing firms for distribution. 
Manufacturer A business establishment that creates garments for sale to retailers, 
jobbers, contractors, and sometimes the ultimate consumer. 
9 Paul H. Nystrom, Fashion Merchandising (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1932); Penny Storm, 
Functions of Dress (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987), 287; Paul M. Gregory, "Fashion and 
Monopolistic Competition," The Journal of Political Economy (1948): 69. 
10 
Model 
Mode 
Novelty 
Originals 
A particular style of dress. 
The prevailing fashion. 
According to patent law, a novelty is the quality of being absolutely 
new as compared to all pre-existing things. 10 
The quality of originality as applied to clothing was one of the 
most contested arguments concerning the regulation of design piracy 
in the women's ready-to-wear apparel industry. Those on the forefront 
of fashion created original styles. Some in the industry argued that 
adaptations could be considered originals as long as the adaptations 
were stylistically distinct from the original. A definitive distinction 
between an original style and an adaptation is most subjective and 
remains unclear. 
Ready-to-Wear Ready-mades described clothing produced for mass consumption in 
the early twentieth century. 11 After the 1920s, the term ready-to-wear 
gained more widespread usage to describe clothing bought off of racks 
from retail outlets. As such the term ready-to-wear is used consistently 
throughout this dissertation. 
Retailer A business establishment that purchases goods from the wholesale 
market for resale to the public at higher, retail prices. 
Style During the period 1910 to 1941, the words design and style were often 
used interchangeably. To this day, the word style is very difficult to 
define as it has many different connotations and meanings. The word 
style as used in Women's Wear Daily during 1910 to 1941 frequently 
connoted distinction or superior quality, a general look, a fashion, and 
as a descriptive statement of personality and taste. In this dissertation, 
style is used to describe the above mentioned ideas. The word style is 
also used to describe specific models of dresses. 
Style/design pirate During the period 1910 to 1941, the words design and style pirate were 
often used interchangeably. Style or design pirates were those who did 
not have authorization to copy specific styles yet did so anyway. The 
term style/design pirate is used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
10 John P. Nikonow, "Patent Protection for New Designs of Dresses," Journal of the Patent Office 
Society (1935): 253-4. 
11 Jean L. Parsons, "No Longer a 'Frowsy Drudge' Women's Wardrobe Management: 1880-1930," 
Clothing and Textiles Research Journal 20 (2002): 33-41. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review chapter provides the framework for an analysis of the history of 
design piracy within the United States (U.S.) ready-to-wear women's clothing industry. In 
this section, I discuss the development of the women's ready-to-wear clothing industry and 
the structure of the women's ready-to-wear apparel industry that allowed design piracy to 
develop and flourish. Next, I examine the development of design piracy with a summary of 
the apparel and legal scholarship concerning this topic. 
Development of the Women's Ready-to-Wear Apparel Industry 
The transition from wearing custom-made clothing created by dressmakers and tailors 
to purchasing ready-to-wear garments bought off the rack in retail outlets occurred in uneven 
stages during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Spearheaded by advances in the 
women's corset and undergarment branches, mass manufacturing realized American desires 
for decent fitting, ready-to-wear clothing. During the 1860s, women could purchase corsets 
and loose fitting ready-to-wear cloaks, coats, and mantillas. It was not until the late 19th 
century, however, that changing societal attitudes and technical advancements allowed for 
the production of more closely fitted, feminine ready-to-wear garments such as suits, skirts, 
shirt waists, and gowns.1 The focus of this section is the changes within society that made 
1 Claudia Kidwell and Margaret Christman, Suiting Everyone: The Democratization of Clothing in 
America (Washington: The Smithsonian Institution Press, 1974); Florence S. Richards, The Ready-to-
Wear Industry 1900-1950 (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1951); Jean L. Parsons, "Dressmakers: 
Transitions in the Urban Production of Custom-Made Clothing, 1880-1920" (PhD diss., The 
University of Maryland, 1998); Bernard Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial Development: The 
American Clothing Industry in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries" (PhD diss., Yale University, 
1989),Chapter 3; Blanche Payne, Geital Winakor, and Jane Farrell-Beck, The History of Costume 
(New York: Longman, 1992); Linda Welters and Patricia A. Cunningham, "The Americanization of 
Fashion," Twentieth Century American Fashion (Oxford: Berg, 2005). 
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fashionable clothing available and necessary, and the technical advancements that made 
fashion possible. 
Changes in the Need and Availability of Ready-to-Wear Apparel 
Before the 1860s, for either geographical or economic reasons, clothing consumption 
meant personal production for most American women. "Babies" or dolls dressed in European 
styles and fashion drawings illustrated in magazines such as Graham's, 1826-1857, Godey's 
Lady's Book, 1830-1898, and Peterson's, 1842-1898 informed clothing makers of the latest 
styles. Homemade clothing, created from patterns, or based on existing styles, often did not 
fit well or look good, partly because of the great complexity of the fashionable styles and the 
lack of training and skill of the maker. Wealthier clients could order clothing directly from 
Europe or commission tailors and dressmakers to faithfully copy the fashions. Clients often 
insisted that gowns follow the fashionable silhouette and idea, yet were adapted to the 
particular form and personal characteristics of the individual woman. In large cities there 
were custom businesses that catered to the servant classes. Yet, for the majority of American 
citizens, while custom made clothes were the most fashionable and had the best appearance, 
workmanship, and fit, they were often prohibitively expensive.2 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, ready-to-wear clothing, offered in a variety 
of styles, quantities, and prices, became available in almost all markets. Ready-to-wear 
clothing mass produced by garment manufacturers, transformed clothing "made for 
2 May Allinson, Dressmaking as a Trade for Women in Massachusetts, U.S. Bureau or Labor 
Statistics, Census Bulletin 193 (Washington, D C.: GPO, 1919), 18; Margaret Walsh, "The 
Democratization of Fashion: The Emergence of the Women's Dress Pattern Industry," The Journal of 
American History 66 (1979): 299-313; Jane A.U. Funderburk, "The Development of Women's 
Ready-To-Wear, 1865 to 1914: Based on New York Times Advertisements" (PhD diss., The 
University of Maryland, 1994), Chapter 2; Katherine Cranor, "Homemade Versus Ready-Made 
Clothing," The Journal of Home Economics (1920): 230-233. 
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somebody" to clothing "made for everybody."3 Ready-to-wear apparel followed fashionable 
trends but was non-specific to individual tastes and preferences. The growth of the ready-to-
wear industry exploded in the United States due to increased opportunities for consumption, 
expanding societal roles of women, and the simplification of garment styles. In addition, the 
telephone, the wireless, a transatlantic cable, and the appearance of the first steam lines and 
cruise liners made swifter transmission of ideas and apparel styles possible, intensifying the 
tempo of fashion.4 
Linked to a growing economy and increasing opportunities for consumption, mass 
production in the women's ready-to-wear apparel industry accelerated in the early twentieth 
century. Mass production in women's fashions was a cause as well as an effect of mass 
consumption. Women's roles expanded through increased opportunities for wage-earning 
employment and participation in sports, etc. These roles were celebrated by more ready 
access to shopping, cultural events, and recreation. Shopping rituals changed as department 
stores became centers for display and entertainment, and clothing became available from 
more various and more convenient sources. As opportunities for interaction with high fashion 
images in the form of advertisements and retail shop displays increased, women desired more 
frequent style change and became increasingly interested in fashionable clothing. By 1915, 
women were doing 80 to 85% of the consumer purchasing in the United States.5 
Women of most economic standings needed and were more able to afford fashionable 
clothing during the twentieth century. New responsibilities in manufacturing, clerical, 
3 Kidwell and Christman, Suiting Everyone. 
4 William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1993). 
5 Leonard Drake and Carrie Glaser, Trends in the New York Clothing Industry (New York: Institute of 
Public Administration, 1942), 25. 
academic, administrative, and management positions blurred and broadened the definition of 
women's roles and the concept of the middle class. The disposable income created from the 
influx of women into the public domain fueled the growing demand for women's ready-to-
wear apparel. The newfound roles of young, single, women in the workplace transformed the 
routines associated with the purchasing of clothing. College life, clerical jobs, and careers 
such as teaching and social work required neat, professional and fashionable clothing. With 
increased prosperity, women bought a variety of ready-to-wear dresses for business, travel, 
sports, and formal occasions.6 
Women bought more clothing than before, but they chose simpler, looser fitting 
garments in keeping with the fashionable trend. Awkward, cumbersome styles such as those 
proposed in French haute couture, would impede fulfillment of their new roles in life. 
Attitudes toward time, budget, and fashion influenced the growth, promotion, and acceptance 
of ready-to-wear clothing. Long working hours coupled with greater opportunities to fill 
leisure time such as riding in automobiles, attending movies, or playing sports, meant less 
time to sew. The struggle to make a well-fitted acceptable garment made home sewing even 
less appealing. Active women increasingly wore separate skirts and shirtwaists and one-piece 
dresses, purchased in retail stores rather than wear custom or home-made intricately designed 
dresses. Women of most economic classes simply had more places to go, for which they 
6 See also: Susan Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, and Customers in 
American Department Stores 1890-1940 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Jane Farrell-
Beck, Alyson Rhodes-Murphy, Meredith I. Richardson, "Clothes Hangers: From Business Tool to 
Consumer Convenience, 1852-1936," Clothing and Textiles Research Journal 18 (2000): 9-18; 
Madelyn Shaw, "American Fashion: The Tirocchi Sisters in Context," in From Paris to Providence, 
Fashion, Art and the Tirocchi Dressmakers' Shop, 1915-1947 (Providence, R.I.: Museum of Art, 
Rhode Island School of Design, 2000), 105-132. 
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needed and desired a greater variety of clothing that was comfortable, convenient, practical, 
and in-fashion.7 
Technical Advancements 
Technical advancements that stimulated the growth of women's ready-to-wear 
garment factories included the invention of the sewing machine in 1846, the long cutting 
knife about 1870, which allowed simultaneous cuttings of multiple layers of fabrics, and the 
application of electric power to drive the sewing machine and the knife by machine. Other 
specialized machines mechanized pinking, button-holing, snap-fastening, and other once 
laborious hand-processes.8 
The changed organizational structure of the clothing industry following the Civil War 
further reduced the costs of mass-production. The large demand for ready-to-wear uniforms 
during the Civil War hastened the use of sewing machines and the division of labor to 
accommodate unskilled workers. Learned quickly and performed repetitively, less skilled 
workers completed simple, sub-divided tasks once reserved only for skilled professionals. 
Garments were mass produced on a large volume scale. The early years of the apparel 
industry (especially in the period after 1880) also witnessed a large influx of immigrant 
populations from Eastern Europe. Many of these immigrants entered the clothing business as 
factory workers, allowing for an abundance of cheap and ready labor.9 
Partly due to the technical advancements that allowed for mass-production and the 
relative affordability of production equipment, entry into the apparel manufacturing industry 
7William Leach, "Transformations in a Culture of Consumption: Women and Department Stores, 
1890-1925," The Journal of American History 71 (September 1984): 333; Payne, Winakor, and 
Farrell-Beck, The History of Costume; Jean L. Parsons, "No Longer a 'Frowsy Drudge' Women's 
Wardrobe Management: 1880-1930," Clothing and Textiles Research Journal 20 (2002): 33-41. 
8 Richards, The Ready-to-Wear Industry 1900-1950. 
9 Kidwell and Christman, Suiting Everyone. 
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was easy. Small shops could quickly begin on low capitalization, with few employees. 
Further, the smallness of many shops allowed for flexibility in adoption of fashion changes. 
As women's interest and participation in mass consumption increased, the apparel 
industry promoted the use and importance of fashion. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
manufacturers, particularly in the cloak and suit industry, began to use style changes as a way 
to both compete with each other and to appeal to customers at various income levels. They 
changed styles rapidly and used decorative trims to hide otherwise poor quality fabrics. 
Manufacturers generated sales by offering many garment variations and by changing their 
styles frequently from season to season and even with-in seasons. According to Parsons, 
manufacturers and department stores even manipulated what constituted style change by 
advertising simple changes such as sleeve lengths or placement of trim as being up-to-date.10 
Manufacturers could both adapt prevailing modes into their own variations as well as exactly 
copy the popular styles. Successful styles, quickly copied in the marketplace, stimulated even 
more style variations. The multitude of offerings stimulated constant production and 
consumer demand.11 
A new organizational structure of retail stores catered to consumer demand. Before 
1880 there were small, dry goods firms and neighborhood shops that offered only a limited 
number and variety of items. There were also department stores such as Bon Marche, begun 
in Paris ca. 1850, and Jordan Marsh and John Wannamaker's, ca. 1860. For the most part, 
however, women either purchased their clothing from personal dressmakers or bought fabric 
to create their own garments at home. Department stores flourished after the 1880s and were 
10 Parsons, "No Longer a Frowsy Drudge," 38. 
11 Parsons, "Dressmakers: Transitions in the Urban Production;" Smith, "A Study of Uneven 
Industrial Development." 
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large retail establishments that offered women the choice of purchasing ready-to-wear 
garments, custom-made garments, or a selection of fashion fabrics to be created into 
garments elsewhere. Women had many opportunities to purchase clothing at various price 
points in the department stores; from amount the lowest dollar available to several thousands. 
The New York Times reported in 1930 that this specialization of departments was needed 
because, "the lumping of the various price classes of merchandise into a single section 
caused a class consciousness on the part of customers that was detrimental to sales."12 
Women were encouraged to shop in departments that fit their economic means and social 
status.13 
The custom dressmaking departments in department stores were very competitive 
with individual dressmakers, as these stores were more able to purchase popular Parisian 
designs in the form of muslin patterns and then modify them to specific client tastes. The 
often extravagant haute couture designs were adapted into wearable ideas based on the style 
of the original. Styles were copied from the most elite haute couture into the custom houses 
of the department stores and then into ready-to-wear. The ready-to-wear offerings were often 
adaptations utilizing cheaper materials and less intricate workmanship than the couture 
goods. 
Department store consumers were encouraged to browse, and shopping became a new 
pastime for many women. Manufacturers and retailers increasingly offered a greater diversity 
of products and changed their product offerings often. To make a profit, retail stores relied on 
the rapid turnover of a large volume of merchandise. Manufacturers needed to 
12 
"Separation of Low-Priced Section From Higher Recommended To Increase Retailer's Trade," The 
New York Times, January 12, 1930, 20. 
13 William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture. 
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simultaneously differentiate their goods from all rival brands, as well as distinctly position 
their own brands from previous seasons. Sellers tried to sell products more frequently than 
their rivals by means of carrying the newest styles. With the department store's power to 
generate demand through advertising and special promotions, and the ready-to-wear 
manufacturer's ability to constantly change styles to differentiate their products, the small 
custom producer became less important. The department store became a "palace" of 
consumption for Americans.14 
Structure of the Women's Ready-to-Wear Apparel Industry 
After 1880, the structure of the women's clothing industry became increasingly 
stratified. Before this time, many manufacturers performed the inside operations connected 
with the designing, production, distribution, and marketing of their own merchandise. During 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the need for new styles, and increasing 
competition from small and medium sized firms, required many inside manufacturers to out­
source elements of production. The constant inflow of immigrants, driven by their need for a 
livelihood and willingness to receive low wages, allowed for the growth of sub-
manufacturing apparel producers. 
Increased numbers of manufacturers dealt with independent agents called outside 
shops or contractors to produce a product, or part of a product for a stipulated price. The 
manufacturers supplied clothing designs, piece goods, materials, and credit. The contractor 
rented factory space and machinery, found and hired a labor force, and directed the 
14 Leach, Land of Desire; Judith G. Coffin, "Women's Place and Woman's Work in the Paris 
Clothing Trades" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1985), 60-65; Funderburk, "The Development of 
Women's Ready-To-Wear"; Wendy Camber, "The Female Economy: The Millinery and 
Dressmaking Trades, 1860-1930" (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 1990), Introduction; Kidwell & 
Christman, Suiting Everyone, 135; Parsons, "Dressmakers: Transitions in the Urban." 
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production process. The manufacturer paid the contractor by the piece. The contractor, in 
turn, paid his employees either by piece or time wages, extracting dollar amounts for the 
employees' use of sewing machines, needles, and threads. To make a profit, contractors often 
had to pay their workers less per garment than they themselves received.15 
By the.early twentieth century, some of the larger manufacturers required the services 
of 25-30 contractors to maintain their production levels. To achieve agreements for work, 
contractors bid increasingly lower amounts. For employees, this often meant unsanitary 
working conditions, long hours, and low wages. Work was often seasonal, with high turnover 
of employment as unskilled workers moved from place to place and from job to job. Due to 
the growing strength of union organizations and social outrage about factory conditions, laws 
passed in 1899 deterred contractors from using living quarters for workshops. Contractors 
moved from workshops in the New York East Side tenement districts to regular 
manufacturing sections of the city, concentrated in about a twenty block area along Seventh 
Avenue. The passage of these laws centralized the location of the women's ready-to-wear 
apparel manufacturing business but failed to solve sweat-shop conditions.16 
The stratification and centralization of the apparel industry in New York City meant 
that there was an increasing number of manufacturing interests involved in the creation of 
garments located in a very close geographical area. Contractors were involved in the 
manufacturing of anywhere from 100 to 2000 different styles for a multitude of companies at 
any one time. Sub-manufacturers and subcontractors felt little loyalty to one specific 
company, as they worked for different concerns. Little secrecy existed in the production of 
15 Richards, The Ready-to-Wear Industry. 
16 Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial Development"; Richards, The Ready-to-Wear Industry. 
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clothing since rival firms often hired the same contractors to manufacture their goods. 
Therefore, unauthorized copying of garments, known in the industry as piracy, was rampant. 
Women's Wear Daily regularly reported sightings of peculiarly similar dresses in even the 
most exclusive Fifth Avenue shops such as Henri Bendel and Louise and Co.17 
Rapid Growth 
Between 1889 and 1899, the women's clothing industry grew three times as fast as 
other manufacturing, measured by the number of workers and the value of output. In fact, the 
women's ready-to-wear industry grew at a faster rate than the population. The New York 
ready-to-wear industry expanded in importance, favored by a large supply of largely 
immigrant labor, efficient distribution infrastructure, proximity to other clothing-related 
manufacturing and retailing firms, and the existence of a metropolis with a great 
concentration of wealth. Hotels, theaters, movie and opera houses, concert halls, and other 
recreational and shopping activities encouraged the growth of New York as the natural style 
capital of America. New York's industry grew fastest in the nation and by 1899 the value of 
its manufactured product had risen to 64.5% of the total. This rapid growth continued into the 
twentieth century. From 1900 to 1910 the volume of women's ready-to-wear doubled.18 
At the turn of the century, manufacturers opened women's firms on a shoestring and 
competed effectively with older, well-established firms due to the small amount of capital 
required to operate factories, together with the division of risk offered by the contract system. 
17 A C. Johnston & Florence A. Fitch, Design Piracy: The Problem and Its Treatment Under NRA 
Codes (Washington: Office of N.R.A. Administration, 1936); "Costumes," Women's Wear, 
September 2,1911, 1. 
18 Jessica Daves, Ready-Made Miracle: The American Story of Fashion for the Millions (New York: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), 34; Drake and Glaser, 25. 
Low entry costs plus the growing interest by American women to consume fashion created a 
plethora of manufacturing and merchandising firms. According to one writer, 
New machinery has never been expensive enough to preclude its use by the smallest 
manufacturers. Where, again, the large firm may acquire new machinery or greater 
skill in management, the competitive advantage so earned may be frequently 
overcome by the absurdly low overhead costs of the small firm.19 
Women demanded fashion, and retail stores catered to these desires through constant 
newspaper advertisements of the latest styles. Firms embarking on a career in dress 
manufacturing could be lacking in all of the necessary ingredients for success except one, the 
hope of the employer that the firm could create a popular style or "number" that captured the 
public's imagination. In other manufacturing industries which were less fashion oriented with 
standardized products, capital requirements were much greater. These firms needed to 
maintain large production plants and consistently sought improvements in technical 
efficiencies. In dress manufacturing, however, the prevalence of outside manufacturers 
removed the need for a new firm to invest large sums in plants, equipment, and even 
employees.20 
During the early twentieth century, the number of small and medium size shops 
increased greatly. Firms employing five or fewer employers grew from 9.7% of the total 
number of firms in 1904 to 27.2% of the total in 1919. Firms employing between six and 
twenty workers grew from 33% of the total in 1904 to 42.6% of the total in 1919. Medium 
size shops employing from twenty-one to fifty workers showed increases from 1,143 to 1,649 
shops. The value of output from these shops increased as well. From 1914 to 1919 the value 
19 Leo Wolman as quoted in Drake and Glaser, Trends in the New York, 25. 
20 Simon Larson, "Union Impact on Price in The Dress Industry," (masters thesis, City College, 
1963). 
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of manufactured women's ready-to-wear clothing rose from $473,888,354 to 
$1,208,543,128, a 39% increase, in part due to the mounting scientific exactness of 
production. In 1919, value of the dress industry in the United States was exceeded only by 
the food and the iron and steel manufacturing groups.21 
The growth of the ready-to-wear apparel industry caused the decline of personal 
dressmakers and seamstresses and the creation of ample factory employment opportunities. 
According to the U.S. Census of Occupations the number of non-factory dressmakers and 
seamstresses declined from 498,000 in the year 1900 to 235,000 in 1920 and 158,000 in the 
year 1930. In contrast, U.S. Census of Manufacturing 1919 figures, placed textile and 
clothing manufacturing as the number one employer in the nation. Due to the demand for 
ready-to-wear and the growth in number of small and medium sized firms, the rate of 
expansion in factory employment from 1900 to 1920 was faster than at any other time 
thereafter. By 1923, New York was producing 79.9% of women's clothing; other clothing 
production occurred in other large cities such as Chicago and St. Louis. Of all of the workers 
engaged in manufacturing industries in 1919 in the five boroughs of New York City, nearly 
one in every six was at work on women's clothing.22 
The Emergence of the Dress Industry 
Dresses or one-piece garments sewn from shoulders to hems were a twentieth century 
product. In the 1890s, separate shirtwaist blouses and skirts were often worn with matching 
jackets. As the twentieth century progressed, bodices and skirts were often sewn together at 
21 Valerie Mendes and Amy De La Haye, 20fh Century Fashion (New York: Thames and Hudson, 
1999); Richards, The Ready-to-Wear Industry; The Clothing and Textile Industries in New York and 
Its Environs (New York: Regional Plan Of New York And Its Environs, 1925), 17; U.S. Census of 
Manufactures, 1920: 30 
22 U.S. Census of Manufacturing, 1923. 
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the waistline and were much simpler in cut, decoration, and amount of fabric than previous 
shirtwaist and skirt combinations.23 
Prior to the emergence of rayon from its experimental state to a staple fiber, and the 
enterprising use of cotton as a style fabric, there were basically two dress industries: that of 
silk dresses and that of house or wash dresses.24 The silk dress industry created more 
specialized and ornate garments produced for street apparel whereas the housedress industry 
produced utilitarian garments such as uniforms, aprons, and cotton dresses for use in homes 
and workshops. The silk dress industry produced on a smaller scale, whereas the housedress 
industry sold to retailers in dozen lots rather than as individual garments. In the wash dress 
industry, 
Style was of little importance. Their simple construction and their freedoms from the 
risk of style obsolescence permitted standardization, volume production methods, and 
the spreading of production schedules over relatively long seasons, and made it 
unnecessary to employ skilled labor in their production.25 
In contrast, style was of utmost importance in the silk dress industry and production was 
divided among thousands of small factories using tailoring methods of manufacturing and 
employing a large number of semi-skilled workers. With improvements in the quality of 
rayon in the late twenties and the introduction of new styles in house dresses, prices of house 
dresses overlapped those of the lowest priced silk dresses. Women who once could only 
23 Payne, Winakor, and Farrell-Beck, The History of Costume, 575; Phyllis, J. Tortora, and Keith 
Eubank, Survey of Historic Costume. 
24 In the 1929 Census of Distribution, Products of Manufacturing Industries, the dress industry is 
divided into all cotton, all rayon, all silk, and a category for all other fabrics. Wool is listed under the 
categories of ensembles, suits, separate coats, separate skirts, and coats. 
25 S. Trowbridge, Some Aspects of the Women's Apparel Industry (Division of Review, N.R.A., Work 
Materials No. 44., 1936): 95. 
24 
afford house dresses were now able to afford the more stylish silk dresses, thus blurring 
noticeable class distinctions once made obvious by clothing.26 
Toward the end of the 1920s, economic prosperity which had in part fueled the rise 
of the women's ready-to-wear apparel industry faltered. On October 29, 1929, the stock 
market collapsed, and the United States and Europe (to a lesser degree) sank into the period 
now known as the Great Depression. Although as much as twenty five percent of the 
American work force was unemployed during periods of the Depression, people continued to 
consume goods. The economic problems of the Depression had minimal effect on the growth 
of the dress industry in New York in terms of overall volume. But more high priced than 
lower priced firms went out of business. Shopping habits changed as women of all income 
levels needed to maximize their clothing purchases. This they achieved through comparative 
shopping, evaluating similar clothing styles sold by different stores and purchasing based on 
price in order to get the most for their money.27 
Changes in apparel industry practices solidified the institution of manufacturing in 
precise price lines, as firms specialized in very exact price points, with some selling dresses 
at only one wholesale price. Each manufacturer differed in the quality of labor they 
employed, the technical methods of production they used, and in the markets for their 
merchandise. Dress manufacturers specialized in specific price points for evening wear, 
tailored garments, party frocks, dresses, junior misses dresses, etc. Within each line, 
manufacturers were highly competitive within their own price lines and merchandise 
26 Drake and Glaser, Trends in the New York, 65. 
27 
"Bootleg Fashions," Collier's, October 5, 1929, 21; John Keating, speaking as legal counsel for the 
Code Authority, on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, Hearing on the 
Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 25; Bernard Barber and Lyle Lobel, 
"Fashion in Women's Clothes and the American Social System," Social Forces 31 (1952): 124-131. 
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boundaries. Manufacturers were also able to compete with neighboring price lines. Thus, a 
firm manufacturing dresses to sell at $4.75 wholesale not only competed with other firms in 
the same price line but also with firms specializing in price lines immediately below and 
above the $4.75 line.28 
Mirroring the practices of manufacturing firms, retail stores compartmentalized by 
price and type of merchandise and hired buyers for individual departments. Ready-to-wear 
departments included women's dresses, coats, and suits, sportswear, and junior miss for 
young women, among others. Expensive, medium, and bargain dress departments were 
created. In other words, the buyer for the house-dress department bought exclusively from 
house-dress manufacturers who produced in a specific price point; whereas buyers for the 
junior miss department dealt exclusively with junior miss creators. Price-lining reduced 
confusion and permitted greater assortment of sizes and colors in a more limited number of 
lines.29 
During the Great Depression, thousands of able-bodied, willing workers were 
unemployed. Accustomed to buying ready-to-wear in a variety of price and quality levels, 
women chose to buy less-expensive garments rather than cease buying altogether. Women 
once comfortable paying retail prices of $16.95 for their dresses shopped around for one at 
$10.95, while the $10.95 customer settled for a $6.95 dress. By 1933, the wholesale price of 
79% of all dresses was $4.75 or less. The shift in consumer demands from high priced to low 
28 Daves, Ready-to-Wear Miracle; Drake and Glaser, Trends in the New York; Payne, Winakor, and 
Farrell-Beck, The History of Costume, 575; Phyllis, J. Tortora, and Keith Eubank, Survey of Historic 
Costume, 4th ed. (New York: Fairchild Publications, 2005), 389. 
29 John Keating, speaking as legal counsel for the Code Authority, on November 15, 1934 to the 
National Recovery Administration, Hearing on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress 
Manufacturing Industry, 25; Jane Farrell-Beck, and Colleen Gau, Uplift: The Bra in America 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 87; Grace Kunz, Merchandising: Theory, 
Principles, and Practice (New York: Fairchild Books, 1998). 
26 
priced dresses caused a fundamental shift in the competitive relationship of the dress 
industry. Inexpensive dresses accounted for the majority of the dress industry by 1942. 
According to published records of the U.S. Census of Manufacturers, the average wholesale 
value per dress decreased from $5.39 in 1927 to $5.11 in 1929 to $3.74 in 1931 to $2.60 in 
1933 to $2.95 in 1935 and to $2.62 in 1937.30 
The 50% reduction in ten years from dresses wholesaling at $5.39 to $2.62 was 
caused in part from the decline in cost and quality of dress materials and the sub-contracting 
system that outsourced production. The demand for inexpensive dresses was strong, 
stimulating manufacturers to produce low cost creations. According to a report of the General 
Executive Board of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union in 1932: 
The crisis, within the past three years, has practically revolutionized the main lines of 
dress merchandise to meet a growing demand for cheaper garments. As a result of 
this tendency, the number of firms manufacturing higher grade dresses has 
tremendously decreased, giving way to $3.75 and $6.75 production lines which 
today constitute the bulk of the market's output. In a word the production slogan in 
the New York dress industry has now become not quality but cheapness, and as the 
cost of materials, overhead, and marketing does not vary substantially between firm 
and firm, this rush for cheapness has been carried on principally at the expense of 
labor.31 
Many manufacturers ardently advertised their products on characteristics of price. 
One headline from an 1932 advertisement, stated, "We're Shouting Value" with an 
illustration of evening wraps available at wholesale prices of $10.50. In the copy, the 
manufacturing company Del Opera Wraps declared, wraps "at a price that's going to make it 
30 Drake and Glaser, Trends in the New York, 78. 
31 
"Dress Trade's Growth Brings Union Problem," Women's Wear Daily, May 2 1932, 13. 
very easy for you to do a volume business at a good mark-up." This ad and ones similar to it 
pronounced value rather than quality or workmanship of goods.32 
The tremendous number of firms producing low priced one-piece dresses in the 
1920s was evident in statistical data available from the period (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Number and value of dress establishments, 1929 
Dresses, 1 piece Number of establishments Number of dresses Value 
Made to retail for: 
Under $1 108 22,865,972 $14,238,961 
$1 to 1.99 254 35,785,413 $35,903,510 
$2 to 2.99 272 15,907,909 $26,501,877 
$3 to 4.99 230 14,190,180 $44,017,184 
$5 to 9.99 497 34,534,628 $187,131,190 
$10 to 24.99 812 31,212,384 $323,167,367 
$25 and over 511 8,340,375 $192,311,325 
Source: U.S. Census Office. Fifteenth Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States Taken in the 
Year 1929, Distribution (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1932), 23. 
This table illustrates the number of garments produced by the lower priced firms; the 108 
establishments producing goods made to retail under $1 produced 211,721 garments per firm 
whereas the 511 establishments producing goods made to retail for $25 and over produced 
only 16,321 garments per firm. While the value of output is highest in the $10 to $24.99 price 
range, these dresses sold at retail for more money than their lower priced counter-parts. 
According to Drake and Glaser, statistics showing the distribution of dress production 
by price most clearly reveal the expansion of the low price dress industry. Census data from 
1929, 1931, and 1937 detail the total output and total wholesale value of dresses for dresses 
made to retail under $2 and those made to retail at or over $2 (Table 2.2). 
32 
"We're Shouting Value," Women's Wear Daily, November 1, 1932, 9. 
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Table 2.2 Number and value of dress production, 1929, 1931, 1937 
Number of dresses produced Wholesale value of dresses 
Year Under $2 (retail) Over $2 (retail) Under $2 Over $2 
1929 35.8% 64.2% 6.0% 94.0% 
1931 40.2% 59.8% 8.1% 91.9% 
1937 54.6% 45.44% 17.4% 82.6% 
Source: Leonard Drake and Carrie Glaser, Trends in the New York Clothing Industry (New York: 
Institute of Public Administration, 1942): 81. 
The physical output of dresses made to retail under $2 increased from slightly more than one-
third of the total production of dresses in 1929 to more than one-half in 1937. Measured by 
its wholesale value, the relative importance of this low price group grew from 6% to more 
than 17% between 1929 and 1937. Related evidence from the National Credit Office 
indicated that sales of dresses in the wholesale price range $3.75 and below increased from 
17.2% of the total sales of dresses in 1931 to 28.6% in 1936.33 
The paring down of profits per unit due to contracting, coupled with the fact that 
fewer units were sold, led to a stampede of bankruptcies. Firms continuously went into and 
out of business. Executives who had found the women's wear industry easy to enter made 
their exits more precipitously. Studies undertaken by the New York Dress Joint Board of the 
Dress and Waist Makers Union revealed that "Of the 1,687 [manufacturing] dress firms 
reported doing business in Manhattan in the spring of 1925, fully 1,411, or 83.6% of the 
original number had discontinued business by the spring of 1933."34 Insolvency rates of 
apparel firms during the 1932-1933 year were 12%, compared with an average of 2.9% in the 
semi-durable industries, and 1.8% in durable groups. Other sources indicated that 
33 Ibid., 81; Recent trends in important manufacturing industries in New York (New York: Division of 
State Planning, 1941). 
34 Lazare Tepere, The Woman 's Garment Industry, an Economic Analysis (New York: Educational 
Department of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 1937), 18. 
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customarily about 20% of apparel firms went out of business annually, and that this 
percentage doubled in 1932.35 
Importance of Style and Fashion Change 
By 1910, every article of women's clothing could be purchased ready-to-wear, off of 
retail store racks. Style changes increased in frequency, and style variety grew in extent in 
the 20th century. The apparel industry utilized mass media to encourage consumers to 
respond to new styles and advertisers began to emphasize fashion as the most important 
motive to purchase a product rather than reasons of health or durability.36 Fashion stimulated 
sales by encouraging obsolescence and premature replacement of goods. Women's Wear 
Daily noted: 
This feature of the business is a radical departure from the old time system of turning 
out good, staple styles in quantities, when the idea of "dressing in uniform" as it is 
now called, was not regarded as objectionable, but contrarily, the more one saw of 
any special style and color, the more fashionable it was considered.37 
An atmosphere was created wherein a woman would almost rather be "caught dead" 
than wear last year's style or gaze on another woman wearing the same dress.38 Obsolescence 
set in, not because a product became worn or unusable, but because it was out of date; it was 
no longer fashionable. The public compulsion for continual style creativity, evinced by the 
number of styles introduced each season by various manufacturers, was encouraged by the 
ready-to-wear apparel industry. Rapid obsolescence was a means for increasing consumer 
demand and expanding sales, and enabled firms an equal opportunity to create successful 
35 Richards, The Ready-to-Wear Industry. 
36 James D. Norris, Advertising and the Transformation of American Society, 1856-1920 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990): 104; Parsons, "No Longer a 'Frowsy Drudge,' 42; Shaw, "American 
Fashion: The Tirocchi sisters in context." 
37 Women's Wear, November 30, 1910. 
38 Weare Holbrook and Frank Fogarty, "Clarence," The New York Herald Tribune, January 20, 1935. 
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sellers and achieve maximum profits. Even if a woman sought to purchase outdated styles, 
manufacturers and retailers only produced and stocked salable fashionable goods.39 
As the desire to keep up with changing styles began to increase, a philosophy evolved 
that quality was less important than stylishness. While consumers of haute couture and 
custom-mades stressed quality of goods and personalization of their relation with the 
producer, ready-to-wear consumers seemed more interested in following the every whim of 
fashion produced in prices they could afford. In the National Recovery Administration's 
Hearing on the Codes of the Dress Industry in 1934, John Keating, legal counsel for the 
Dress Code Authority, believed that by 1934 one-tenth of all dresses manufactured in the 
United States could clothe the American people. The abundance and proliferation of 
changing styles, however, caused American women to desire and purchase a multitude of 
dresses, which the fashion industry made available with great abundance.40 Further, women 
desired a variety of dresses and sought quantity, rather than purchasing one or two good 
quality, expensive dresses wearable for a number of years. In the U.S. Supreme Court case 
decision of FOGA vs FTC, Judge Black expressed the importance of fashion over all other 
characteristics of a garment. 
Women do not buy hats, they buy fashions. They most certainly do not protect the 
wearer against rain or snow or cold. Virtually their sole function is to make the 
wearer happy in the thought that she has a beautiful thing which is in fashion. No 
matter how beautiful, if not in fashion the hat will not sell. A woman buys fashion, 
not goods.41 
39 Paul M. Gregory, "Fashion and Monopolistic Competition;" Larson, "Union Impact on Price," 
Chapter 1. 
40 The N.R.A. hearing will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4: The Fashion Originators Guild 
of America. John Keating, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery 
Administration, Hearing on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 21. 
41 
"FOGA was Self-Appointed Tribunal, High Court Finds," Women's Wear Daily, March 4, 1941, 1. 
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The increasing importance of style changes throughout the twentieth century had a 
strong influence on the operation of the clothing industry. Success was not entirely 
determined by the quality of production or by the costs of production. Profits and longevity 
of firms in the dress industry were to a large extent due to success in styling and luck in 
selling. Despite early importance of technology in industry growth, speed of fashion change 
was more important than advanced technical know-how. Constant fashion change 
necessitated hand-to-mouth buying of materials, small-lot production, excessive mark-downs 
of unfashionable goods, and intensified the seasonality of production. These changes often 
artificially raised product prices and lowered labor wages.42 
Fluctuations in fashion were so great and occurred so quickly that manufacturers and 
retailers were reluctant to assume the risk of purchasing materials, trimmings, and stock long 
in advance of actual production or the start of a season. Due to this, on average, the 
manufacturing workshops, as distinct from the designing rooms, were busy only 30-32 full 
weeks of the year. The ability to concentrate so much of the year's business into short 
periods made possible the existence of many firms because there were ample opportunities to 
enter and exit the industry. Firms needed only to carry small stocks since the popular style 
changed so quickly. Success in marketing clothing, especially some styles of women's 
clothing, had become so speculative as to be "compared to playing the stock market."43 To 
the dress manufacturer, production was secondary to styling and merchandising. But if two 
firms had equally attractive styles, the firm willing to sell at the lowest prices would do a 
42 
"Why do Women Disregard Standards of Value to Follow Style?" Women's Wear, February 3, 
1919, 40; Paul M. Paul M. Gregory, "Fashion and Monopolistic Competition," The Journal of 
Political Economy (1948): 74. 
43 The Clothing and Textile Industries in New York and its Environs, 19. 
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greater amount of business, and under these circumstances the determining factor was likely 
to be cost of production.44 
The towering importance of style in the dress industry was incalculable. Fashion 
commentator Helen E. Meiklejohn stated style was the very essence of the industry, 
determining geographical concentration, the structural scheme of the jobber-contractor 
arrangements, the size and amount of production, conditions in the workroom, and rate and 
terms of employment. This author further stated, 
Style is largely responsible for the high rate of business mortality... It presides over 
merchandising practices and creates a market with laws all its own; it is not without 
significance in shaping the character of trade association and labor union. Finally, 
style, like a magnet, exercises a selective influence on those who enter the industry.45 
The importance of style was thought to negatively affect the quality of garment 
production. Because of this, in 1919 the need for a "Clothes Administration" to do similar 
work to that of Food Administration was stated in the trade press. Some believed rapidly 
changing styles "impeded rational choice" by taking women's minds off of price, quality of 
materials, and workmanship. These authors contended rapid style changes encouraged 
wasteful buying for the simple reason that last season's clothing were discarded after mere 
months never to be worn again.46 Consumer dependence on style change allowed producers 
of goods to sell inferior goods at exorbitant prices since each season's offerings were touted 
as new and different. But were they truly new? In the women's ready-to-wear apparel 
industry, the creation and advertising of new styles more often changed the mind of the buyer 
rather than offering significant style changes, making her dissatisfied with her existing 
44 Paul M. Gregory, "Fashion and Monopolistic Competition," Larson, "Union Impact on Price," 
Chapter 1. 
45 Helen E. Meiklejohn, Dresses: Impact of Fashion on a Business (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc., 1938). 
46 Paul M. Gregory, "Fashion and Monopolistic Competition," 70. 
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clothes.47 Fashion writer Elizabeth Hawes expressed the irony of yearning for new items, 
differentiated from past offerings only in the smallest detail in the following quote. 
All the filling in is done on the same basic patterns...It is the proud boast of some 
wholesalers that they make up a whole line with only three dress patterns. The 
newness, so loudly called for, is new trimming, new collars and cuffs, new glass 
buttons, new flowers, and all of this, not too new, please.48 
As the importance of style replaced quality and workmanship with the rise of the ready-to-
wear industry, women no longer desired apparel that would withstand the test of time. 
Instead, many preferred to purchase less expensive garments, in inferior materials, as long as 
the garments were fashionable. Perhaps exaggerating the importance of style to twentieth 
century women, a writer for Women's Wear stated "today's woman almost does not care if 
the dress is put together with pins. If it gives her the fashionable appearance she is 
satisfied."49 
Originals and Adaptations 
Fashion as a device to encourage obsolescence of goods meant that at any one time 
there were a great variety and multiplicity of styles. To create these styles, designers and 
manufacturers followed the general tendencies and ideas occurring in their society in 
movements of art, architecture, politics, high-society life, and by studying cultures and 
civilizations of the past and present. Culled from the same sources, styles frequently followed 
a general idea. In the 1920s, for instance, the fashionable style included decorative effects 
imitative of Russian peasant motifs or Egyptian inspired designs.50 
47 Ibid., 75. 
48 Elizabeth Hawes, Fashion is Spinach (New York: Random House, 1938), 108-9. 
49 Women's Wear, August 10, 1910. 
50 Payne, Winakor, and Farrell-Beck, The History of Costume, 573. 
When a particular arrangement of elements in a style caught the public's imagination, 
other designers and manufacturing interests would imitate the garments. Some manufacturers 
would change minor details such as color, pattern, and use or type of trimmings. Other 
manufacturers would copy the garments in exacting detail substituting the more invisible 
elements such as fiber type or quality of materials. Manufacturers copied exactly or made 
minor changes to more closely approximate their target markets' price range. They copied or 
adapted to save money on hiring their own designers as well as avoiding possible financial 
losses incurred from product failures. Nearly all price ranges in the apparel industry 
adapted/copied, especially since there were few visual differences between copies and the 
originals to the inexperienced eye.51 
Different interests classified garments as adaptations, copies, or originals. Because of 
the tenuous differentiation between these classifications, one of the more controversial issues 
argued in the trade press during the period 1910 to 1941 was at which point adaptations 
ceased being copies and became original creations. In accounts of Women's Wear Daily, the 
NIRA hearings of 1934, and in the FOGA v. FTC Supreme Court case, the various 
definitions of the terms adaptations, copies, and originals were regularly discussed. Some 
within the apparel industry classified all garment styles as originals claiming each garment 
uniquely combined diverse elements into new creations. Others believed garments that 
followed the lines and silhouettes of popular styles were adaptations as they each reflected 
the prevailing fashion yet were stylistically unique in some minor way. Others within the 
51 Jessie Stuart, The American Fashion Industry (Boston: Simmons College, 1951), 28; Parsons, "No 
Longer;" Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. (1941). 
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apparel industry argued most garments were copies since they contained changes so small as 
to be nearly invisible. 
Manufacturers regularly advertised their goods as originals, adaptations, or copies 
depending on their meaning of the words and the ideas the manufacturers wished to convey 
to consumers. In an ad from 1919, Maurice Rentner, advertised his company's goods as "in 
distinctly, original adaptations" of various fabric names and garment styles such as "kitten's 
ear crepe," "satin-madelon," and "paullette chiffon," etc (Figure 2.1). Through this ad, M&H 
Rentner is proclaiming that their creations are original garments adapted from or inspired by 
prevailing fashions or fabric ideas. The truthfulness of originality of their garment styling is 
difficult if not impossible to verify. 
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Figure 2.1 M&H Rentner advertisement. 
Source: "Falltime's Silhouettes," Women's Wear Daily, June 24, 1919, 21. 
Many within the apparel industry wrestled with the suggestion of "original" designs, 
believing all garments to be imitative adaptations. Writers such as M.D.C. Crawford 
contemplated whether any styles were truly original, since pre-existing ideas, styles, and 
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trends were the basis for all garments.52 Many in the apparel industry confessed that past 
creations were the inspiration for their garments. However, the crux of the piracy issue would 
be at what point adaptations became direct copies. It was generally agreed that adaptations 
were acceptable, and a normal aspect of fashion circulation. Maurice Rentner, chairman of 
the FOGA argued that likenesses of a certain style or "derivation through inspiration" were 
acceptable as long as manufacturers did not present "only insignificant changes in detail."53 
The assessment of whether a garment was an adaptation or copy was highly subjective and 
most unclear. Rentner himself conceded that the argument concerned "a conflict of 
individual interest."54 An exact definition of an original design remained ambiguous. 
Undoubtedly, many consumers assessed garments of similar style as nearly identical and 
purchased based on price considerations rather than exacting evaluations of minute style 
variations. It was for this reason that some within the apparel industry sought to protect their 
"original" designs from all manners of adaptations and copies. 
Fashion, Class, and Social Status 
In the following section, I discuss theories regarding dress and fashion as status 
symbols. I particularly contextualize these theories in relation to the structure and 
characteristics of the early twentieth century women's apparel industry. Social differentiation 
and stratification, also known as status, or social position, is a relative value placed by a 
society on a role or group of roles. Roles define the individual in his or her society by 
describing the special tasks or functions he or she has in that society. Ascribed roles are 
52 M.D.C. Crawford, "We Need Interpretive Creation-Not Copying," Women's Wear, June 28, 1919, 
3. 
53 Maurice Rentner, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, 
Hearing on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 113. 
54 Ibid. 
38 
conferred upon birth; sex, nationality, and age. Achieved roles are gained through choice and 
decision; career, marriage, or avocation. Within societies, individuals order themselves and 
others on a superiority-inferiority scale with respect to the comparative degree to which they 
possess or embody socially approved or desired attributes or characteristics. This hierarchical 
positioning identifies one with others in a social position and serves to differentiate from 
others especially in lower status groups due to the degree to which certain characteristics are 
embodied. Visual signs and symbols of class make manifest placement and belonging to a 
particular status group. 
One of the most obvious signs and symbols of class distinction is clothing. Clothing 
can facilitate the assumption of a role both by aiding the individual's actual performance and 
by persuading others that he or she belongs in the role. The use of clothing is a common way 
to demonstrate one's roles and therefore status. Clothing is a universal cue to status; it is a 
status symbol. Of all of the various functions of clothing, including modesty, protection, and 
beautification, comparative anthropological studies suggests that status display is the most 
universal.55 
Dress and Fashion as Status Symbols in Open Class Systems 
Societies with open class systems are considerably more advantageous to the 
promotion of fashion. Characteristics of open class systems include mobility within and 
between classes, openness for change, and greater distribution of economic resources 
throughout the population. Twentieth century American life was representative of an open 
55 Penny Storm, Functions of Dress, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987); P.M. Keesing, Cultural 
Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rienhart, & Winston, 1958: 202-4; Emile Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, 
Status Types, and Status Interrelations" American Sociological Review 9 (1944): 151-161; Gideon 
Sjoberg, "Are Social Classes Becoming More Rigid?" American Sociological Review 16 (1951): 775-
783. 
class system. Based largely on materialistic gain, the American open class system judged 
individuals primarily on their ability to control their economic resources, their ability to 
consume, and their purchasing power. The power of clothing to represent status was strong in 
this open class system characterized by the opportunity and desire to achieve wealth, great 
and abundant economic resources, a growing economy, the expanding social roles of women, 
increased opportunities for consumption, and the maturation of mass marketing. Twentieth 
century Americans equated consumption with social class perhaps because of the perceived 
relationship between consumption and wealth or income; wealth or income with occupational 
position; occupational status with social class; and thus, consumption with social class56 
Theories of Fashion Diffusion 
Veblen (1934) wrote extensively about the demonstration of social class and the 
emulation of status through the display of ornaments and clothing. Veblen's theory of 
conspicuous consumption or competitive emulation stated that individuals copied those of 
higher status whom they wished to imitate and that clothing primarily functioned to show the 
social status of the wearer. Demonstrating Veblen's theory of competitive emulation, the 
purchasing of ready-to-wear clothing allowed women the occasion to display their social 
status, aspire to higher status levels, or give the appearance of higher status. The class-
symbolic functions of women's dress were extolled in fashion magazines of the period with 
headlines such as "If at first you don't succeed, change the way you dress." Clothing was one 
way in which individuals could climb the ladder to success both personally and financially. 
56 Melanie Archer, and Judith R. Blau, "Class Formation in Nineteenth Century America: The Case of 
the Middle Class," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 17-41. 
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To improve their appearances and likelihood of success in both love and work women were 
encouraged to adopt fashionable clothing.57 
With increased technical advancements, in textiles especially, that made expensive 
originals and cheaper reproductions more similar, fashions diffused to all economic classes. 
According to the trickle-down theory of fashion diffusion, when the highest classes adopted a 
fashion, the classes below, wanting to move up or even to appear already moved up, 
proceeded to adopt the new fashion. The fashion continued a downward adoption through the 
classes until it reached the lowest class economically able to afford the style variation offered 
to them, usually made with less desirable materials and poorer workmanship. By the time the 
lowest price ranges adapted and modified the style, the upper ranges changed their styles to 
differentiate from those they considered inferior. The adoption by the highest classes of a 
new fashion, making obsolete the older style, made the cycle begin again. In the 
dissemination of fashion, innovators first created the newest styles, leaders implemented the 
style into their lifestyles, and followers embraced and popularized the style into a fashion. By 
its very nature, the concept of fashion created a similarity of styles. In order for a garment to 
be "in fashion" a critical mass of people needed to adopt it and that meant the trickling down 
of at least some styles.58 
In nineteenth century America, fashion more successfully demarcated class 
distinctions. Although lower classes sought to maintain fashionable appearances, high 
fashion items were somewhat restricted to the upper classes who could afford the trims, 
57 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Random House, 1934); Ladies 
Home Journal, November 1934, 32; Mademoiselle, July 1939, 71. 
58 Storm, Functions of Dress; Phyllis J. Tortora, and Keith Eubank, Survey of Historic Costume, 4th 
ed. (New York: Fairchild Publications, 2005), 467; Georg Simmel, "Fashion," International 
Quarterly (1904): 130-155. 
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flounces, and fine fabrics that distinguished the elite from the lower classes.59 As the 
twentieth century progressed, however, a number of factors equalized fashion among the 
classes. Styles were simpler with fewer decorative effects and less fabric, making them easier 
to imitate. Standardization of products, a necessary facet of mass production, limited the 
degree of status differentiation through clothing. Equitable distributions of goods enabled a 
degree of material equality. Individuals craved symbols of upper class membership; yet, 
demarcations between the classes were less severe. According to Barber and Lobel writing in 
1952, the delineation between adjacent social classes was vague in the United States. They 
stated, 
The American class system is a finely-graded continuum of strata rather than a series 
of sharply separated ranks with little mobility between them. The result of this kind of 
class structure, in combination with American egalitarian values, has the possibility 
of asserting the equality and similarity of everyone in the society, despite the actual 
class differences which exist.60 
The preceding quote is not to say, however, that all Americans enjoyed the vagueness of 
class distinctions. Throughout time and in various cultures, sumptuary laws prevented 
imitation of higher classes by limiting the adoption of specified items by lower classes. In 
twentieth century American life, however, no such sumptuary laws existed, and as the upper 
class reduced its proportionate share of consumer power and the middle class raised its 
portion, it became increasingly difficult for the upper class to prevent imitation. The elite 
were less able to afford garments too costly for the rising business person to copy and less 
able to enact and enforce laws to limit the behavior of an increasingly powerful middle class. 
59 Joan Severa, Dressed for the Photographer: Ordinary Americans and Fashion, 1840-1900 (Ohio: 
Kent State University Press, 1995). 
60 Paul Blumberg, "The Decline and Fall of the Status Symbol: Some Thoughts on Status in a Post 
Industrial Society," Social Problems 21 (1974): 480-98; Bernard Barber and Lyle Lobel, "Fashion in 
Women's Clothes and the American Social System," Social Forces 31 (1952): 124. 
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They resorted to frequent, and often major, fashion changes to demonstrate their 
superiority.61 Further, the apparel industry itself had become a major style change force by 
the twentieth century, making style change a constant characteristic of the apparel industry, 
and thus consumption habits. 
The Inherent Similarity of Fashion 
Individuals desire to be unique and concurrently fit into a specific group. Fashionable 
dress allowed one to concomitantly conform to a group while safely differentiating oneself. 
There was a wide enough range of fashionable dress to effectively express oneself as a 
unique individual through color choice, textures, and the choosing of accessories. Yet, even 
these attempts at differentiation were somewhat limited by the available choices. Fashion 
enhanced one's freedom to differentiate by choosing clothes that expressed individual tastes 
while also limited it by forcing one to stay within the limits of the alternatives of fashionable 
dress. Merchants did not typically carry unfashionable goods, further restricting free 
consumer choice. Fashion limited the genuine variety available to consumers and at the same 
time contributed to building shared experiences and taste as people were restricted to 
purchasing particular types of clothing.62 
Although styles changed rapidly in the twentieth century, the very concept of fashion 
encouraged women to dress in similar manner. In order to become a fashion, styles needed to 
be copied and much imitated. Improvements in the technical proficiency and the rapid 
adoption of ready-to-wear apparel created clothing with "gross similarity and subtle 
61 Desmond Morris, The Human Zoo (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969); Storm, Functions of Dress. 
62 Storm, Functions of Dress; Elizabeth Hurlock, Psychology of Dress (New York: Amo Press, 1976); 
Herbert Blumer, "Fashion Movements," From Collective Behavior: An Outline of the Principles of 
Sociology, ed. Robert Ezra Park (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1939). 
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differences in fashion."63 Even when style variations were numerous, only a few garment 
styles would be truly fashionable. This idea is supported by a 1930 estimate that, of the . 
thousands of models presented by the Parisian haute couture in one season, only twenty were 
copied by U.S. manufacturers in all price ranges.64 
Scholars have stated that stylistic similarities in fashion of the early twentieth century 
were in part due to the consolidation of the middle class and its culture of consumption. 
Leach described the availability of fashion to consumers of all economic levels as a key 
feature of the success of early department stores. According to Kidwell and Christman, the 
vast availability of ready-to-wear clothing in the early twentieth century was the primary 
reason for the democratization of clothing. Madelyn Shaw commented that, in the twentieth 
century, social class was much more fluid in the United States than in Europe. She continued 
to state, that while there was a clearly demarcated leisured society in the United States that 
showed their wealth through possessions, there was also a need for stylish apparel among the 
countless middle class women who worked outside of the home.65 Women were more able to 
afford and had more opportunities for participation in the following of fashion. 
Style and Design Piracy 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of the women's clothing trade during the 
early 20th century was the ease and rapidity with which rival firms copied the innovative 
product designs of the leading firms. Successful styles in high price markets were quickly 
63 Paul H. Nystrom, Fashion Merchandising (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1932); Paul H. 
Nystrom, Economics of Fashion (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1928; Bernard Barber and Lyle 
Lobel, "Fashion in Women's Clothes and the American Social System." 
64 Paul M. Gregory, "Fashion and Monopolistic Competition," The Journal of Political Economy 
(1948): 71; 
65 Leach, Land of Desire; Kidwell & Christman, Suiting Everyone; Shaw, "American Fashion: The 
Tirocchi Sisters in Context." 
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copied by close competitors. Firms producing for the mid- and low-priced markets copied 
and adapted the designs, cuts, materials, and accessories to supply their lower income 
customers. Designs developed by the most exclusive custom tailors and dressmakers were 
copied in sequence by jobbers and high grade ready-to-wear manufacturers, smaller firms 
working on tighter economic margins and economies of scales, and ultimately by the smallest 
and most marginal contractors and sweatshops. 
Design piracy affected the structure and conduct of the women's clothing industry. 
The price of a successful new product quickly declined as competitors introduced imitations. 
Flooding the market with inexpensive reproductions often devalued high grade products 
below their cost of production because copies were more affordable to the majority of 
consumers and bought more readily than the more expensive originals. Design piracy 
induced the leading firms to continually develop new styles to stay ahead of their competitors 
in the high grade market and to distinguish themselves from the imitators in the lower priced 
lines. Throughout the season new designs were introduced and old designs were altered, 
fixed, and retouched. Design piracy precluded leading firms from advertising or disclosing 
complete and timely information about their new product lines to the general public, the trade 
papers, and the retailers. Moreover, design piracy exacerbated the risks of managing 
inventories. Retailers were cautious in their orders of new and expensive apparel because 
they feared that cheap imitations would quickly appear on their competitors' shelves.66 
66 Julius H. Cohen, Law and Order in Industry: Five Years Experience (New York: Fairchild 
Publications, 1970), 87-88; Lewis Levine, The Women's Garment Workers: A History of the 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1924), 406-407; Smith, "A 
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The history of design piracy in the United States apparel industry has been largely 
overlooked by textile and apparel historians. Many writers have commented on the 
proliferation and prevalence of design piracy in the apparel industry and have mentioned the 
FOGA as a self-help organization in the attempt to control design piracy. Legal scholars have 
examined the government's attitudes regarding piracy from the standpoints of intellectual 
property rights, collective bargaining agreements, and anti-trust legislation. These legal 
commentaries lack, however, the apparel industry's and the apparel consumer's perspective 
concerning U.S. ready-to-wear design piracy. 
Style and Design Piracy from the U.S. Apparel Industry Perspective 
Very little research concerning design piracy from the perspective of the U.S. apparel 
industry has been published. Scholars have examined attempts by the French haute couture, 
or elite fashion creators, to regulate the copying of their goods. Other scholars have touched 
upon the U.S. apparel industry's attempts to create original fashions, not dependent upon 
Parisian models or on specific court cases regarding trademark infringements.67 
Addressing the relationship between fashion and the Parisian apparel industry in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Nancy Green suggested couturiers struggled with the 
desire to produce haute couture custom goods and the economic need to prepare ready-to-
wear clothing. According to Green, highly skilled tailors in the late nineteenth century 
defended their work by identifying their mode of production with art and relegating ready-to-
wear to artless, industrial production. As the ready-to-wear industry grew in economic power 
and developed in most of the late nineteenth century industrialized societies, French 
67 Nancy Green, "Art and Industry: The Language of Modernization in the Production of Fashion," 
French Historical Studies 18 (1994): 722-748; Nancy Troy, Couture Culture: A Study in Modern Art 
and Fashion (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003), 284. 
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hegemony in the fashion business was challenged. Confronting the debate between the 
unique and the reproducible, French industrialists began to admit that elegance was no longer 
enough to ensure sufficient sales. Green stated that self-criticism and a call for modernization 
and industrialization by certain industry and governmental spokes-people were aimed at the 
French audience in order to stimulate greater productivity and maintain competitiveness. 
While many believed the French to control all things elegant, and commented on the 
"uniformization" of Americans, the French had long adapted exports to United States sizing, 
commercial techniques, and even "style."68 
Troy discussed concepts of originality and reproduction, relevant to Parisian artists 
and designers of the early twentieth century, who attempted to protect and prolong their 
fashion dominance. The issues surrounding copying and copyright by the French couturiers 
were "matters of great concern because they raised crucial questions involving the legally 
and culturally constructed relationship between art and industry." Related to apparel design, 
Troy analyzed the history of the Syndicat de Defense de la Grande Couture Françoise et des 
Industries. This was a group of leading Parisian designers that sought to protect the top 
echelon of couture houses from piracy by U.S. manufacturers, retailers, and buyers. Through 
an examination of newspaper and trade publications, she stated that the French couturiers 
found themselves in a web of contradictions as they attempted to prevent copying on the one 
hand and sought to exploit the practice of copying by licensing designs, in an attempt to 
control their reproduction and circulation. Faced with uncontrolled and often illegal or 
unauthorized copying of unique models, designers were forced to prohibit or try to limit mass 
68 Farrell Beck & Gau, Uplift; Nancy Green, "Art and Industry: The Language of Modernization in 
the Production of Fashion," 722-748. 
production in order to protect their businesses. Troy found that the initial strength of the 
Syndicate to protect designs during World War I was illustrative of how important the 
couture industry was to France, and how issues of copying and protecting apparel designs 
were complicated on many levels.69 
Scholarly examinations of U.S. notions of originality are fairly recent. Schorman 
noted promotion of individuality and customized fashion habits by magazines such as Vogue 
and Ladies Home Journal as something of a contradiction in terms because their "exclusive" 
designs simultaneously passed through the hands of thousands of readers. Schorman stated 
that through advertising copy in fashion magazines and mail order catalogs, mass production 
and distribution incorporated terms of exclusivity and the emphasis upon custom work. He 
discussed questions of national identity with the influx of East European Americans to 
America, particularly during the Spanish American War of 1898.70 
Milbank provided a brief sketch of copying in the United States apparel industry.71 
She stated that U.S. designers and manufacturers in the 1920s had yet to learn the art of self-
promotion and copied or claimed to copy Parisian styles. Although New York based 
magazines occasionally gave credit to local couturiers, they never mentioned ready-to-wear 
designers. American women in the 1930s could buy the actual designer originals, the store-
made exact copies (using the same fabrics and notions as the originals); blatant copies that 
did not begin to duplicate the original quality, and adaptations, or similar styles with slightly 
69 Troy, Couture Culture: A Study in Modern Art and Fashion, 284. 
70 Rob Schorman, Selling Style (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
71 Caroline Rennolds Milbank, New York Fashion: The Evolution of American Style (New York: 
Harry N. Abrams, 1989). 
48 
changed details. Milbank stated that as the 1930s progressed, clothes designed by Americans 
for Americans began to fill the gaps between the Paris major and midseason collections. 
Milbank identified the 1930s as the formative years that helped establish New York's 
wartime reputation as the fashion capital of the world. Fashion design was promoted in the 
1930s through the work of Dorothy Shaver at Lord & Taylor and design exhibits at the 
Chicago World's Fair in 1933, and the New York World's Fair in 1939. Other historians 
have argued that America's reputation dissolved to a degree after the War with the re-
introduction of Paris couture to the United States by fashion writers, editors, and buyers.72 
These scholars looked at concepts of copying from a Parisian haute couture perspective, 
through an analysis of fashion magazines that were promoting originality yet were selling 
fashion that was reproducible, and from the standpoint of promotion of U.S. fashion by 
department stores and publicly staged events. 
Style and Design Piracy from the Legal Perspective 
Piracy is not a problem peculiar to apparel, yet the neglect of Congress to address this 
problem is well-documented. As noted by Leslie Hagen, when the piracy of musical 
recordings reached the $100 million mark in 1971, Congress deemed the problem chronic 
enough to warrant copyright protection for the recordings. Likewise in the face of more than 
$100 million a year in pirated computer chip designs in the semiconductor chip industry, 
Congress in 1984 granted copyright-like protection to the semiconductor chips. In 1981, 
apparel manufacturer Jack Mulqueen exceeded $200 million in gross sales. Nearly all of 
these receipts were due to sales of garments which the company's president readily admitted 
were copies of original creations of other designers. The lack of protection for apparel 
72 Valerie Steele, Paris Fashion: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
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designs may be due to the complex issues of free competition, the promotion of creativity, 
and issues of restricting class mobility inherent in regulating style piracy.73 
The U.S. government has never protected works of fashion against design plagiarism. 
Piracy is possible in the U.S. apparel industry because intellectual property rights do not 
protect clothing designs. The term intellectual property refers to the creative ideas and 
expressions of the mind and intellect that have commercial value and may receive the same 
legal protection of a tangible property right. Federal intellectual property laws include three 
separate types of protection: copyright, patent, and trademark. These intellectual property 
laws enable owners to select who may access and use their property and to protect their 
property from unauthorized use. The substantial loss of revenue to original designers and 
other market distortions suffered by the fashion industry as a result of design piracy have 
long called for a remedy. United States law, however, is incomplete as far as providing 
protection to fashion designs through intellectual property laws. In discussing the complexity 
of design protection via laws of intellectual property rights, Ralph Brown suggested, 
The whole body of the law is two faced...One face recognizes that Homo Sapiens 
thrive on imitation and so does the economy. The other looks with distaste on 
copiers. They reap where they have not sewn; they compete unfairly. Behind the 
distaste is a more rational concern that easy copying discourages originality and free 
riding copiers may diminish investment in socially useful innovation.74 
Early legal scholarship concerning design piracy provided a history of pertinent court 
cases and the various bills regarding design piracy presented before the House and the Senate 
73 Anne Theodore Briggs, Student Author, Hung Out to Dry: Clothing Design Protection Pitfalls in 
United States Law, 24 Hastings Communications and Entertainment L. Journal 169, 169-200 (Winter 
2000); Leslie Hagen, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: 
Renewing the Proposal for Folding Fashion Works in the United States, 26 Texas Int. L. Journal, 
341-388 (1991). 
74 Ralph Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1337, 1337-1404 (1987). 
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from 1914 to the time of their publication.75 More recently, scholars have discussed legal 
decisions regarding the protection of apparel design. These essays were specifically from a 
legal, rather than an apparel industry perspective. Many of the commentaries regarding 
design piracy in the U.S. apparel industry supplied detailed technical information that 
illustrated the difficulty in providing official court supported protection to fashion as well as 
discussing possible legal solutions to the piracy problem. Rather than discussing these 
authors' hypothetical resolutions to the piracy issue, I will discuss the general hindrances of 
the U.S. intellectual property law framework to protect apparel designs. 
Copyright protection for apparel designs is precluded under section 101 of the 
Copyright Act, which provides only limited protection to designs of "useful articles." The 
Copyright Act authorized Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing, for a limited time to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries."76 Protection has been broadly construed by the courts to include 
fabric designs, but distinguishes the actual dress design as an unprotected useful article. This 
interpretation of the act protects the fabric design; however, the garment that is created from 
the fabric is not protected under copyright law. 
Since 1914, seventy-three bills to protect design through copyright have been 
introduced in Congress. All of these bills have failed largely because providing such 
protection to garment designs would extend the law to include utilitarian or useful objects 
75 See Maurice Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 Indiana Law Journal 235, 235-257 (1943-1944) and David 
Goldenburg, The Long and Winding Road, A History of The Fight Over Industrial Design Protection 
in the United States, 45 JCPS 21, 21-48 (Fall 1997) for a history of design piracy legislation. 
76 U.S. Constitution, art. 16 8. 
and this extension would potentially allow for monopolies in the apparel industry.77 As 
quoted in Mencken's legal commentary, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, in 1977, 
former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer stated that the issue of design protection is 
"one of the most significant pressing items of unfinished business."78 
The design patent statues grant protection to "a new, original and ornamental design 
for an article of manufacture."79 Patent protection can apply to utilitarian inventions or 
ornamental design. While this definition of patent protection might first seem to apply to the 
protection of clothing, the design of an article of manufacture must be novel, must advance 
beyond the prior art in a way that is non-obvious, original, ornamental, and meet the test of 
invention. Courts have consistently held that garment designs do not meet these 
requirements.80 Further the length of time needed to determine requirements for patentability 
may take up to two years and the costs of obtaining a patent make this form of intellectual 
property protection an impractical source for protecting clothing designs, which typically 
have a very short style life of approximately one season of, at most, three months. Finally, 
even if designers secure patent approval in the Patent and Trademark Office, the courts often 
find design patents invalid and patent infringement is found in only about half the cases 
brought to court. Thus, for garment designs, the protection provided by a design patent would 
come too late, if at all, because fashions change rapidly.81 
77 Rocky Schmidt, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 861, 
861-880 (1983). 
78 Jennifer Mencken, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, B.C. Intell. Prop. & Tech F. 121201 
(1997). 
79 Schmidt, Designer Law. 
80 Brassieres have been patented. See: Farrell Beck & Gau, Uplift. 
81 Roger Meiners and Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly, 13 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 911, 911-934 (Summer 1990); Christine Magdo, Student 
Author, "Protecting Works of Fashion from Design Piracy," LEDA, Harvard Law School (2000); 
The primary function of trademark law is to protect marks or design features that 
primarily serve to identify the source of goods. A trademark is a name, sign, symbol, or 
device attached to goods offered for sale as to distinguish them from similar goods. 
Internationally known trademarks within the apparel industry include the multi-national 
companies of Chanel with the double C logo and the signature LV Louis Vuitton logo. In the 
United States, trademark laws provide protection against counterfeiters that create look-alike 
products passed off as the true original; they do not protect the design of the goods 
themselves. Early U.S. manufacturers who applied false Paris labels to their products would 
have been guilty of violating trademark laws. However, most fashion pirates do not falsely 
mark their goods as coming from the originator. They place their own identification on the 
copies. Copyists of designs do not violate trademark laws since pirates simply copy the 
designs without using the name or trademarks of the designer of the works they have copied. 
The principle of unfair competition is similar to trademark laws, whereas protection 
under unfair competition is limited to cases in which an unauthorized copy is "palmed off' as 
the product of an original designer. Palming off is the attempt to pass off another's goods or 
products as one's own. To be considered unfair competition, the original creator must show 
that the sale of the copy is likely to confuse the public as to the source of the article. Such 
confusion would only be found to exist if the original designer had established the identity of 
his product so firmly in the minds of consumers that it becomes associated with him alone. In 
order for works of fashion to be protected by laws of unfair competition they must acquire 
what is known as "secondary meaning," which is a "connection in the consumer's mind 
Safia Nurhabhai, "Style Piracy Revisited", NYSBA 10, no. 3, (Winter 2001): 1-11; Peter Shalestock, 
Student Author, "Forms of Redress for Design Piracy: How Victims can use Existing Copyright 
Law", 21 Seattle U.L. Rev. 113, 113-126 (Summer 1997). 
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between the mark and the product's producer."82 Given the short style life of garment 
designs, the seasonal nature of the garment industry, and the fast entries and even faster exits 
in the apparel business, there is little likelihood of establishing a secondary meaning in 
designer apparel. The courts have consistently refused to apply the doctrine of unfair 
competition in design piracy cases.83 
In large part due to the inability to rely on the courts or Congress for protection, 
garment manufacturers resorted to self-help by forming the Fashion Originators Guild of 
America (FOGA) in 1932. The FOGA was a trade association of garment manufacturers and 
retailers who banded together in attempt to control design piracy. To further this goal, 
retailers and manufacturers signed "declarations of cooperation" whereby they pledged to 
deal only in original creations. The Guild maintained an exclusive design registration bureau, 
and as part of its elaborate enforcement system, the bureau instituted the use of red-cards. 
The cards listed non-cooperating retailers and Guild members were forbidden from dealing 
with red-carded retailers. At one point, the Guild controlled 60% of the dress market.84 
Although highly effective in combating design piracy, Guild's practices were held by the 
Supreme Court to violate the Sherman Anti-trust Act and, therefore, could not continue. This 
case provided one of the first and most pivotal court cases regarding protection of fashion 
works and has become a benchmark case regarding the difficulty of receiving protection for 
works of fashion design. 
82 Brown, Design Protection: An Overview. 
83Brown, 1341; Schmidt, Designer Law. 
84 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 4346 (1941). 
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Summary 
This chapter provided a framework for an analysis of the history of design piracy 
within the U.S. ready-to-wear clothing industry. The first section of this chapter explored the 
development of the women's ready-to-wear clothing industry. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, ready-to-wear clothing that offered a variety of styles, quantities, and 
prices became available in almost all markets, and was growing rapidly in the women's dress 
industry. Ready-to-wear transformed clothing "made for somebody" into clothing "made for 
everybody."85 Partly due to the technical advancements that allowed for mass-production and 
the relative affordability of production equipment, entry into the apparel manufacturing 
industry was easy. Small shops could quickly begin on low capitalization, with few 
employees. Further, the smallness of many shops allowed for flexibility in adoption of 
fashion changes. With these changes in the structure of the apparel industry, manufacturers 
began to use fashion as a way to both compete with each other and to appeal to customers at 
various income levels. They changed style rapidly, and used decorative trims to hide 
otherwise poor quality fabrics. In addition, the ready-to-wear production of dresses was 
introduced on a large scale. Dress manufacturers generated sales by offering many garments 
and by changing their styles frequently from season to season and even with-in seasons. Style 
variations stimulated demand. Further, the changing status of women in the workforce and as 
consumers necessitated inexpensive and stylish clothing. Due to these developments and 
85 Kidwell and Christman, Suiting Everyone. 
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changes in the apparel industry, design piracy came to be considered "a way of life in the 
garment business."86 
The second section of this chapter described design piracy. Among the most 
distinctive characteristics of the women's clothing trade during the early 20th century was the 
ease and rapidity with which rival firms copied the new, innovative product design of the 
leading firms. Successful styles in high price markets were quickly copied by close 
competitors. Designs developed by the most exclusive custom tailors and dressmakers were 
copied in sequence by jobbers and high grade ready-to-wear manufacturers, smaller and less 
prosperous firms, and by the smallest and most insignificant contractors and sweatshops. 
Legal commentaries discussed design piracy from a judicial perspective. They defined and 
provided limitations for copyright, design patents, and trademarks for protecting [or not 
protecting fashion works. 
86 Kitty Dickerson and Jeannette Jamow, Inside the Fashion Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
2002), 150. 
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CHAPTER THREE: AMERICAN FASHIONS FOR AMERICAN WOMEN 
Scholars have identified World War II as the period when U.S. designers began to 
achieve world-wide recognition for their apparel creations.1 Nevertheless, the U.S. ready-to-
wear industry slowly began to cultivate and even demand the idea of American design as 
early as the 1910s, as reported in Women's Wear. This chapter examines the emergence of 
U.S. design, not dependent on following and copying the Parisian dictates of fashion. The 
beginning of the cultivation of the idea of U.S. design is important to the analysis of design 
piracy and copying as it sets the stage for the FOGA's incorporation as an association "to 
promote the sale, identification, and recognition of original style and merchandise" of 
American apparel interests, particularly FOGA members.2 This chapter is divided into the 
following sections: the need and a desire for an American art of dressing, the copying of 
Paris for design inspiration, developments that encouraged American design, and the 
encouragement, education, and promotion of the U.S. designer. 
The Need and Desire for an American Art of Dressing 
At the beginning of the 20th century an increasingly complex set of fashion 
organizations in the women's ready-to-wear industry began to exert an influence on 
transmission of fashion ideas. Burgeoning retailing and manufacturing structures recognized 
a need to both forecast and control fashion change, but found it difficult to predict. In one of 
1 Sandra S. Buckland and Gwendolyn S. O'Neal, "'We Publish Fashions Because They Are News': 
The New York Times 1940-1945," Dress 25 (1998): 33-41; Madelyn Shaw,"American Fashion: The 
Tirocchi Sisters in Context," From Paris to Providence, Fashion, Art and the Tirocchi Dressmakers' 
Shop, 1915-1947 (Providence, R.I.: Museum of Art, Rhode Island School of Design, 2000), 105-132; 
Jessica Daves in Ready Made Miracle notes that American production of U.S. produced goods did not 
wholeheartedly occur until World War II. Milbank noted the years between the stock market crash of 
1929 and the outbreak of World War II as most formative for American design. 
2 Fashion Originators Guild of America, Incorporation Papers, March 1932, New York Department of 
State. 
the first issues of Women's Wear, editors endeavored to identify sources of fashion change 
for industry readers, crediting influential society women, prominent actresses, Parisian 
dressmakers, and clothing manufacturers. But most U.S. apparel manufacturers were slow to 
develop their own design talents, and tended to rely on a growing world of style 
commissioners who sold authorized copies of Parisian designs for design inspiration and 
outright copying.3 Employed by manufacturing firms and the custom salons in department 
stores, American designers created salable adaptations of prevailing French fashions. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, at all price levels, U.S. made garments 
clothed the vast majority of American women. American businesses adapted Parisian designs 
to American sensibilities; retail outlets, for the most part, sold U.S. manufactured clothing. 
For the ready-to-wear industry, the capacity to create unique styles played a major role in its 
rapid growth and the ability to reach consumers of all economic levels. Manufacturers and 
designers became convinced of the need to create their own styles, yet recognized the 
continuing influence of Parisian creations. American designers often lacked the elite 
patronage that French couturiers enjoyed. Instead, women of all economic levels expected 
fashionable modes delivered in price points they could afford. American fashions were 
viewed as primarily imitative, with few original styles.4 
As the twentieth century progressed, increasingly strident voices began to demand 
development of an American style not dependent on Paris. American customers were 
perceived to be different from their French counterparts. American women were believed to 
3 
"We are Advertising Foreign Styles While they are Copying our own Smart Women," Women's 
Wear, October 15, 1912, 1. 
4 Shaw, "American Fashion: The Tirocchi Sisters in Context"; Jessie Trimble, "Why Paris is the 
Capital of Fashion," The Delineator (1907): 291, 408; Grace Aspinwall, "Lady Duff-Gordon," Good 
Housekeeping (1910): 573. 
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be healthier, more athletic, and with more active lifestyles. But, without access to the training 
and the resources of Paris, American designers had to fight for credibility. Although 
editorials and advertising in trade publications argued the need for original American 
fashions with demands to promote the national economy, cries of patriotism, and 
disappointment in "the freakish, tasteless, and audacious Parisian models," the celebration 
and copying of Parisian models was still the norm. Fashion writers, designers, and 
commentators questioned why U.S. manufacturers and designers, who had adapted Parisian 
designs all along to fit American tastes, did not originate their own creations.5 
A debate for American fashions for American women wore on in the U.S. press with 
advertisements, articles, and letters to the editor celebrating, questioning, and decrying the 
possibility of American created fashion. In the 1920s, associations and advertising finally 
began to pay homage to U.S. designers based on their own artistic merit. Designers did 
achieve celebrity status in the 1940s. This would not have been possible, however, without 
the groundwork of the previous forty years. 
The Copying of Paris for Style Inspiration 
Before a discussion of the rise of American created styles begins, it is important to 
understand the ways in which U.S. fashion had previously "originated." The most 
widespread technique for developing garment styles was through the copying of models by 
Parisian dressmakers and fashion houses. Paris's fashion houses were the leading creators of 
innovative designs. Often collaborating, all segments of the French fashion industry 
5 
"We are Advertising Foreign Styles While they are Copying our own Smart Women," 1 ; "Paris 
Losing its Vogue," Women's Wear, December 1, 1912, 16; Jesse Trimble, "Why Paris is the Capital 
of Fashion," 291, 408. 
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continuously experimented with new designs, cloths, embroideries, cloth patterns, colors, 
textures, and accessories. French garments were unveiled to private customers in salons, as 
well as more public displays held at fashion houses and sporting events such as the horse 
races at Auteuil, Longchamps, and Grand Prix. American firms anxiously anticipated the 
opening of each fashion season in Paris, sending representative buyers to the fashion houses 
and dressmaking establishments. To purchase Parisian models U.S. firms often pooled their 
resources. Style commissioners who were independent tour guides/business people/advisors 
arranged the transactions between U.S. buyers and French fashion houses. They also 
facilitated the movement of garments through the maze of French and U.S. customs laws. 
Purchased Parisian gowns passed through many hands; first the original buyer and then 
frequently to other arriving Americans in Paris.6 
Due to the tenuous nature of the apparel industry, firms wanted to create garments 
guaranteed to sell. While many Americans, in an attempt to develop the new country's 
identity and create its own fashion story, revolted somewhat against the dictates and 
influence of Paris fashion, many still identified and sought the cachet of European modes. 
For upstart as well as established firms, the easiest way to avoid bankruptcies and forced 
dissolutions was through the copying of established fashions from Paris haute couture 
designers and fashion houses. 
Identification of Paris with Fashion Creation 
In part, the identification of fashion creation with Paris in the early part of the 
twentieth century was due to the "exclusive" nature of that industry. In Paris, law, custom, 
6 Bernard Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial Development: The American Clothing Industry in 
the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries" (PhD diss., Yale University, 1989). 
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and tradition were all against the design pirate.7 As early as 1745, statutes protected civil and 
ecclesiastical designs of the silk fabrics of Lyons and Tours. In 1789, at the dawn of the 
French Revolution, King Louis XVI issued a decree which further extended design 
protection to all the fabric industries of France, and stated that French foreign commerce was 
the result of the genius and taste of the French designers, that France by her laws, would 
protect those who promoted her trade with the world. During this time, Paris became the 
established leader of fashion in the Western world. A combination of fashion leadership and 
example on the part of Louis XIV and his court, combined with concerted efforts on the part 
of the French government to promote and protect the silk weaving industry in France, 
provided the foundation on which the Paris couture and dressmaking industry eventually 
grew and flourished. 
In 1793, the National Assembly extended design protection to all decorative 
industries in France. Adding to existing laws, Emperor Napoleon stated that determinations 
over registered design disputes would be settled by a jury of experts in the same industry. 
Article 10 of the present French law provided for the confiscation of all copies and 
instruments used to produce these copies. Successful maintenance of their monopoly of the 
fashion market was aided by governmental protection, and the prosecution of style piracy as 
a criminal offense.8 
Quality and workmanship were important selling points of the Parisian haute couture. 
High quality items indicative of superior status contained intrinsic (beauty) and extrinsic 
7 In the U.S. on the other hand, the copying of styles had been declared a legitimate means of 
competition. Leonard Drake and Carrie Glaser, Trends in the New York Clothing Industry (New 
York: Institute of Public Administration, 1942): 29. 
8 M.D.C. Crawford, The Ways of Fashion (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), 226; Sylvan 
Gotshal and Alfred Leif, The Pirates will Get You (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945). 
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(cost) value. Workmanship, the quality of the construction techniques, included 
meticulousness in finishing garments; such as hand finished hems and decorative elements 
and other such laborious techniques not readily available in most ready-to-wear American 
apparel. Parisian and American retailers and the press promoted the great care and fine 
materials of French fashions. Anspach (1969) suggested that mass fashion in America 
identified status levels through the "hierarchical relationship between high fashion, mass 
fashion, and past fashion." She noted that these fashion types reflected American values of 
time: high fashions or haute couture have high status; mass fashion or ready-to-wear 
medium; and past fashion, low.9 
Demand for Parisian Goods 
Many high-status American customers desired Parisian-created goods in part because 
of the exclusive nature of the Parisian industry. Other less affluent consumers bought 
Parisian goods in great number before World War I due to exchange rates that allowed 
Americans inexpensive travel to Europe and provided significant purchasing power over 
French goods. Throughout the nineteen teens and twenties Americans spent an enormous 
amount of money in Paris. The U.S. Department of Commerce figured that Americans spent 
$660,000,000 in Europe between 1913 and 1926. Noted fashion historian, Valerie Steele, 
proposed that during the time period between World War I and World War II American 
women "with money to burn" were perceived to have "swarmed over Paris, perverting and 
destroying fashion through their taste for the spectacular."10 
9 Penny Storm, Functions of Dress (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987); Karlyne Anspach, The Why of 
Fashion, (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1969): 28. 
10 Valerie Steele, Paris Fashion: A Cultural History (New York: Berg, 1998). 
Although the stock of U.S. money grew during and after World War I, this war 
severely undermined France's economic strength and stability. War expenditure, inflation, 
and post-war reconstruction, financed partly through the printing of money, reduced the 
franc's purchasing power by seventy percent from 1915 to 1920 and a further 45 percent 
from 1922 to 1926. With its nation's economy struggling for recovery, the French fashion 
industry targeted its American customers and designed to American needs; especially since 
German and Austrian interests ceased to "deal with the enemy" and English women were 
considered to be economically conservative. Coupled with the attractive currency exchange 
rates presented by economic problems faced by France and the cultural advantages of being 
the leader of fashion, Paris was a desirable destination for many Americans to shop.11 
During the early part of the twentieth century, the rate of exchange between francs 
and U.S. dollars remained fairly consistent between a low of 5.020 and a high of 9.830. 
From 1920 to 1924 the exchange rate fluctuated from 11.97 to 22.16 francs per U.S. dollar. 
Peaking at 35.84 French francs per U.S. dollar in 1926, the exchange rate remained at 
approximately 25.00 French francs per U.S. dollar throughout the mid 1930s, just following 
the collapse of the U.S. stock market in October 1929. These numbers make clear the 
increasing purchasing power Americans held in France during this time. One writer who 
lived in Paris from 1920 to 1930 stated Parisians did not have to work during the 1920s and 
1930s because Americans were able to and willing to pay any price the French requested for 
goods and services.12 Although Americans spent a large amount of money in Paris during the 
11 Sheryl F. Leipzig, "It is a profession that is New, Unlimited and Rich!: The Promotion of the 
American Fashion Designer in the 1930s" (Ph.D. diss., Iowa State University, 2005); Buckland, 
"Promoting American Fashion." 
12 William Bailey, Americans in Paris, 1900-1930: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1989), Appendix; Eleanor L. Dulles, The French Franc 1914-1928 (New York: 
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nineteen teens and twenties, high tariffs as well as rising wholesale and retail prices in Paris 
meant that Americans spent a lot of money in Paris, yet they may not have received good 
value for their expenditure. 
Methods of Copying Parisian Styles 
In spite of the laws protecting French styles from piracy, French designer goods were 
consistently copied throughout the twentieth century. Merchants and manufacturers could 
copy Parisian designs either legally or through dishonest means. The Parisian haute couture 
had developed a system for the legalized copying of their garments under the auspices of the 
Chambre Syndicale de la Couture. For a negotiated price, buyers could purchase the original 
garments, paper patterns of the garments, or the garments' linings. Reference lists 
demarcating every item needed to duplicate the garment were included in the negotiated 
13 price. 
With the patterns and reference sheets, custom salons could exactly duplicate their 
Parisian counterparts. Less high-end salons, department stores, manufacturers, and designers 
also purchased the reference sheets but modified many details to American tastes and in 
varying quality levels and price-points. United States manufacturers made substantial 
alterations in the designs, colors, and fabrics of prevailing fashionable styles. The American 
Cloak and Suit Review noted that the emergence of an "American" style of clothing 
combined the artistic cuts of the haute couture of Paris with the practical designs desired by 
the U.S. woman. By 1914, it was so evident that American designers would look to the 
The Macmillan Company, 1929); M.S. Rukeyser, "American Returns from Europe," World's Work 
(1927): 82-89; Eleanor K. Mcdonnell, "Plain Tales from the Tourists," Saturday Evening Post (1930): 
125. 
13 Sandra S. Buckland, "Promoting American Fashion 1940 through 1945: From Understudy to Star," 
(Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1996), 11. 
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general idea of Parisian couture but then make extensive changes to details that one leading 
member of the Chambre Syndicale de la Couture stated, 
It is altogether surprising to see these [buyers] come to Paris and buy goods because 
they have the air of knowing exactly what they want. One of them says, 'you are 
wrong to use taffetas.' Another declares, 'Americans will not wear tartans this 
season.' Why not make it themselves? Once they agreed to accept what the Parisian 
dressmakers had discovered. Today they decide among themselves whether to adopt 
certain novelties or reject certain daring ideas. The whole proceeding is entirely un­
commercial.14 
It was clear that one of the most important components of Parisian fashions was the French 
labels and names sewn into the garments. 
American firms became world renowned for their skill in carefully adapting haute 
couture garments into less expensive versions. Companies publicized their wares as exact 
copies or adaptations of well-known French modes by particular French designers. The 
manufacturing company Simpson Crawford Co. was so proud of their adapting skills that 
they displayed in their store window an original Drecoll imported gown costing $485, 
reproduced in every detail by their dressmakers for sale at $24.75. By comparing the original 
Drecoll model with an American-made copy, the company was convinced that fashion 
forward American women would realize U.S. dressmakers were the peers of those of Paris, at 
least in technical skill, if not design sense.15 
Unauthorized copying of Paris abounded in the twentieth century. Unscrupulous 
means to exploit French modes ranged from the sophisticated to the simplistic. To gain 
insight into the latest styles, copyists could simply glance at items displayed in a store, during 
a fashion show, photographed or sketched in advertisements, or observed on fashionable 
14 Bernard Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial Development; "Threaten to Bar American Buyers," 
The New York Times, March 4, 1914, 4. 
15 
"Style vs. Quality," Women's Wear, December 13, 1912, 1; Women's Wear, October 28, 1912, 4. 
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women in the streets of Paris. In the millinery trade, one manufacturer stated that copyists 
merely clipped advertisements of high priced goods from the newspaper, inscribed such 
notations as "our price $3.00," mailed it to clients, and then produced replicas in inferior 
materials. Employees were often bribed in France and the United States to describe design 
activities in their plants. Factory and workshop workers often acted as spies, faithfully 
passing along style details to competitors. As garments were purchased, copied, and then 
returned, pirating was detrimental to productive retail sales.16 
Due to technical improvements and the sheer number of manufacturers involved in 
the production of clothing, U.S. manufacturers quickly copied popular styles in great 
quantities. Expressing anger and frustration at the speed and huge number of which her 
models were blatantly copied, Madame Paquin stated in 1913, 
It is just as painful for us to see one of our creations spoiled by an unskillful copy as it 
is for the painter to see one of his works copied by an ignorant pupil who reproduces 
the picture by the dozen.17 
By the early nineteen-teens, frustrated Parisian designers ceased relying solely on French law 
to protect against piracy and created their own self-help anti-piracy initiatives. Individual 
designers such as Paquin attempted to use trademarks, serial numbers, and copyrighted 
names of garments to dissuade and prosecute copyists. Paris dressmakers attempted to slow 
16 Paul H. Nystrom, Fashion Merchandising (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1932.) 
Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial Development;" Babette Muelle, "New York Dressmakers," 
Good Housekeeping (1903): 302-303; A C. Johnston & Florence A. Fitch, Design Piracy: The 
Problem and Its Treatment Under NRA Codes (Washington: Office of N.R.A. Administration, 1936); 
"Paris Police Seize American as Leader in Style Piracy," Women's Wear Daily, February 7, 1933, 21; 
"Clearance of Exclusive French Models at Wanamaker Store," Women's Wear, January 1, 1921, 4; 
"Franco-American Board Reports on Exploitation of French Models," Women's Wear, May 19, 1919, 
3; Helen Josephy and Mary M. McBride, Paris is a Women's Town (New York: Coward-McCann, 
Inc, 1929), 75; Bernard Roshco, The Rag Race: How New York and Paris Run The Breakneck 
Business of Dressing American Women (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1963). 
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down the speedy transmission of ideas by holding back their new designs in February 1912 at 
the opening of the Auteuil racing season. Greatly anticipated by those interested in fashion, 
the races at Longchamps, Grand Prix, and Auteuil were where haute couture designers 
traditionally presented their newest styles. The great dressmakers and milliners instead chose 
to send out mannequins dressed in winter furs and spring-like straw hats. The reason given 
was to keep the clothes from being "immediately copied by the smaller houses and wholesale 
dressmakers, who only vulgarize models." American buyers complained to the press 
concerning the "nerve of the French" to suppress transmission of the newest styles.18 
In addition to individual initiatives, Parisian dress makers developed group methods 
for controlling piracy. In July 1914, the Couturier's Defense Syndicate was established 
under the leadership of Paul Poiret (president) and Jacques Worth (vice-president), and 
included the haute couture designer members Premet, Cheruit, Rodier, Paquin, Callot, Lucien 
Vogel et Compagnie, Atuyer, Bianchini, and Ferier. Poiret surmised that "unless something 
is done to stop the pirating of fashions, there will be no great dressmakers left in Paris in ten 
years."19 Methods to slow down the unauthorized copying of designs and thus control piracy 
included the refusal of foreign buyers, particularly Americans, from viewing fashion shows, 
the prevention of photographers from selling pictures of their newest fashions, and attempts 
to prevent the newspapers from bringing out fashion supplements in which exclusive ideas 
were broadcast to the world. The Syndicate discussed refusing to show models to any 
18 
"Hold Back the Styles," The New York Times, February 25, 1912, sec.3, 1. 
19 
"To Stop Pirating of Dress Fashion," The New York Times, May 29, 1914, 4. 
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persons except those purchasing the models. In part to make styles difficult if not impossible 
to copy, Parisian designers such as Poiret created intricate and quite complex draperies.20 
The attempts of the Syndicate to limit the number of copyists may have allowed for 
U.S. apparel industry growth and creative fashion development independent of Paris. In 
describing the .possible effects of Paris designers withholding styles from Americans, 
Francis, a designer stationed in Paris, stated, 
If Paris wants to continue to develop and force the American people to become 
creators instead of copyists, this is the very best way for Paris to go about it. It 
puts a premium on the development of American designing and it forces America to a 
much more intense and conscious development than she could possibly have under 
the old method. If the best French models are withheld from American buyers, 
America will produce designers, or go elsewhere to procure models."1 
Some of the rules discouraged, or at least made harder, the unauthorized copying of 
Syndicate wares. Barring Americans from viewing the latest styles, however, did not end 
copying. Buyers were needed to view and purchase styles. Many of these houses sold the 
originals or even their copies of the originals to other firms for profit. Copying continued 
unabated. Due to these holes in Syndicate rules, dissemination of fashion and growth and 
development of lesser known French fashion houses and American firms occurred.22 
Developments that Encouraged American Style Independence 
One of the many phases of business and manufacturing evolution in the U.S. ready-
to-wear industry was the call for and increased support of American fashions. During the 
nineteen-teens, the growth of the U.S. industry had risen to such a point that manufacturers, 
designers, and retailers argued that, "It should be a matter of national pride to keep this 
20 
"Threaten to Bar American Buyers," The New York Times, March 4, 1914, 4; "To Stop Pirating of 
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21 
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22 Troy, 284. 
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industry, which is becoming one of the largest in the country, truly American."23 According 
to Edward W. Bok, senior editor of Ladies Home Journal, 
Each garment bought in the United States means the support of some people who 
spend their money with us. Every merchant should have sufficient pride in his 
bosom to say to his trade, 'this garment is of American goods; American labor and I 
stand in back of the maker's label.' We stand in front of the American flag with a 
reverence short of worship. Let us do the same in pride of our American products.24 
Considered un-American in spirit and enterprise, the reliance on Paris for fashions forced 
U.S. manufacturers into second place, "to scramble to catch up with the Frenchman."25 
By the turn of the century, the United States was growing and thriving economically 
and socially. Even though the United States was rapidly developing with seemingly limitless 
resources, Americans spent fortunes in Paris on clothing and entertainment. According to 
early twentieth century writers, World War I had some positive results on the creation of an 
independent U.S. ready-to-wear industry.26 The New York Times commented, 
Not the least beneficial result to this country of the European outbreak will be the 
opportunity for American manufacturers of women's wear to throw off the shackles 
of custom that have bound them to Paris for so many years and to make the creations 
of their own minds takes the place of copies of the ideas of designers overseas.27 
Styles continued to be copied from Paris during World War I, but certain economic and 
social conditions caused growth in U.S. creative design talents. Although exchange rates 
favored the U.S. dollar in France, and Americans spent fortunes in Paris during the nineteen-
teens and nineteen twenties, there is evidence that high tariffs and rising wholesale and retail 
23 
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24 
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prices of Parisian goods negatively impacted American purchasing of Parisian created 
clothing forcing many American consumers and retailers to purchase U.S. made goods. 
Tar# 
Historically, the tariff has been the most effective weapon in the arsenal of U.S. 
business promotion against foreign competition. Tariffs (duties on foreign goods that are or 
could be domestically produced) have been touted as protecting industries for national 
defense, contributing to national prosperity, and raising the standard of living for U.S. 
workers. Due to the protectionist policy of tariffs during the early part of the twentieth 
century, infant industries grew into giants, and lack of competition allowed for organization 
and monopoly. The consistent rise in tariffs throughout the early twentieth century was a 
partial explanation for the growth of the U.S. apparel industry's development of its own 
creative talents.28 
Tariffs repeatedly rose following the end of the Civil War in 1865 to the 1930s, 
negatively affecting the purchasing of women's apparel from France. Exports from Paris to 
the United States declined sharply in the early to mid twentieth century. They dropped 50% 
from the first to second financial quarter of 1912, as garments were assessed duties as high as 
28 Protectionism, in the form of high tariffs, was firmly established as an enduring policy in the U.S. 
by the end of the Civil War partly due to national fiscal needs. For the subsequent half century, duties 
were raised repeatedly. World War I had the further effect of cutting off or restricting imports from 
industrialized countries, giving greatly increased protection to many U.S. industries. After World 
War I, several industries such as dyestuffs and other chemicals stressed their infancy and argued that 
without protection they would be unable to withstand competition. Although efforts were made to 
reduce the tariffs between the Civil War and the New Deal policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, they 
were for the most part ineffective. The prosperity of the U.S. served as impetus for the continuation 
of high tariffs. The Depression which began in 1929 stiffened even more the American protective 
system. Due to the high customs duties, imports to the U.S. fell from $4.4 billion to $1.5 billion from 
1929 to 1933. F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1914), 361; Percy W. Bidwell, The Invisible Tariff (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939); 
Merle Fainsod, Lincoln Gordon, and Joseph Palamountain, Government and the American Economy 
(New York: W.W. Norton And Company, 1959). 
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50 to 150 percent of their value. In the four years from 1926 to 1930, French exports dropped 
40%. The American government imposed a duty of up to 90 percent on the cost of original 
Parisian models, explained by the advent of the Great Depression.29 Continual increases in 
duties meant that fewer U.S. dressmaking establishments made regular trips to Paris, and, 
when they did, only the larger firms bought many Parisian models. R. J. Shoninger, the 
President of the American Chamber of Commerce stated that the high tariffs and duties 
caused Americans to find the Parisian market less attractive than previously and helped boost 
American fashion production. According to Shoninger, 
Not long ago, hundreds of American dressmakers made regular trips to Paris twice a 
year, returning with an average of a dozen new models each, they passed more or less 
duty free. Now duties are charged and the result is only the large firms buy 
Paris models. Of course, it is quite natural that none of the great Paris 
dressmaking establishments should be willing to acknowledge this fact, but from all 
accounts it is now beyond doubt that America, and New York especially, has become 
a fashion center to be reckoned with, even by Paris.30 
Rising Wholesale and Retail Prices 
In addition to the tariffs, rising wholesale and retail prices of French goods from 1914 
to 1927 negatively impacted the desire for and purchasing of French garments by American 
consumers. According to some reports, wholesale prices jumped from 300 to 500 percent of 
previously recorded levels. According to Women's Wear in 1919, the availability of luxury 
goods grew increasingly scarce and increasingly expensive. 
The dress that could be bought before the war for 800 francs is 2200 francs and over 
today. The modest cotton voile blouse of 40 francs of other days is replaced by one 
for 85 francs today. Before the war 25 francs would buy the fine handkerchief linen 
chemise adorned with superb embroidery and real Valenciennes lace. Today you pay 
85 francs for a linen one trimmed with shirred bands of cotton tulle and consider 
yourself lucky. Some American women would have their boots made by a French 
29 James Laver, A Concise History of Fashion, (New York: Doubleday, 1965). 
30 
"America Lifting Paris Fashion Yoke," The New York Times, July 14, 1912, 4. 
maker and kick because 80 francs seemed so high, for today, the same boot maker is 
asking 800 francs, and the quality of the leather is actually inferior.31 
The exorbitant rise in prices hit the French people harder than the Americans, due to currency 
rates. The high tariffs and rising wholesale and retail prices of goods prompted the smuggling 
of Parisian gowns into the United States via Canadian ports without the payment of revenues 
to U.S. customs officials. It also seemed to spur American design independence.32 
Disappointment in Paris 
Partly due to negative economic conditions in Paris as well as declining exports to the 
United States, wealthy foreigners represented an enormous segment of the French fashion 
industry's revenue. The wants, desires, and needs of the American woman significantly 
contributed to the style of garments created by Paris couturiers and dressmakers. Parisian 
firms adopted their garments to American tastes and with it the structure and methods of 
Parisian couture were changed. Both French and American industry executives, entertainers, 
and average consumers stated disappointment in Paris partly because of these changes. Vocal 
American consumers (often quoted in Women's Wear) turned away from Parisian styles, 
seeking American-made garments.33 
Parisian firms significantly changed their methods of creation and garments to suit 
American tastes. French designer Jean Patou decorated the sportswear section of his salon in 
a "paneled wood, such an interior as you might see in an exclusive shop in America." He also 
31 Eleanor L. Dulles, The French Franc 1914-1928, Appendix, 143; "Paris Advises Americans to 
Shop at Home," Women's Wear, December 12, 1919, 1, 17. 
32 
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included an "American" bar to attract male patrons.34 By seeking to appeal to American 
interests, French concerns underwent increased commercialization and interest in quantity 
rather than quality production. This radically altered the nature of the French fashion industry 
in the twentieth century.35 Some writers feared that the "dressmakers of royalty have passed, 
and now France is run by tradesmen."36 Singers and actresses complained of hastily and 
poorly sewn gowns, publicly doubting and in some cases renouncing the renowned 
craftsmanship of Paris. For some Parisians the catering of Parisian style to U.S. tastes had 
disastrous results for the French design aesthetic. Fernard David, the French Minister of 
Commerce stated in 1912, "Dressmakers here have lately sought inspiration in America with 
the result that their models have lacked their former characteristic cachet of elegance and 
distinction."37 
French haute couture designers once created gowns specifically for a particular 
woman's complexion and figure. Demanding Americans seeking gowns necessitated more 
constant production by the French. Society women desired exclusive designs; working class 
U.S. women demanded the fashionability created by French designers offered at U.S. 
manufacturers' prices. While some Parisian firms still catered to their select, elite clientele, 
the sheer amount of "numbers" needed by the Americans left little time for personalized 
dressmaking. The French, and some Americans, decried the increasing commercialism as 
grotesque and vulgar.38 
34 Therese Bonney and Louise Bonney, A Shopping Guide To Paris (New York: Robert M. Mcbride 
& Company, 1929), 17, 35. 
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The continual production of clothing for a greater variety of people, meant designs 
were increasingly available to a large number of people at the same time. American women 
complained "we have become sick and tired of being charged preposterous prices for 
supposedly personal models, and finding that model copied a hundred times over in Paris and 
in New York."39 When wealthy, prominent, society women wore a gown, second rate 
designers and houses copied these designs for less wealthy women. American buyer Edith 
Rosenblum complained to Women's Wear that American manufacturers would receive the 
same style of garment from the French even if they were willing to pay more money for an 
exclusive haute couture garment.40 
According to Poiret, methods of American manufacturing promoted the 
standardization of style. Poiret complained that U.S. manufacturers came to Paris in search of 
"dresses that are easy to wear, easy to make, and little by little they led our couturiers to a 
type of dress, almost standardized, that each woman dons like a uniform without thinking of 
her personality, or even of her silhouette!" Even Parisian women were concerned with 
duplications of designs. In the Bois-de-Boulogne, numerous young Parisian women 
intentionally dressed exactly alike in blue taffeta dresses and matching hats to make a point 
concerning their frustration with the duplication of styles. The women told reporter, M. 
Marcignac, they had found it "impossible to wear a toilette or hat original either in color or in 
cut without seeing a few days later, their model [in cheap, inferior materials] for sale in all 
the large stores and made by every petty dressmaker."41 
39 
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False Parisian Labels 
Tariff legislation and rising wholesale and retail prices negatively affected the 
importation of Parisian designs to the United States. Consumers of both ready-to-wear and 
custom-made designs continued, however, to demand the latest fashions and attached value 
to a Parisian label. Some companies imported Parisian labels and paid the customs duty of 50 
cents a pound on these labels to sew them into their American made authorized copies. Other 
enterprising U.S. companies created their own counterfeit French labels. Deemed important 
selling points to consumers by both large and small retailer, false labels, both imported from 
Paris and created in the United States, sold for about 25 to 50 cents a piece. Some 
manufacturers felt that these false labels were deceptive to the consumer, while others argued 
that, "any American woman knows that she can't get a new Paris hat for twenty dollars. If 
she doesn't she's a fool, and she deserves to get swindled" by the false labels.42 Proponents 
of a campaign for "American fashions for American women" blamed American women for 
the dependence on Paris. According to a leading U.S. dressmaker, 
It certainly cannot be that our dressmakers haven't sufficient creative ability to please 
American women. I believe the fault lies entirely with the women and not with the 
gownmakers. It is a form of snobbery that we should do away with. There are dozens 
of shops in New York where American-made clothes bear French labels, because 
American women would not buy them otherwise. If this isn't snobbery, I would like 
to know what is 43 
Others felt that the purchasers who used the labels in deceiving their customers were the ones 
upon whom the responsibility, legally or morally rested.44 
42 Samuel Hopkins Adams, "The Dishonest Paris Label: How American Women are being fooled by a 
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The plethora of false labels led one writer to state, "Paris is very often only a label, 
and very often, the label is a lie."45 In 1912, one French house complained that of the 1000 
models found in retail outlets bearing their labels only 200 were legitimate.46 In a Ladies 
Home Journal article titled "The Dishonest Paris Label: How American Women are being 
fooled by a Country-Wide Swindle," Samuel Hopkins Adams commented, "in purchasing a 
so-called imported cloak or gown in this country you have one chance out of fifty of getting 
what you pay for. In purchasing a so-called imported hat you have one chance out of two 
hundred." Included in his report were numerous pictures of false labels discovered in dresses, 
gowns, and hats (Figure 3.1). 
45 
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Figure 3.1 The dishonest Paris label. 
Source: Samuel Hopkins Adams, "The Dishonest Paris Label: How American Women are being 
fooled by a Country-Wide Swindle." Ladies Home Journal, March 1913.47 
False labels were described by many writing in the fashion trade press to be 
"advertising bait and merchandising bluff."48 The problem of false labels was so great that 
Paul Poiret copyrighted his label. He published warnings that declared he had no problem 
with those who imitated his garments and labeled these goods, "a copy of a Poiret model." 
Rather Poiret objected to false, counterfeit labels. He stated: 
47 The Dishonest Paris Label by Samuel Hopkins Adams Copyright March 1913, Meredith 
Corporation. All rights reserved. Used with the permission of Ladies Home Journal. 
48 
"How American Retailers Promote Foreign Goods," Women's Wear, October 18, 1912, 2. 
77 
Copyists, even among my best friends, who falsely place my label on their own 
creations, will do so at their peril, for I shall turn the fullest punishment of the law 
upon those who offend in this manner. 49 
A list of legitimate American purchasers of French merchandise was published in Women's 
Wear to prevent unscrupulous enterprises from selling pirated copies into which counterfeit 
labels were sewn. Little to nothing was gained by this attempt.50 
The false labels disappointed some U.S. women, which may have led to the decline in 
the purchasing of imported gowns and the promotion of American design. According to 
fashion editor, Dorothy Dix, "American women are flocking to American fashions not only 
because of the merit and real values from a design viewpoint but also because of the so 
frequent fraud and disappointment of the so-called foreign goods."51 The counterfeit labels 
falsely promoted French designers. Although he also used the counterfeit labels, James 
Blaine, head designer for the U.S. firm Thurn, lambasted the practice. 
America has made Paris and it is a pity. All that time we were sewing in fake labels 
we were building up the reputation of the Paris houses, and all the time we were 
killing our own chances. That is what I mean when I say that America has made 
Paris. We have been doing the same work here with the same materials and the 
same designers which Paris has had and we have been giving Paris all the 
recognition.52 
According to Nathan Nadoolman, women's tailor and chairman of the fashion 
committee of the National Ladies' Tailors and Dressmakers Association, the supporting of 
French design and garment styles did a double injustice to the welfare of the Unites States, 
first by forcing the American designers to deny their own creations and second, because the 
49 
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constant boosting of "French" modes diminished the U.S. industry from realizing great 
economic profit. The loss in profits caused idleness and unemployment to thousands of 
needleworkers, as well as loss in profits to U.S. companies, and to general American 
prosperity. The promotion of anything foreign angered manufacturers because the false labels 
belittled and hid their work.53 
By 1912, Women's Wear, The New York Times, The Dry Goods Economist, Women's 
Home Companion and other trade magazines routinely printed ideas for getting American 
fashions and designers recognized based on merit. One exasperated writer for Women's 
Wear stated, 
Simply American labels on American goods. That is the whole question and the 
whole solution. The premises are already quite familiar and their repetition seems 
superfluous to those who have followed the matter. Surely there can be no 
defensible objection against allowing American women to know what they are 
really buying?54 
Although it was evident that many writers, manufacturers, designers, and retailers were 
angered that U.S. created goods were seemingly only salable with a Parisian label, U.S. 
women presumably preferred and demanded the cachet of a French label and continually 
sought novelties and up-to-the minute ideas in fashion. Much work would need to be 
accomplished before American goods were appreciated and more importantly sought after 
and purchased. 
53 
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Development of an American Design Presence 
The need and desire for an American art of dressing not dependent on Paris, plus 
economic and social conditions in both countries, led to the beginning stages of the 
development of a U.S. creative design presence in the early 1900s. American fashions for 
American women were desired by out-spoken individuals as quoted in the trade press and 
other newspapers. Organizational structures needed to be put into place, however, to truly 
encourage, educate, support, and thus promote the United States as a fashion center. 
Numerous proposals were offered in the pages and editorials of Women's Wear Daily, 
including the creation of museums and style libraries, the formalized education of nascent 
American designers, and the need for the media to publicize American designers. 
What are American Fashions? 
American women were considered to have distinct personalities that required clothing 
made by those who thoroughly understood these sensibilities. Evolution from Paris 
dependence to U.S. originality was the result of both a need and a desire to develop a 
characteristically American art of dressing. American designers and manufacturers adapted 
borrowed fashions from Paris to the needs, physique, and temperament of the American 
woman. Why could they not initiate their own design creations? A paradigm shift in 
American society and industry needed to occur concerning the goals of production. 
According to Ida Tarbell, 
The very heart of the question of clothes of the American woman is imitation. That is, 
we are not engaged in an effort to work out our individuality. We are not engaged in 
an effort to find costumes which by their expression of the taste and the spirit of this 
people can be fixed upon as appropriate American costumes, something of our 
own.55 
55 Ida Tarbell, The Business of Being a Woman (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912): 122-3. 
80 
Most writers agreed that Paris would continue to be the fountain head of fashion innovation 
except in those instances when the designs would not do for the supposed tasteful, common-
sense American women. 
As early as the turn of the century, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the ornate 
garments offered in Paris. Although many retailers and manufacturers faithfully copied 
Parisian designs, there were some out-spoken proponents that lambasted the: 
Absurdities and occasional immodesties of French fashions. The preposterous French 
hats, the uncomfortable drapery favored in Paris are too much in vogue. The 
Frenchwoman alas still sets the fashions for the world, but her taste is open to 
question.56 
In 1912 the New World commented that, "Paris was mentally and morally 
unbalanced. [The fashions] will be folly in Paris, freak in New York."57 Stating the purpose 
of the first "American Fashions for American Women" fashion contest, in which Americans 
were encouraged to design and manufacture U.S. styles, The New York Times avowed, 
"American women too long have endured the imposition of foreign fashions designed by 
foreign dressmakers without any sound reference to American conditions and American 
appropriateness."58 
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and the American Woman," Women's Wear, April 26, 1912, 9, 13; "American Styles for American 
Organized in 1912, the Society of American Fashions for American Women 
"patronized any movement leading to the encouragement and development of higher 
standards in the art and craft of women's wearing apparel and fabrics in America."59 
Invitations were initially sent to manufacturers, those who worked with the building blocks 
of fashion creation. The society was then opened to every branch of the apparel trade. 
Members fought false labels and other misrepresentations of merchandise that occurred in the 
U.S. apparel industry. This society created and vocally promoted an "American fashions for 
American women" campaign in the nineteen teens largely through the outspoken and often 
quoted chairman, Alexander Grean, a dress manufacturer.60 
At the heart of the call for "American fashions for American women" was the notion 
that French manufacturers and designers produced fundamentally distinctive clothing 
unsuited to the American lifestyle. Celebrated as taller, heavier, healthier, and stronger; 
American women were considered more athletically inclined than their French counterparts. 
Elements of dress that were considered particularly "American" included the shirtwaist, 
lingerie, tailored garments, sports clothes, fur coats, as well as ideas in neckwear, veils and 
other accessories.61 Other than these garments, the distinction between French and American 
designs was subtle. According to one New York Times fashion judge, 
Women," Women's Wear, October 8, 1912, 1, 8, 12; "Fashion Contest for Times Readers," The New 
York Times, February 25, 1912, 1. 
59 
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This contest constitutes the first comprehensive presentation of American genius 
applied to the designing of women's dress. It seems to foreshadow a new war of 
independence, in which, no doubt, American enterprise, adaptability, and taste will 
soon find some effective means of adequate self-expression.62 
This statement enthusiastically endorsed the American system of production. The question 
remained, however, what exactly distinguished American design from Parisian ideas? Annie 
Russell, a committee member of The New York Times fashion contest, commented, 
It is very hard to frame in words that subtle difference between the gown which is 
French in spirit and the one that is American. There were many designs which were 
unanimously rejected, not because they were not beautiful but because we felt them to 
be expressions of French ideas and ideals and in some indescribable way, alien to the 
average American woman...It is a quality, not a fact that distinguishes French and 
American design.63 
The ambiguity expressed in this commentary makes clear the difficulty of describing and 
assessing the nationality of a garment. The actress Sarah Bernhardt maintained that it should 
be easy to create an American costume, as we did not have a national heritage to follow, yet 
was at a loss to describe the distinguishing characteristics of a truly "American" garment. 
Urged to choose high-quality garments of good material, design, and workmanship, 
American women were advised to follow their own stylistic sensibilities rather than 
economically and emotionally depend on the ever-changing Parisian models. Social 
commentator Ida Tarbell believed the following of every fashion folly to be a waste of 
intelligence and a ruse of the less fortunate woman. 
From every side the adoption of meaningless fashions is corrupting national taste and 
wasting national substance. The worst of this is not only that it forces too much 
attention from useful women, but that it gives such poise and assurance to the 
ignorant and useless!64 
62 Ida Tarbell, The Business of Being a Woman, 122-3. 
63 
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In this quote, Tarbell seemed equally concerned that fashion would blur easily visible class 
boundaries and waste the usefulness of intelligent middle and upper-class women. In an 
article originally printed in the New York Evening Post and reprinted in Women's Wear, 
American women were encouraged with militaristic gusto to shun the following of every 
French fashion. 
The women of America are being summoned to a new war of independence. This 
time it is not against the domestic despot who holds the vote and pays the family 
bills. The new enemy lives far across the seas, in the Rue de la Paix, the Place 
Vendôme, and the Avenue de I'Opera. There the Parisian dressmaker sits and 
plots his fall designs, which designs are immediately copied by the dressmakers of 
the rest of the world. It is proper that our own country should be the first to rebel 
against this ancient tyranny. In the first place, we are, on principle, the enemies of 
foreign domination. In the second place, we spend more money in Paris shops than 
any other nation. In the third place, we are the one nation that can afford to take the 
chance.65 
During the early part of the twentieth century, supporters of American design posited 
that U.S. designs, which would arguably be of a better quality than Parisian models, would 
remain popular for a longer period of time. This would leave a woman with the time to 
consider "more important matters such as her greater self-development."66 As the twentieth 
century progressed, however, fashion change became a staple of the manufacturing and 
retailing community, and women faithfully updated their wardrobes to accommodate the 
latest fashions. Previously, manufacturers produced large quantities of goods that they hoped 
would be popular sellers for relatively long durations of time. As manufacturers produced 
smaller quantities of goods and retailers carried smaller stocks, rapid style change was 
possible and encouraged. Women were thus encouraged to actively participate in fashion by 
following and purchasing garments representing the newest style changes. 
65 
"The Judgment of Paris," Women's Wear, January 9, 1913, 3. 
66 
"The Coming of American Fashions," Ladies Home Journal, February 1913, 5. 
84 
Encouragement, Education, and Promotion of the American Designer 
The growth of the ready-to-wear industry, plus a growing spirit of nationalism, 
opened the door to demand for designers in the American apparel industry. Once the need 
and desire for American creative talents was established, where were these designers to come 
from? Numerous proposals were discussed, beginning almost as early as the movement of 
"American fashions for American women," to support and encourage emergent creative 
talents in the United States. These included a call to teach design students independence 
from Paris and techniques for teaching students creative design, the establishment of style 
libraries and museums for American designers, and the plea for U.S. stores to recognize 
American design talent and to use advertising to promote American fashion. The demand 
and desire by manufacturers for American fashions had been growing for some time. For 
American fashions for American women to be a success, consumers needed to be interested 
in purchasing U.S. made garments. Consumers needed to be educated to understand and 
appreciate American design. 
The designer came into being in the United States with the enormous rise of the 
ready-to-wear industry. Years before, the dressmaker, with the aid of fashion magazines and 
client wishes, designed each garment as more or less of an original based on prevailing 
French fashions. In contrast, in the early twentieth century, it was not unusual for a 
manufacturing establishment to create hundreds, if not thousands of dresses made within a 
few weeks based on variations from one model. Although there were American dress 
designers in the United States by the early twentieth century, many worked for specialty 
shops, department stores, or ready-to-wear manufacturers who preferred to cultivate client 
loyalty to a brand name or trademark rather than to a particular designer name. Some 
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twentieth century ready-to-wear designers started as private dressmakers. With the 
proliferation of inexpensive ready-to-wear, many could not compete with the prices offered 
by the ready-to-wear manufacturers and went to work for larger firms that could afford to 
hire a designer.67 
Museums and Style Libraries 
American designers were encouraged to adapt from the same historic sources used by 
the French fashion houses. These sources included historic paintings and sculpture, literary 
works, and costumes, as well as current trends in architecture, dress, and leisure. Since the 
turn of the twentieth century, American manufacturers had been acknowledged for excellent 
workmanship and adaptations of French designs. All that was missing was inspiration for 
designs ideas. 
To ensure a nurturing environment for designers, manufacturers, and the extended 
U.S. fashion community, fashion industry leaders sought to foster a relationship with New 
York museums including the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Brooklyn Museum of Art, 
and the American Museum of Natural History. Taken together these collections included 
costumes, textiles, furniture, and sundry items. Fashion industry writers such as Women's 
Wear Daily editor M.C.D. Crawford insisted that through the study of art, fashion history, 
and the artistic heritage of different countries and periods that was included in museums, 
American fashion design potential would develop. 
A young country, America did not have the same artistic atmosphere as France. In 
explaining the dominance of Paris, Women's Wear from 1912 noted, "On the side of the 
67 For a further discussion of American fashion designers please see: Crawford, The Ways of Fashion; 
Grace D. Ely, American Fashion Designers (New York: Personnel Group, 1935); Shaw, American 
Fashions, M.D.C. Crawford, "How Is a Costume Created?" Arts and Decoration (1921): 228-229. 
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Paris fashions is all the weight of long customs, great publicity, and real atmosphere, merit, 
and natural public preference. There is all the glamour of Paris."68 Could Americans create 
new marvels in fashion if provided with the same artistic knowledge as Europeans? Designed 
to inspire and edify, educational lectures were presented by eminent artists and university 
professors. Lectures included the topics of "History of Woolens, Worsteds, Silks, Ribbons, 
and Velvets," "Concerning the Practical Phases of Art Work," "About Dyestuffs of the 
Ancient World," "On Costume Design, Specifically The Various Colors, Lines, and Values 
of The Proportions of the Human Body," and "Textile Designers Studying Primitive Art At 
Schools And Museums."69 These lectures were designed to impart a similar knowledge and 
love of art as was considered common in Paris. 
Education 
Encouraged to develop domestic U.S. designing talent, public education in textile and 
apparel arts grew in the twentieth century. As early as 1911 there were independent schools 
of design such as The Anna Morgan School of Expression in Chicago, The Cooper Union 
and The Pratt Institute in New York City, and lesser well known schools such as Professor I. 
Rosenfeld's School of Designing on Second Avenue in New York City. By the 1920s, the 
apparel industry began the very slow process of recognizing the creativity of its own 
designers. According to a 1936 study on design as an occupation, in the 1920s firms went 
"looking for American designers."70 There was a plethora of programs and schools by the 
1930s to educate young native-born American designers. These schools included state 
68 
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70 Costume Design, 7. 
universities, teacher colleges, liberal arts colleges and universities, private art schools, and 
vocational colleges. State universities and teacher colleges typically offered courses in 
conjunction with home economic programs, stressing the selection of clothing and 
fundaments of clothing construction. Artistically minded schools, such as the Pratt Institute 
in New York, taught students fashion design, sewing, and drawing as well as pertinent 
business methods. Within the more commercially minded vocational schools, students 
typically decided between programs in fashion illustration and dress designing. Depending 
on the talent and needs of the student and the availability of jobs, students were encouraged 
to consider working in any area within the apparel industry, including manufacturing, 
retailing, fashion journalism, and even modeling. Prominent apparel industry members urged 
young designers to take history of textiles, costume design, and artistic courses and urged 
travel to exotic and domestic locales.71 
The combination of mass production with the growing desire for beauty and 
distinction made evident the importance of the study of psychology as related to fashion. 
Nascent designers were encouraged to analyze fashion tendencies in light of recent events 
and probable future trends and to recognize important silhouettes. Students were encouraged 
to train their powers of observation and analysis by keeping journals and scrapbooks, cutting 
out illustrations of dresses, suits, coats, hats and shoes, recording the popular designs. 
According to one dressmaker and tailor speaking to a group of students at the Teachers 
College of Columbia University, "It makes no difference how clever you may become with 
71 Julia Coburn, "So You Want to Be A Designer," Ladies Home Journal (1935): 22-5; "Designers, 
Stop Guessing!," Women's Wear, March 20, 1912, 9; "The Chicago Dressmakers' Club Convention," 
Women's Wear, March 15, 1911, 1,2; Catharine Oglesby, Fashion Careers: American Style (New 
York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1936), 69. 
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the pencil. The most important thing is to cultivate your aesthetic taste by observing and 
studying everything that is beautiful and harmonious in nature and in art." This dressmaker 
stated that it was more important to learn artistic drawing than pattern cutting because the 
United States had enough pattern makers; it needed artists. Young students needed to 
develop "interpretive design creations" and not blatantly copy Paris or U.S. designs.72 
Training was different for those hopeful designers of custom dress than those heading 
for careers in the ready-to-wear industry. High fashion designers apprenticed within couture 
houses and had the luxury of name association with particular lines or types of clothing. U.S. 
ready-to-wear manufactures and retailers demanded efficiency and salable goods from their 
designers. In the ready-to-wear apparel industry, successful styles effected a compromise 
between the creative ideas of the haute couture and the necessary economies of trade of mass 
production. To succeed in ready-to-wear, designers needed to create a great number of 
variations based on one model. 
At least in the early part of the twentieth century, women were discouraged from 
pursuing careers in design, because of the assumption that they would marry, have children, 
and abandon the profession. Leading proponents of the "American fashions for American 
women" urged manufacturers to pay designers enough money so that they could, "Work 
designs, eat designs, drink designs, and at night he must dream designs or pay a fine for 
72 M.D.C. Crawford, "We Need Interpretive Creation-Not Copying," Women's Wear, June 28, 1919, 
3; Henry Creange, "Safeguarding Industry Against the Pilfering of Ideas," The Guilds of America 
(New York: The Guilds of America Foundation, Inc., 1932), 3-4; "Grean Lectures on American 
Fashions," Women's Wear, November 23, 1912, 8-9; Henrietta Harman, "Development of the 
American Designer," Journal of Home Economics, 423-6; "What Makes a Good Designer?" 
Women's Wear, April 18, 1913, 4. 
every dream that is alien to the profession."73 As the twentieth century progressed women 
were encouraged to pursue careers in design. 
American apparel interests endorsed developments of consumer appreciation of the 
real value, both artistic and economic of purchasing American made clothing. Promotion of 
the American designer occurred as early as 1913. A particular film mentioned in Women's 
Wear, available in 1,400 American cities, devoted about three minutes to an exposition of the 
cause and purposes of the "American fashions for American women" movement, and then 
seven minutes of pictures showing models by the U.S. dressmakers Grean, Henry Newman, 
and others.74 
Advertising 
One reason American designers struggled to achieve fame in the early part of the 
twentieth century was due to the lack of attention from the press. Parisian designers were 
celebrated as superior creators of exquisite design, whereas American designers were 
routinely commended for their technical abilities for copying Parisian design. Advertising to 
consumers publicized the French designers Poiret, Doucet, Paquin, and Cheruit, while 
American designers were rarely mentioned in advertising spreads. According to dress 
designer James Blain, the newspapers were to blame for the "bewitching and hypnotizing of 
women" for all things Parisian.75 Each season, Parisian design decisions, tendencies, and 
innovations filled American department and specialty store ads. American stores rarely 
commented on U.S. made merchandise. According to Women's Wear, 
73 It is interesting to note that the author of the quote used the pronoun "he" whereas the title of the 
article was "Girls who Apply for Positions," Women's Wear, April 18, 1913, 4. 
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If we had the support of our own press (who are giving Paris so much free 
advertising) if they would recognize our talents without fearing that an ad might get 
lost by boosting our home industries, American women would soon generally 
realize the great mistake in buying the poorly finished and hurriedly made French 
dresses.76 
If the trade press promoted the advertising campaign of American designs for American 
women stores would be "Courageous in advocating and pushing American made goods."77 
American dressmakers wondered why the U.S. press gave so much space to French and other 
foreign merchants, especially since these advertisements competed with U.S. made clothing 
sold in retail shops. Manufacturers, however, were partly to blame for not advertising and 
making known their own designers. In advertisements to consumers manufacturers rarely 
listed their designers, choosing to highlight the company name. Interestingly, theatre 
programs publicized and recognized their American costume designers. According to one 
dressmaker, in 1912 there were 50% more American-made gowns worn in the theatre than 
1911, and 85% more than in 1910.78 
Suggestions for promoting American made goods varied. Many writers stressed 
advertising American made goods in U.S. newspapers. Other manufacturers and designers 
suggested developing special departments in stores or even the development of special chain 
stores that only carried American crafted merchandise. To "build up consumer appreciation 
76 
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of good materials and good design even in inexpensive merchandise" American retailers 
were urged to "sincerely and intelligently back talent"79 The women's ready-to-wear 
department of the Bush Terminal Sales Building hired U.S. designers to create "works of art" 
that were to be produced by the Bush manufacturing department and exclusively sold in their 
women's wear.department, thus creating, promoting, and selling American made ready-to-
wear clothing. It wasn't until 1919 that a U.S. magazine published six pages of illustrations 
of the costumes designed by U.S. designer Harry Collins.80 While the trade press clung 
tenaciously to French ideas of fashion, this was one of the first U.S. magazines to celebrate 
an American designer.81 
In the 1930s, the recognition of the importance of promoting American fashions by 
the U.S. retailer and the press resulted in, to a degree, the sponsorship of American designing 
talent.82 By 1940, however, the apparel industry was still grappling with the possible success 
of American fashion for American women. Some writers argued that the mass production of 
ready-to-wear clothing was something to marvel at, "like the production of automobiles, 
breakfast cereals, and canned foods, which are so integral a part of the American scene." 83 
Others, such as Marjorie Belle Clark in the September 1940 Textile World, continued to 
wonder if Americans had the proper mindset for producing works of art. According to Clark, 
In America, there are few people concerned with the business of feminine fashions 
who think first of the artistic achievement. Here we must make money. If we produce 
79 
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something beautiful and in good taste, it must also fit into the wardrobes and budgets 
of many people in order for enough of it to be sold to yield a profit.84 
Charles Rendigs, head of Nanty Frocks, high priced dresses selling for $150 to $550 
in 1930s, echoed Clark's statement in 1960. According to Rendings, 
We in America don't have time for originality. In France, a designer can sit with a 
cigarette in his mouth and think. He can go out to lunch for two hours and if he 
doesn't want to come back, he might not; he has time to be original. All you need to 
be successful in this country is to take a French garment with the originality etcetera 
add American ingenuity, talent, and machines then it can be done right.85 
Summary 
While some writers called the work of "American fashions for American women" 
prior to 1940 premature, it is evident that many voices requested and demanded a style 
independent of Paris. In 1941, when some within the ready-to-wear apparel industry claimed 
U.S. design styling and selling was "floundering" partly due to the absence of Paris, M.D.C. 
Crawford stated that "1914 to 1918 began the greatest era of prosperity and creative design in 
the costume industries of America."86 Clearly in this early period of the twentieth century, 
the recognition of American-made garments was important to the development, growth, and 
promotion of the U.S. women's ready-to-wear apparel industry. 
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed an influx of manufacturing and 
retailing businesses interested in promoting the consumption of fashion. At all price levels, 
U.S. made garments clothed the majority of U.S. women. American firms once solely reliant 
on Paris for garments and inspiration became convinced of the need to create their own 
styles. But, Parisian tradition, atmosphere, and laws that protected designers' works, were all 
84 Marjorie Belle Clark, "America...Refuge for Fashion," Textile World, (1940), 72. 
85 Fashion Institute of Technology Special Collections. 
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on the side of the Parisian designers. For the campaign of American fashions for American 
women to be successful, several changes needed to occur including a spirit of pride in 
American made garments and disappointment in Paris. 
World War I caused changes to the structure of the Parisian and U.S. apparel 
industries. American tariffs on Parisian goods were raised in part to assist the U.S. clothing 
industry. Paris, devastated by printing of paper money, sought to appeal to U.S. consumers. 
In doing so, however, commercialism, particularly evident in the multiplicity and uniformity 
of styles, prevailed. Further, rising wholesale and retail prices discouraged some Americans 
from purchasing from France. But, many Americans still desired the cachet associated with 
Parisian labels. American industries recognized their opportunity to grow and prosper by 
exploiting the desires of Americans for French garments by creating their own clothing with 
attached counterfeit Parisian labels. 
Perhaps angered by the lack of credit given for their creations, members of the ready-
to-wear industry developed a spirit to actively change the perception of American made 
clothing. Numerous proposals were discussed beginning almost as early as the movement of 
"American fashions for American women" to support and encourage emergent creative 
talents in the United States. These included a call to teach design students independence 
from Paris, to establish style libraries and museums for American designers, and a plea for 
U.S. stores to recognize American design talent and to use advertising to promote American 
fashion. Consumers also needed to be educated to understand and appreciate American 
design and garment styles. 
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In the 1930s, the recognition of the importance of promoting American fashions by 
the U.S. retailer and the press resulted in the sponsorship of American designing talent.87 
This would not have been possible, however, without the earlier attempts and foundation laid 
by early twentieth century writers, industry executives, and consumer interest groups. 
Appreciation of both the artistic beauty of American-made clothing and the economic 
benefits of developing an industry not dependent on Paris needed to occur. Efforts to educate 
designers, consumers, and the press concerning the benefit of supporting and developing 
American design seemed at times to be personal crusades. Coupled with the steep growth in 
apparel industry volume and profits, these efforts resulted in the strident arguments for 
American creative design talents. In the next section, I will discuss efforts to further promote 
American design through attempts to protect the works of fashion designers. 
87 Helen Cornelius, "American Designer Movement," 500-501. 
CHAPTER FOUR: AMERICAN STYLE PROTECTION ARGUMENTS 
Discussed in this chapter are the arguments by U.S. ready-to-wear women's apparel 
industry interests to regulate or to allow style piracy to flourish. The rapid growth of mass 
production, supported by the great number of firms created in the early twentieth century, 
stimulated style piracy. Manufacturers once satisfied with traveling to Paris to receive style 
inspiration grew in confidence and ability, and realized the need to create their own fashion 
identity. Other manufacturers producing primarily in the lower price ranges copied the 
successful garments of their American counterparts. This system of American style piracy 
created a large number of firms producing in all price ranges. Businesses did not have to hire 
designers or risk creating product failures; they simply needed to copy the successful styles 
of other American firms. But was style piracy hindering the growth of American creative 
talent? Arguments both for and against style piracy were heatedly debated. Discussed in this 
chapter are industry attempts to regulate style piracy as well as some of the more common 
ideas concerning the style piracy dilemma. 
Style and Design Piracy 
The practice of copying both garment styles and company trademarks began early in 
the development of the U. S. ready-to-wear apparel industry. Although dressmakers often 
copied and/or adapted the ideas of French couture designers for the custom market, the rise 
of the ready-to-wear industry meant an increased number of designers and manufacturers 
attempting to trade on the reputation of Parisian style. As more manufacturing firms entered 
the U.S. scene, many began hiring their own designers. However, a large percentage of 
manufacturers in the industry were so in the habit of copying European creations, were so 
lacking in originality and in facilities for doing their own designing, or lacked capital to 
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invest in designers, that they turned their attention to the copying of styles originated by the 
leaders of the United States.1 While the ethical considerations of copying remained 
ambiguous, one writer expressed relief and pride that the time had come "that it is considered 
vulgar to pirate French dressmakers instead of those of our own country."2 
As the women's ready-to-wear industry expanded rapidly in the 1890s, a trickle-down 
process of copying within the U.S. industry became a widespread practice. Style change was 
considered "the very essence of the industry," but something that created "a market with laws 
all its own."3 One of the most idiosyncratic characteristics of the women's trade was the 
rapidity with which rival firms copied high end manufacturers. Copied quickly, innovative 
styles were available at successively lower price points to consumers of economically diverse 
standings almost immediately. 
In 1913, according to the managing editor of the magazine Dress Essentials, "No 
sooner does a new idea or a new design appear upon the market today that it is fallen upon, 
seized, copied, and mangled by a horde of pirates who crouch in ambush awaiting the 
opportunity of stealing a ride upon the originality and brains of some enterprising 
competitor."4 The short life of a dress was due to the fact that new ideas were constantly 
being developed, and accepted by the public. According to M. D. C. Crawford, "The 
demand from the public is constantly for new things, for designs that appeal to a rapidly 
1 Grace D. Ely, American Fashion Designers (New York: Personnel Group, 1935), 21; Catharine 
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advancing artistic standard."5 Described by Cohen, after the expense of "thousands of 
dollars" to create a style intended to appeal to the American customer, copies appeared 
"within forty-eight hours." The only recourse was "multiplicity and rapidity of design at 
such frequent intervals" that competitors would "lag behind."6 Hence, manufacturers 
constantly introduced large numbers of new style variations. One manufacturer claimed 300 
"active numbers" or styles at a time, with styles tending to persist for only about six weeks.7 
The pervasiveness of style piracy affected the organization of the women's apparel 
industry. Styles copied at lower price points flooded the market with cheap imitations of 
higher end goods. Piracy permeated the industry; even copies were copied. According to Ida 
Tarbell, 
From top to bottom we are copying. The French or Viennese mode, started on 
upper Fifth Avenue, spreads to 23rd St., from 23rd St to 14th St., from 14th St. to 
Grand and Canal. Each move sees it reproduced in materials a little less elegant and 
durable; its colors a trifle vulgarized, its ornaments cheapened its laces poorer. A 
travesty, and yet a recognizable travesty.8 
Style piracy was easy to accomplish, especially with the system of American 
production. The high-price houses hired designers, sent them to Paris to research and 
sometimes copy the new styles, and took the risks associated with being innovative. 
Producers and sellers who successfully anticipated a fashion trend would receive profits 
assumed to be a reward for risk-taking. Those manufacturers, who guessed wrong on a 
presumed best-seller, took losses on unsold inventory and markdowns. 
5 M.D.C. Crawford, "High Time That Design Piracy Should Disappear," Women's Wear, February 7, 
1919,21. 
6 Julius Henry Cohen, Law and Order in Industry: Five Years Experience (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 
1916), 88. 
7 Bertha June Richardson, The Woman Who Spends: A Study of Her Economic Function (Boston: 
Thomas Todd Co., 1916), 69. This was originally published in 1904. See also Emma M. Hooper, 
"Remodeling Last Year's Gowns," The Ladies' Home Journal, June 1893, 26. 
8 Ida Tarbell, The Business of Being a Woman (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912): 122-3. 
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It was far easier and cheaper to copy the successful garments of American producers 
rather than research the latest trends, hire designers, risk product failure, or even spend the 
money on travel and customs duties for French goods. American sub-manufacturing firms 
often produced garments for more than one company. Company executives sent spies to 
these factories for purposes of observing and copying the most salable items. Reproduced 
within twenty-four hours, garments seen in factories, fashion shows, displayed in store 
windows, or illustrated in the press were quickly ubiquitous. 
Many U.S. firms, particularly the small and medium sized firms producing goods in 
the lower price ranges, saved money on operating costs by avoiding trips to Paris, by simply 
copying the garments of other American firms who themselves had copied the Parisian 
examples. Manufacturing firms copied rival firms of all price points. In estimates provided 
by Women's Wear, in 1913, a Parisian model was obtainable in New York for $300 to $400. 
Copied dresses in similar materials and with like ornamentation of these Parisian models 
were available for as little as $100 in the United States. For $25, adaptations of the original 
model in poorer materials and without the detailed workmanship were available. The fabric 
quality and delicacy of trimmings would certainly be less intricate in the $25 gown, yet the 
style of the garment would be recognizable.9 
Style Protection Arguments 
Style piracy affected the structure of the apparel industry. One of the greatest 
complications of the style piracy dilemma, however, was that few parties agreed on the 
implications of style piracy. In many ways, the style piracy debate intensified because of the 
Great Depression's influence on women's consumption habits. As already discussed, during 
9 
"Sales of Copied Models," Women's Wear, October 10, 1913, 2. 
the Great Depression, thousands of able-bodied, willing workers were unemployed. 
Accustomed to buying ready-to-wear in a variety of price and quality levels, women chose to 
buy less-expensive garments rather than cease buying altogether. Women comfortable paying 
$16.95 for their dresses shopped around for one at $10.95, while the $10.95 customer settled 
for a $6.95 dress. By 1933, the wholesale price of 79% of all dresses was $4.75 or less. The 
shift in consumer demands from high priced to low priced dresses caused a fundamental shift 
in the competitive relationship of the dress industry. More high priced than low priced firms 
went out of business. To meet consumer demand, lower priced firms grew tremendously.10 
Reacting to this situation, higher-priced manufacturers sought to forestall their own 
obsolescence in the industry and safeguard their investments by adding to their merchandise 
the element of fashion individuality. If garments could be protected based on style 
exclusivity, dress manufacturers and retailers would have an all-important selling point for 
fashion-conscious women. But, piracy allowed low priced houses to thrive. Consumers 
needed to have high priced fashions interpreted at lower prices. The arguments both for and 
against style protection were ambiguous and complex.11 
Arguments in Support of Style Protection 
Supporters of regulation against style piracy believed the practice detrimentally 
affected all individuals involved in the production and consumption process. As long as a 
style remained exclusive (protected against imitations) its creators and sellers would obtain 
profits of innovation. Leading trade publications called for collective action by both 
10 Leonard Drake and Carrie Glaser, Trends in the New York Clothing Industry (New York: Institute 
of Public Administration, 1942), 78. 
11 Many of these arguments were presented at the N.I.R.A. hearings regarding the code of fair 
competition for the dress industry and the FOGA v. FTC court case, which will be discussed in much 
further detail in chapter five. 
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manufacturers and retailers to deal with piracy as early as 1910. Women's Wear called the 
practice the "copying evil."12 Proponents believed style protection would eliminate "the 
ever-present fear which exists today that to create new ideas is only to furnish one's 
competitors with added material for carrying on their campaign of style piracy and price 
slashing."13 Those who supported design protection believed the interests of manufacturers, 
retailers, consumers, and laborers would be best served by some form of design protection. 
The manufacturers' interest 
According to supporters of style protection, the practice of piracy resulted in great 
economic losses and disadvantages to manufacturers. Style piracy allowed manufacturers of 
all price levels the opportunity to profit from others' work. Manufacturers who spent the 
time, effort, and money to create original garments would see their profits diluted when 
imitators created similar goods in lower prices, which consumers willingly bought. The 
original garment styles would most probably be un-saleable especially if cheaper imitations 
were available. Some consumers, mainly those of lesser economic status could only afford 
the cheap imitation; while other, wealthier customers would not tolerate purchasing the 
higher quality original garment because cheaper variations were also available. Supporters 
of protection argued that copyists caused unfair trade practices; that they profited from the 
hard work of originators and then undersold these same originators. 
Constantly creating new style variations, manufacturers of original merchandise 
struggled to retain their businesses. These companies spent money to develop and produce 
12 Women's Wear, Oct. 29, 1910, as quoted in Bernard Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial 
Development: The American Clothing Industry in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries," (Ph.D. 
diss., Yale University, 1989). 
13 Alphonsus Haire, "Pirated Designs," 10. 
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original goods. Because styles were copied quickly, these original manufacturers needed to 
constantly revise their creations, generating slight variations of previous models. Since styles 
changed so quickly, manufacturers often produced small quantities, rather than large 
numbers of any one garment. Piracy promoted the production of constantly changing, small 
inventories of merchandise. Further, cancelled orders were a frequent complaint of 
manufacturers. Pilfered copies available in retail stores often meant withdrawn orders for 
manufacturers of the original styles. Stated by Johnston and Fitch, "manufacturing became a 
series of sprints between originators to make and sell their dresses and pirates to quickly 
copy the style of each popular dress, followed by slack periods in which all waited for 
another popular style to be developed."14 
With protection, the proponents of control assumed that the situation would be 
reversed, and that the expenditures of money, effort and time involved in creating original 
styles would be recovered. It was also assumed that stability of the industry would ensue. 
Rather than frantically produce new style variations, manufacturers could rely on the merits 
of their production and extensively reproduce successful styles. According to supporters of 
style protection, the protecting of garment styles against copying would eliminate rapid style 
changes and constant variations, lengthening the seasons of operation and avoiding wastes 
resulting from swift change. 
The retailers ' interest 
According to those who proposed the prohibition of style piracy, copying was a heavy 
burden on retailers. Primarily, style piracy encouraged retailers to adopt a hand-to-mouth 
14 A C. Johnston & Florence A. Fitch, Design Piracy: The Problem and Its Treatment Under NRA 
Codes (Washington: Office of N.R.A. Administration, 1936), 40. 
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buying approach from manufacturers. Orders were small and many retailers hesitated to 
reorder garments as anything fashionable would be quickly copied in lower price levels. If 
retailers did stock a number of dresses in a particular style there was always the risk that 
copies would saturate the market, and consumers who had purchased the original might later 
see a copy of it at another store at a lower price. The consumer might think that the retailer 
from whom she bought the original lacked ability to select distinctive models or that she had 
been overcharged. The customer returned goods to the retailer and discontinued shopping in 
certain outlets. If retailers could not sell their merchandise due to style piracy, prices were 
marked-down at an economic loss to the retailer. 
Those who wanted style protection believed that if garment designs were protected, 
retailers would be able to anticipate and order large amounts of goods, thus saving time and 
money on cancelled orders and marked down merchandise resulting from piracy. These 
proponents argued that piracy caused cheap imitations of goods and that protection would 
eliminate inexpensive knock-offs, restoring customer loyalty and purchasing habits. One of 
the main complaints of piracy was the multiplicity of similar styles. The presumption of 
supporters of protection was that a style that appealed to some women would automatically 
appeal to many women. The prohibition of copying, according to proponents, would allow 
for a greater diversification of products because manufacturers would have to create their 
own style ideas in garments. In light of the business failures caused by the Great Depression, 
supporters of protection argued that the diversity of garment styles created for specific price 
points would permit retailers ample opportunities to become more specialized, presumably 
creating niche markets less susceptible to business failure. 
103 
The consumers ' interest 
One of the ways in which pirated copies appeared so quickly on the market was 
through the use of cheap materials. These materials were often of poorer quality than the 
more expensive resources used by the higher priced manufacturers. According to supporters 
of style protection, great waste resulted from the use of poor quality merchandise. Retailers 
and manufacturers were forced to continuously turnover their merchandise because 
consumers desired new items. Rather than purchase expensive goods of high quality 
materials that might not sell to consumers, retailers ordered cheap imitations of the popular, 
expensive garments. Proponents of style protection argued that women drifted away from 
quality high-priced merchandise to similarly styled, lower quality, inexpensive dresses due to 
design piracy. The assumption was that if styles were protected, women would once again 
purchase expensive garments. This argument did not take into account the effects of the 
Great Depression on women's consumption habits. This argument also assumed ability to 
judge the quality of materials, which not everyone possessed. 
According to supporters, style protection would eliminate the practice of selling 
clothing made of inferior materials. Manufacturers forced to create original merchandise 
would be compelled to create salable goods. One proven way of selling goods was through 
high quality standards. High quality goods, not dependent on style variations, would lengthen 
the usability of garments. Women would thus save time, money, and energy purchasing 
goods less sensitive to change. In addition, consumers who desired distinctive articles could 
safely rely upon the exclusiveness of protected items. The perpetuation of class distinction 
through dress was a common underlying argument of the proponents of style protection. If 
styles were protected, styles would presumably be recognizable as clothing items targeted to 
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high, middle, or low consumers. Style protection would serve to obviously differentiate 
between the elite and the less economically able. Arguments for style protection were counter 
to the broad consumer trend during this period of purchasing lower quality, fashionable 
goods. 
The interests of labor 
According to supporters of protection, piracy negatively affected the interests of 
labor, from the designers to the most unskilled workers. Piracy utilized the products of a 
relatively few number of designers because companies copied established fashions rather 
than hiring designers to create new modes. If protection was given to industry, the competent 
designers trained in vocational schools and colleges would find profitable work. 
Another concern was that price became the basis of competition, since firms tried to 
offer similar styles at the lowest possible costs to themselves and to their consumers. To save 
costs, employees were paid minimum wages for long hours. Wages were frequently lowered 
as price became the primary competitive edge for many companies. Needleworkers were 
especially affected by piracy. Frequently paid by the piece, they couldn't learn styles fast 
enough to master new construction techniques and details, and thus could not make a living 
wage. It was asserted that the protection of styles would result in better working conditions 
including higher pay for employees, because manufacturers would need a more constant 
supply of stable goods, rather than constantly producing garments with only minor style 
variations.15 
15 A C. Johnston & Florence A. Fitch, Design Piracy; May Allinson, Industrial Experience of Trade 
School Girls in Massachusetts (Boston: The Department of Research: Women's Educational and 
Industrial Union, Studies in Economic Relations of Women, Vol. 9, 1917), 217. 
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Arguments Against Style Protection 
Those industry members opposing style protection argued that the growth of the dress 
industry was due to two primary forces; the ability to supply fashionable merchandise at low 
prices and to the frequent changes of fashion which caused the obsolescence of articles 
before their actual utility had been exhausted. They contended that frequent turnover of 
styles, caused by copying, accounted for the sizable volume of business done by the ready-to-
wear apparel industry. Manufacturers who were opposed to style protection frequently 
produced goods in the lower price points. These manufacturers were concerned that style 
protection would destroy their ability to create fashionable garments at cheap prices. It was 
after all, their purpose to copy the latest high-fashion, high-price styles into garments lower 
income consumers could afford. Those who opposed style protection felt that the 
manufacturer, retailer, consumer, and laborer would be hurt by style protection and that style 
protection was only in the best interest of the higher priced manufacturers.16 
The manufacturers ' interest 
Supporters of design piracy asserted that protection would cause greater industry 
problems than allowing piracy to continue unchecked. If designs were protected, 
manufacturers would be slowed down in the creative process, trying to prove originality and 
avoid possible infringements. Further, infringements would be innumerable, some deliberate, 
but others innocent because of simultaneous origination of styles by different individuals. 
Opponents of protection worried that the complexity of the arguments concerning original 
garments versus adaptations of pre-existing garments would be overlooked by design 
16 Many of these arguments were presented at the N.I.R.A. hearings regarding the code of fair 
competition for the dress industry and the FOGA v. FTC court case, which will be discussed in much 
further detail in chapter five. 
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protection legislation. In addition, better capitalized manufacturers could hire highly skilled 
designers, register all of the desirable styles, and thus preempt others in the field from 
creating salable merchandise. 
The retailers ' interest 
Opponents of style protection believed retailers would bear the burden of 
responsibility of anti-piracy enforcement. In most proposed style protection plans, retailers 
were required to discern pirated and original goods purchasing only the novel ones. The 
matter of enforceability of plans for style protection afforded the most abundant field for 
condemnation by opponents of style protection. The administration of a broad plan for style 
protection across the dress industry would be so burdensome as to be wholly impracticable; 
the enforcement of rights near impossible. In the dress industry alone there might potentially 
be over one million styles that could be registered as original each year.17 
Retailers specializing in the lowest priced brackets would be hurt the worst. 
Opponents feared that women used to purchasing stylish merchandise at cheap prices would 
rebel against purchasing lower priced merchandise not exactly in fashion that distinguished 
her from wealthier citizens. Some worried that women might revert to the practice of home 
dressmaking with consequent damaging affects on the dress industry.18 
The consumers ' interest 
It is in the relation to consumer interests that the opponents of style protection 
affirmed some of their most fervent arguments. First, for a garment to become a fashion, it 
needed to diffuse to a critical mass of people. Opponents of style protection argued that 
17 A C. Johnston & Florence A. Fitch, Design Piracy. 
18 William Silverman, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, 
Hearing on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 156-166. 
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effective and cheap reproductions of style goods diffused garment styles to all economic 
levels, and thus created fashion. They argued that middle and lower income consumers had a 
right to enjoy current fashions. Style exclusivity due to protection would cause obvious class 
distinctions visible through clothing. It was assumed that current fashions would be 
unavailable to lower income consumers until exhausted by more wealthy citizens. Consumers 
had a legitimate interest in obtaining copied merchandise. Opponents pointed out that, in 
1934, about 80% of the public purchased in the "popular priced" or lower price points. 
Opponents of style protection argued that protection would provide support only to high-
priced manufacturers and the wealthiest clientele who presumably did not want others of 
lesser economic classes in similar styles of garments.19 
The interests of labor 
Those against regulation assumed that laborers were not harmed by style piracy. The 
excess of styles produced due to piracy created a huge number of jobs for both skilled and 
(mostly) unskilled workers. Style protection, according to supporters, would lengthen 
seasons and cause greater stability of styles. Opponents of protection reasoned that greater 
stability and longer seasons would mean less available work, especially for unskilled and 
temporary labor.20 
Regulating Piracy 
If the arguments for and against regulating style piracy were contradictory, creating 
an agreeable style protection plan was nearly impossible. There was little agreement even 
19 Ibid., 151-160; Samuel Hartman, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery 
Administration, Hearing on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 156-
166. 
20 Sachar, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, Hearing on the 
Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 148, 150-151. 
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among advocates of style protection as to how accomplish their goals. First, would protection 
extend to an entire garment or for mere elements of a dress? Would the creator of the 
original garment have exclusive rights over who duplicated the garment? Further, once 
protection was given to a garment, how long would the term of protection last and when 
would protection begin?21 The inherent mutability of fashion made answers to the questions 
vague at best. 
In the 1930s, recommended solutions for ending style piracy included the already 
existing processes of trademarks, copyrights, and patents. A trademark may be defined as a 
convenient way of disclosing the commercial source or origin of goods which are sold in 
trade. Although the practice had existed in men's wear for several decades, few women's 
wear manufacturers or companies appear to have adopted the suggestion. The women's 
industry was quite disorganized with a plethora of small and medium sized firms in the early 
twentieth century. The apparel industry was also marked by high insolvency rates. 
Trademarks were successful largely because they caused name-brand identification with 
certain products. The fluidity of a firm's existence in the women's trade did not lend itself to 
style protection based on stability of name recognition. Individual owners of firms often 
entered the apparel industry in one capacity, left to pursue other opportunities (or were forced 
to resign or dissolve the business), only to create a new business with a different name. 
Trademarks clearly would not have followed individual business owners through their many 
entrances and exits, name and employee changes in the trade. Further, it is questionable if 
women in the early twentieth century identified with a product name. It is more likely women 
21 Kenneth Hutchinson, "Design Piracy," Harvard Business Review 53, no. 2 (Winter 1940): 191-198. 
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purchased garments on style and price considerations, and chose to shop in familiar retail 
stores.22 
Copyrighting and patenting apparel styles were other recommended solutions to the 
copying problem. While some designers tried to copyright and patent their garment styles, 
these attempts proved largely unsuccessful. Copyright laws protected only two dimensional 
works of art such as paintings and poems. Originators of fashions often tried to copyright 
other aspects of their creations to ward off imitators. Some manufacturers and designers 
numbered or named their more important models (Figure 4.1). Madame Simcox was one 
such U.S. designer who named and then copyrighted the names of her designs. Each dress 
included copyright papers protecting the work from appropriation by outsiders. Legal owners 
of the style would have a right to sue interlopers for the amount stated in the papers of 
copyright. Copyrighted names merely created an influx of advertisements that stated styles 
were based on or adaptations of various designer garments recognizable by name.23 
22 
"Trademark Use Was Exploited by Ancients," Women's Wear, August 1, 1919, 31. 
23 Irene Blunt, "Fighting the Design Pirate," Journal of the Patent Office Society 15 (1933): 29-35. 
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Figure 4.1 Dress with copyrighted numbers. This manufacturer was included in Bonwit 
Teller advertising. 
Source: "Exclusive, Registered, Fashions of American Design," The New York Times, May 6, 1934, 
sec.2, 18. 
Patent law protection required proof of style originality and novelty. Typically, 
patents were granted for technical innovations; an example of this would be the "Whirlpool" 
stitching used in brassieres to stabilize the shape of the cup.24 The securing of patents 
required from two to six months, and sometimes years. Waiting for patents, designers would 
lose time in marketing the product and would run the risk of having the style pirated before 
24 Even this patent was sidestepped by clever competitors, using different stitch configurations. See: 
Jane Farrell-Beck, and Colleen Gau, Uplift: The Bra in America (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 66. 
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receiving title. Patents were expensive, as patents for three and a half, seven, and fourteen 
years typically cost $10, $15, or $30, plus $20 for lawyer's fees. The cost of the patents 
proved absurd as some manufacturers created hundreds of different dress styles which would 
remain popular for a limited time. Some designers did patent elements of the dress garments 
including technical elements such as the type of stitching, use and placement of zippers, and 
even the names of garments. Many manufacturers introduced their garments with patented 
names.25 
In addition to the expenses of securing patents, patent holders were then responsible 
for enforcing the patent, having to watch for and sue infringers. In one such case the 
manufacturing company of Forsch, Benjamin Company sued the Morris W. Haft & Bros. 
Company for infringement on patented elements of a particular patented garment (Figure 
4.2). Due to the infeasibility of patent and copyright laws, industry spokespeople proposed 
other strategies such as brand name advertising and the creation of product standards 
(including the regulation and stabilization of price) to deal with the chaotic pace of product 
innovation and style piracy. 26 
25 Kenneth Hutchinson, "Design Piracy," Harvard Business Review 53, no. 2 (Winter 1940): 191-198. 
26 
"American Styles for American Women," Women's Wear, November 4, 1912, 1; John P. Nikonow, 
"Patent Protection for New Designs of Dresses," Journal of the Patent Office Society, March 1935, 
253-4; "They Steal Styles and Numbers," The New York Times, June 20, 1914, 11. 
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Design Patent in Dispute. 
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Illustration attached to papers in iui< o/ F or sell, Benjamin Co. 
against A/orris W. Haft & Broj., /nc. 
Figure 4.2 Design patent in dispute. The illustration is the patent registration, including front 
and back views of the garment produced by the Forsch, Benjamin Company. 
Source: "Design Patent in Dispute," Women's Wear Daily, April 3, 1935, 2. 
Legal Attempts to Regulate Piracy 
The ineffectiveness of patent and copyright laws to protect styles caused great 
concern among many in the apparel industry. Numerous bills were introduced in Congress to 
remedy the piracy problem. One of the first U.S. acts to address the problem was the Kahn 
Act of 1913. European artists banded together and decided to not attend the Panama-Pacific 
International Exposition of 1914 unless their goods were protected against copyists. It did not 
extend, however, to U.S. designers or their goods. The lack of protection angered many 
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creative clothing artists. The Kahn Act did inspire American manufacturers to lobby 
Washington for style protection.27 
In January of 1914, Representative William A. Oldfield of Arkansas, chairman of the 
House Committee on Patents, introduced the first measure on style registration in Congress. 
Thorvald Solberg, head of the Copyright Office, accumulated considerable evidence of the 
widespread need for such legislation. The bill languished before it could pass because of the 
succession of Mr. Oldfield as committee chairman by Representative Martin A. Morrison of 
Indiana. 
Frustrated by the lack of results, designers, manufacturers and others interested in the 
protection of styles formed the Design Registration League in 1914. This league sought 
special legislation through Congress, which would provide a workable, inexpensive and 
quick means of protecting or establishing ownership rights of a commercial style. Design 
League work resulted in the introduction of a few bills to Congress. Lobbied by the Design 
League, Representative Martin A. Morrison of Indiana introduced a bill to Congress in 1916. 
The eponymous Morrison Bill afforded copyright registration to the author of any new and 
original style of apparel, "as embodied in or applied to any manufactured product," including 
surface styles. This bill would have provided protection to textile printing. With American 
involvement in World War I in 1917, the Morrison Bill was laid aside.28 
Representative Albert H. Vestal of Indiana and Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas 
presented a new draft of a bill for style protection in 1925. The Vestal Bill recommended to 
the House in 1925, would "encourage and promote the production of artistic styles in the 
27 Sylvan Gotshal and Alfred Leif, The Pirates will Get You (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1945), 11, 15. 
28 Ibid., 16. 
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United States by furnishing adequate protection against piracy for artistic articles." The 
Vestal Bill favored prompt and inexpensive registration of styles (first in the patent and then 
in the copyright office); a two year term for a two dollar fee, and a right to an eighteen year 
extension for twenty dollars. The Vestal Bill eliminated the need for affidavits of originality, 
and made fraudulent applications to the Copyright Office a misdemeanor. Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover strongly supported the Vestal Bill, stating that Paris abounded in 
styles for textiles, leather, jewelry, etc, and that the "United States needed to achieve a larger 
measure of artistic independence."29 
Certain department stores feared that if passed into law, the Vestal Bill would hamper 
the free flow of goods and that the bill suggested that retailers as a group would be held 
accountable for selling infringing goods. Retail stores also feared the prospect of false 
claims, intimidation by manufacturers, inability to reorder, and a monopoly of fashions by 
those who registered their garment styles. When the bill was argued before the House, 
Congressmen Vestal stated that style copyright would open the door to greater employment 
of designers, enable manufacturers to produce larger quantities more cheaply, establish 
honest competition among manufacturers, and afford consumers a choice of competing 
designs at competing prices in every range. The Bill was passed by the House in the winter of 
1930 to 1931 but Congress adjourned before it was presented to the Senate.30 
The Senate committee led by Chairman Sirovich discussed how to give protection to 
designers and manufacturers without doing harm or injury to somebody else, particularly the 
retailer. The committee decided that the Vestal Bill was far too broad in its scope. Professor 
29 Ibid., 27-38. 
30 Oscar Geier, "What has Been Accomplished towards Protecting Textile Designers," Journal of the 
Patent Office Society 16 (1934): 221-227. 
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Karl Penning of Georgetown University was called by Chairman Sirovich to prepare a new 
bill passable by Congress. He evolved a hybrid plan of style registration. This plan stated that 
the Register of Copyrights would establish a searchable file of styles. Garments deemed 
original and novel would receive a certificate of copyright within seven days with a term of 
copyright of 5. years. Introduced as a bill in 1933 and again in 1935, the bill failed to receive 
approval each time. By 1940, a total of thirty-nine different bills were introduced to 
Congress. The closest to enactment was the Vestal Bill and another, titled S.3047, which 
amended the copyright law of 1909, by the Senate in July of 1935.31 
Trade Association Attempts to Regulate Piracy 
Besides relying on governmental legislation, industry players suggested trade unions 
to support and protect their investments. Discussed in the following section were those 
pertinent to protecting against design piracy. The women's ready-to-wear apparel industry 
grew at an amazing rate in the early twentieth century. Both small and large firms entered 
and exited the apparel business often and in numerous variations. Firms would begin, 
dissolve, and begin again. There was little standardization of uniform trade practices within 
the ready-to-wear apparel industry. Crude business practices and "thoughtless disregard for 
the rights of their employees and public" were common.32 According to economics and 
finance professor Jesse Pope, as the nineteen-teens progressed there was increased wealth 
31 Sylvan Gotshal, Today's Fight for Design Protection (New York: Sylvan Gotshal, 1957); Irene 
Blunt, "Fighting the Design Pirate;" Henry Williams, "Report of the Committee on Protection of 
Designs," Journal of the Patent Office Society 15 (1933), 807-813; Geier, "What has Been 
Accomplished Towards Protecting Textile Designers;" Joseph Rossman, "Proposed Registration of 
Designs," Journal of the Patent Office Society 17 (1935): 995-998; Walter Derenberg, "Commercial 
Prints and Labels: A Hybrid in Copyright Law," Journal of the Patent Office Society 22 (1940): 452-
468; Thomas Hudson, "A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the U.S.," 
Journal of the Patent Office Society 30 (1948): 380-400. 
32 Jesse E. Pope, The Clothing Industry in New York (New York: Burt Franklin, 1905): 195. 
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and respectability of firms which changed the organization of the apparel industry. Trade 
unions were formed to affect apparel industry conditions such as sweatshops, child labor, 
piracy, and other abuses.33 
Perhaps following the lead of the men's shirt trade which used trademarks and logos 
to identify goods and protect against piracy, the American Cloak and Suit Review advocated 
collective action by the larger manufacturers and retailers to deal with style piracy. It called 
for the "reputable" producers to put company labels on their merchandise to "protect the 
legitimate trade from the pirates and harriers that...grow fat from their spoils."34 It suggested 
that such seals could distinguish the worthy merchandise from the cheap imitations. The 
National Cloak, Suit, and Skirt Manufacturers Association and its allied Dress and Waist 
Division formed style committees to regulate the introduction of new styles. They sought 
"the emancipation for all legitimate American trade interests from an irksome and 
unnecessary dependency upon Parisian openings." The committees urged association 
members to reduce the number of new styles they introduced. They suggested general 
guidelines for the style of coat and shirtwaist sleeves, and the length, fabric, cut, and color of 
jackets and skirts, presumably to limit the magnitude of style changes. These attempts were 
fairly successful in the cloak and suit trade mainly because of the great organizational 
structure of this industry. In addition, cloaks and suits were more standardized products, 
easier to regulate, than those of the dress industry.35 
33 See also: Henry Creange, "Safeguarding Industry Against the Pilfering of Ideas," The Guilds of 
America (New York: The Guilds of America Foundation, Inc., 1932), 3-4. 
34 American Cloak and Suit Review, November 1912, 110 as quoted in Bernard Smith, "A Study of 
Uneven Industrial Development: The American Clothing Industry in the Late 19th and Early 20th 
Centuries," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1989), 202. 
35 Smith, "A Study of Uneven Industrial Development," 204; "The Cloak Designers' Convention," 
Women's Wear, March 22, 1912, 1. 
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Much of the early work by trade associations in the dress industry in the nineteen 
teens and nineteen twenties served more as propaganda for the promotion of American style 
not dependent on Paris than as collective action to end style piracy. Throughout the nineteen 
teens the Society for American Fashions for American Women suggested the protection of 
styles as providing support and protection to the dress industry. They offered few concrete 
suggestions for protecting garment styles however. 
Other people and organizations vehemently cried for anti-piracy initiatives in the 
trade press of the nineteen teens. Frequently quoted were the members of The National 
Ladies' Tailors and Dressmakers Association. They met in June of 1912 for a convention in 
which they proposed ways to protect American ideals, to promote New York City as a world 
center of style and merchandise, and to protect against piracy. Speakers urged the notion of 
American styles for American women in order to break away from the tyranny of foreign 
designers. Mentioned throughout the 1930s, this organization accomplished little in regard to 
concrete plans for stopping style piracy.36 
The silk textile industry had greater success than the dress industry in attempting to 
protect textile styles. This success in protection of print styles was accomplished for two 
reasons. First of all, the silk textile industry had the support of most industry players. 
Converters, dyers, weavers, etc. participated and supported the program. Second, the 
originality of styles in printed fabrics was far broader than that of dresses. A paisley pattern 
could have any number of variations of color, line, shape, and type, to make nearly all paisley 
36 
"National Ladies Tailors and Dressmakers Association Plan Fashion Congress," Women's Wear, 
April 11, 1911, 5; "Style Congress of Ladies Tailors and Dressmakers Opens," Women's Wear, June 
27, 1912, 1; "Leading Tailors and Dressmakers Organize for Protection and Elevation of Their 
Industry," Women's Wear, October 9, 1919, 1, 38. 
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patterns a unique variation. Whereas, the popular lines of garment styles take into account 
more of the silhouette and general look than intricacies of pattern. 
In 1928, the Silk Textile Industry, which would later become the National Textile 
Association, established a style registration bureau for the protection of print styles. Before 
putting a style into production manufacturers needed to submit their style plan to the bureau 
to obtain a comparison with all others of a similar type to determine whether it resembled a 
style already in use. Manufacturers were able to save production expense and loss of time in 
fruitless promotion of an already available print style. The bureau was a clearing house of 
style. Printers agreed to refuse to print any style not registered with the bureau. The term of 
registration was 2 years, later reduced to one year, later to six months or a season. Renewals 
were possible. There was a four dollar fee for registering and a $1.50 fee for renewal. The 
success of the plan was attributable to a number of factors including a closely knit trade 
association and the very nature of print styles which may be varied to obtain an almost 
infinite number of different styles. For its first year, the Silk Textile Industry Bureau of 
Registration was touted as a success; 3,045 registrations were granted.37 
The self-registration and regulation of the silk textile industry was not meaningful to 
courts of law however. Regardless of the certificates offered to designers, copyright law did 
not extend to fashion works. The Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corporation decision in 1929 
made this point clear and shook the efficacy of the registration bureau. The Cheney Brothers 
had marked the selvage of polka-dot fabrics with the notice: "Original Design-All Rights 
Reserved," in the attempt to protect against undue copying. The Doris Silk Corporation 
37 Gotshal and Leif, The Pirates will get You, 54; A C. Johnston & Florence A. Fitch, Design Piracy: 
The Problem and Its Treatment Under NRA Codes, xii. 
119 
copied the polka-dots of the Cheney silks. Cheney took the Doris Silk Corporation to court 
claiming that the polka dot style was illegally copied by Doris. Cheney asked for a 
preliminary injunction restraining Doris from manufacturing or selling silk piece goods with 
this style. The motion was denied. Copying of garment styles and decorative designs was not 
forbidden by law. Judge Julian W. Mack of the United States District Court did indicate that 
while the "plaintiff suffered a grievance for which there should be a remedy, judges have 
only limited power to amend the law." 38 Pirates took this decision as license to copy. 
The 1930s were the most prolific decade for attempts to regulate style piracy. This 
was because of the damaging affects of the Great Depression on higher priced manufacturing 
and retailing interests. As was noted in Chapter Two, the Great Depression caused more high 
end firms than low end firms to go out of business because women needed to purchase 
economically more affordable garments. Perhaps ignoring the effects of the Depression, 
some within the higher priced establishments believed piracy was the root of the general 
public's interest in lower priced clothing, which ultimately caused high-priced business 
dissolutions and bankruptcies. Discussed briefly in this section were the more prominent 
organizations in the 1930s which sought to end piracy. 
The Dress Creators League of America incorporated on November 11, 1932. Their 
stated purposes were to "band together manufacturers who are the creators of styles and 
fashions for mutual protection and benefit and for the protection of property rights in original 
styles and fashions, and to prevent the copying and pirating of such styles by others." 
Members of the Dress Creators League manufactured dresses in the $10.75 price line and as 
such were not included within the initial FOGA policy which provided protection to high-
38 Gotshal and Leif, The Pirates will get You, 63. 
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priced lines $22.50 wholesale and up. Before the FOGA changed their policies to include 
lower priced affiliates, the Dress Creators League ran advertising spreads proclaiming their 
goals, and regularly held fashion shows of group members (Figure 4.3). After the FOGA 
included lower priced houses into their guild, the Dress Creators League retained their 
distinctive name yet participated in the Guilds' program as a protective affiliate. The Dress 
Creators League did not have a registration bureau or a formulated plan for stopping 
industry-wide piracy. After FOGA dissolution, the League seemed to disappear. A less 
publicized group with aims similar to the Dress Creators League was the National 
Association of Style Creators incorporated in 1934.39 
The Fashion Group International was founded in 1931 by prominent women in the 
fashion industry. Originally established in New York City during the 1940s, the group had a 
network of branch groups in cities across the country with the purposes of bringing together 
women executives in the fashion industry. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the group held 
regular meetings where topics relevant to executives in the fashion industry as well as 
covering topics of interest to consumers.40 
39 Dress Creators' League of America, Incorporation Papers, November 1932, New York Department 
of State; Samuel Zahn, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, 
Hearing on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry; The National 
Association of Style Creators, Incorporation Papers, November 1934, New York Department of State. 
40 Sandra S. Buckland, "Promoting American Fashion 1940 through 1945: From Understudy to Star" 
(Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1996), 52. 
121 
M E M B Ê R S  
Adorable Frocks, Inc. 
Baum, Krsvat & Be um 
F. E. D. Dree» Cjo., 
Goldman FrockjCo. 
Hariman-Adelman, 
International Dress 
Jomark, Inc. 
•Mo»kowilz & Pa^nek, Inc. 
New York Drcea & 
Parisian Mfg. Co., 1 nc. 
V.. H. D. Bobbins C a. 
Roecn Bros. Frock*, Inc. 
Sakin- & Levinc, Inc. 
Slieîta-Lyhn Dresse^, Inc. 
Sol Wood Co.* Inc. 
i THE FORMATION „I ,1, 
DRESS CREATORS LEAGUE 
OF AMERICA INC. 
41 
tac. 
Inc. 
Inc. 
Co.* Inc. 
Costume Co., Inc. 
I 
an organisation dedicated to foster 
originality and to serve a kroad 
range of otfier constructive pur­
poses in tfie $1O.5O field. 
T • lhe undersigned firms, Specializing in the création and pro* 
duct ion of dresses at $10.50 have formed the Dress Creators 
League of America as a ipedium of co-ordinated activity and 
enlightened expression for the "fashion originators in tfidr die 
vision of the ^dustry and to tender a maximum of tangiWe 
co-operation to retailers die country over. 
Membership in this group is confined to those houses {fiat 
concentrate upon individuality of design, through the main* 
tainiiig of extensive designing staffs and through die exclusive 
interpretation of imports. . 
i : 
Comprised of houses that conform to^the highest standard» 
of ethical ptactke, &« l|eague will conduct consistent en­
deavors through which the stability of their field can ha en# ; > 
hanc^d and through which an cqiiitaMc relationship can fx 
assured to retail merchants and sources of supply. 
ESS CREATORS LEAGUE OF AMERICA INC 
Figure 4.3 Dress Creators League of America inaugural announcement. 
Source: "Announcing the Formation of the Dress Creators League of America, Inc." Women's Wear 
Daily, December 1, 1932, 14. 
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Similar to the situation in the nineteen teens, the nineteen thirties witnessed a great 
number of fleeting organizations. Women's Wear Daily regularly printed brief articles 
concerning initial meetings of associations. A number of these industry organizations were 
founded in support of more ethical ways of doing business; concerning both style piracy and 
the trade practices between retailers and manufacturers. Due to their transitory nature, a brief 
mention of a few of these groups follows. 
The American Society of Style Creators formed in 1930 with the objective of 
"developing and fostering the ability and talent of American creators and bringing about 
better understanding and business relations with foreign couturiers." The National 
Association of Style Creators, Inc., incorporated in New York State November 16, 1934 "to 
protect creators and originators of styles in the dress manufacturing industry." Formed to end 
unfair practices in the garment industry, including piracy, the Garment Industries Board of 
Trade, Inc. consisted of dress manufacturers who were not members of the FOGA. 41 
Not all groups were for the prevention of style piracy. The stated purposes of the 
Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group included: "to promote the general welfare, 
progress, and development of the popular priced dress industry and to promote its services to 
the public; to improve relations between labor and employers; and to secure to its members 
freedom from unjust and unlawful exactions." The Popular Priced Manufacturers Group 
incorporation coincided with the inclusion of piracy provisions in the Dress Code Authority's 
List of Fair Trade Provisions, created under the auspices of the National Recovery 
Administration. The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group strongly encouraged the 
41 The American Society of Style Creators, Incorporation Papers, 1930, New York Department of 
State; The National Association of Style Creators, Incorporation Papers, November 1934, New York 
Department of State. 
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Federal Trade Commission to investigate the FOGA, which led to the legal decision against 
the Guild.42 
Summary 
This chapter briefly discussed the arguments by U.S. ready-to-wear women's apparel 
industry interests to either regulate style piracy or to allow it to flourish. American growth of 
manufacturing firms caused a new problem in the United States; firms copied other 
American firms. While some within the industry felt this piracy was detrimental to all 
involved in the industry from manufacturers to consumers, others felt piracy was the cause of 
rapid economic growth and development. The arguments both for and against piracy in the 
industry were contradictory, complex, highly subjective, and not easily resolved. This was in 
part why the piracy issue continued to be so derisive well into the twentieth century. 
Almost everyone in the apparel trade accepted that piracy affected the industry in 
some way, even if the results of such effects were ambiguous. Piracy unarguably speeded the 
transmission of fashion. To meet consumer demand for new goods, manufacturers were on a 
constant cycle of create, copy, create. Retailers stocked small amounts of goods, rather than 
carry large amounts of potentially unmarketable merchandise. Women did not have a large 
selection of items to choose from, but rather were forced to select from the slight style 
modifications offered by manufacturers and stocked by retailers. Copying allowed style 
reproductions in all economic levels. Women of vastly different economic means were able 
to wear similar styles. Some, especially in the lower price ranges argued this was a positive 
42The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group will be discussed in the next chapter. Popular 
Priced Dress Manufacturers Group, Inc., Incorporation Papers, September 1934, New York 
Department of State; Chas Call, "Pleasing Guilds and Pleasing Chains Two Different Games," 
Women's Wear, November 26, 1935, 14. 
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diffusion of garment styles; others, particularly in the higher price ranges believed this a 
detriment to wealthy women who desired exclusivity. 
Legal and industry groups sought to thwart piracy. Numerous bills were introduced 
to Congress to provide protection for apparel styles. They all failed, ultimately due to the 
complexity of the issue and lack of consensus of industry members. Industry attempts at 
self-regulation were more successful, yet these successes were largely in segments of the 
industry more organized with more standardized products than the women's apparel trade. 
Organizations within the dress trade appeared, advertising would-be solutions to abuses of 
the trade, only to disappear as abruptly. Piracy was not to be easily solved by propaganda or 
press releases of monthly meetings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE FASHION ORIGINATORS GUILD OF AMERICA 
One of the more successful attempts to control style piracy in the dress industry was 
by The Fashion Originators Guild of America (FOGA), in existence from 1932 until 1941. 
This chapter examines the ethical, economic, and social considerations in the historical 
arguments for and against style protection, and analyzes the role of designers, manufacturers, 
retailers and consumers in both the initial success and ultimately the failure of the FOGA to 
control copying. The guild's administrative program against design piracy was an important 
historical piece, illustrating the controversial debates concerning the ability to regulate 
fashion's oldest "creative" practice. The historical arguments offered critical insight into 
how and why design piracy became a standard practice in the ready-to-wear apparel industry. 
The FOGA was an important early case study that highlighted the consequences of a program 
of industry-wide self-regulation. This case study places the piracy dilemma within the 
apparel industry context. 
The FOGA 
The FOGA incorporated in New York State on March 14, 1932 with the stated 
objective to protect the "originators of fashions and styles against copying and piracy of 
styles of any trade or industry."43 The Guild, founded by designer and manufacturer Maurice 
Rentner,44 was an organization of twelve leading ladies' dress manufacturers located in the 
43 Fashion Originators Guild of America, Incorporation Papers, March 1932, New York Department 
of State. 
44 Maurice Rentner was born March 3, 1889 in Warsaw Poland. Rentner helped his father in the 
manufacture of buttons, and was then a salesman of children's wear. Between 1912 and 1923 
Rentner associated himself with his younger brother in M & H Rentner, establishing his own 
company under his name after the partnership dissolved. Rentner, a devotee of the French designer 
Molyneux, popularized dressmaker suits, a feminine dressy style, and draped afternoon dresses. He 
was one of the first manufacturers of ready-mades in the U.S. to employ designers to create original 
clothes. Rentner was one of the original stockholders of the garment center buildings at 498, 500, and 
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New York City area. Other executives of the FOGA included dress manufacturer Herbert 
Sondheim, vice-president; dress manufacturer Charles Gumprecht, second vice-president; 
sports wear manufacturer J.A. Livingston, treasurer, Albert M. Post, executive director; dress 
manufacturer James M. Golby, executive secretary, and Sylvan Gotshal, FOGA attorney and 
counselor at law. 
The Guild was built on a foundation of retailer-manufacturer collaboration in a 
movement to protect and popularize original designs. Guild aims were not to regulate dress 
industry price, production, or quality. The Guild sought to "revive women's interest in 
fashion by stimulating her desire for originality in style and fabric and to overcome the 
mistaken idea that an imitation can replace an original."45 Secondary objectives listed by the 
Guild were: 
to promote cooperation and friendly intercourse in the wearing apparel industry; to 
establish and maintain uniformity and certainty in the customs and commercial 
usages of trade; to acquire, preserve and disseminate information and literature which 
will tend to augment the sale of the commodities manufactured or sold; to advance 
the trade and commercial interests of its members and to foster the industries of its 
members throughout the Americas and to promote the sale, identification, and 
recognition of original style and merchandise of the industries and its members.46 
The FOGA sought to do all of these things through extensive advertising and promotional 
campaigns in New York City newspapers and apparel industry trade magazines, through the 
establishment of a registration bureau for original dress styles, and through the issuance of 
labels to original dress manufacturers. 
512 Seventh Avenue. He was known as "The Dean," "The King," and "Napoleon." Taryn Benbow-
Pfalzgraf (ed.), "Maurice Rentner," Contemporary Fashion (Detroit, MI: St. James Press, 2002). 
45 Women's Wear Daily, November 29, 1932, 9. 
46 Fashion Originators Guild of America, Incorporation Papers, March 1932, New York Department 
of State. 
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Initially, the FOGA worked through publicity: letters, ads, and articles to create an 
interest in American styles, and targeted the better priced manufacturers, wholesaling at 
$22.50 and higher, to join the Guild's program. The FOGA regularly paid for full-page 
advertisements in Women's Wear Daily. They used the ads to both communicate with FOGA 
constituents and address opponents' negative claims (Figure 5.1). 
J To Bring Bael/ Q 
the Demand fa 
Good Clothes• G 
the FASHION ORIGINATORS 
GUIL«D :  OF AMERICA, inc. 
has organized.—Its members afe the trade's leading dress originators and 
fabric manufacturers, (in cooperation with the Design Protection Asso­
ciation, Inc.,) who arc prepared to finance the following program, 
to start immediately: 
An extensive campaign of advertising in metropolitan newspapers and 
in the leading fashion magazines 
—to revive iroman'M interraf in fashion and 
better clothes. 
Extensive editorial publicity through news articles in newspapers and 
magazines, (all of whom arc only too eager to give this reconstruction 
plan their support) 
—to stimulate woman's desire for origi­
nality in design and fabric 
The establishment of a system of protecting original designs and the 
manufacturers and sellers thereof, against style copying 
! —to eliminate the recent consumer-accept* 
ance of inferior clothes, by removing 
its cause» 
The Creadon within a short time, of a distinctive identification (a defi­
nite mark or symbol) by which an original can be immediately disting­
uished from a copy 
—to impress upon women that fashion and 
quality go hand in hand with original de­
signs; and to reestablish her confidence 
In good clothes and stores that sell thenu 
Only through the success of this movement will the manufacturing and 
retailing of ready-to-wear be brought back to a profitable basis. We 
* ask your active cooperation. 
•
k 
- ! 
FASHION ORIGINATORS GUILD OF AMERICA, inc.  
! ,  .  I  l i  I  I  I  i  i  . 4  9 8  S e v e n t h  A v e n u e ,  N e w  Y o f k  C i t y  
Figure 5.1 Fashion Originators Guild of America inaugural announcement. 
t 
Source: "To Bring Back the Demand for Good Clothes," Women's Wear Daily, March 29, 1932, 9. 
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Shortly after incorporation, the Guild sought the cooperation of local retail guilds and 
in 1933 individual retailers. Cooperating retail members agreed that they would not purchase 
from manufacturers that did not conform to the ethics and regulations of the FOGA; would 
not knowingly buy or sell copies of styles legitimately registered with the Guild; would 
accept the decision of the style piracy division of FOGA on all questions of alleged piracy; 
and would stamp all orders for women's merchandise with the following warranty clause: 
This order is placed upon the seller's warranty that the above garments are not copies 
of styles originated by members of the Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. 
The purchaser reserves the right to return any merchandise which is not as 
warranted.47 
Small, individually owned retail shops and departments stores joined the program. 
The Guild advertised to such a degree in the early 1930s that it was difficult to turn a page of 
Women's Wear Daily without seeing either a promotional message from the Guild or the 
joined advertising of the Guild with retail and manufacturing shops. During the years 1932 to 
about 1936, the Guild was everywhere within the pages of the trade press, with multiple ads, 
announcements of Guild-sponsored fashions shows, and full-page announcements. The Guild 
even permeated tangentially related sections of Women's Wear Daily including reports in the 
regional markets of the United States, including St. Louis and Chicago, among others. 
Although the Guild's focus was on the reviving women's interest and desire for American, 
original, quality goods, advertisements were almost always targeted to retailers and 
manufacturers and quite rarely, if ever, to consumers. 
The Guild was innovative in its tactics. In an advertisement from October 1932 the 
Guild announced special mid-winter showings of members' creations. The timing of the 
47 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 4346 (1941). 
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shows in October was rare in the fashion industry. By this time, most manufacturers would 
have been showing the next season's garments. By showing mid-season clothing, the Guild 
encouraged retailers to sell new merchandise to women when they could actually use them; 
rather than offering spring fashions during the cold of winter. One can only surmise the 
tremendous pressure small retail shops felt to join the Guild's program due to the unusual 
tactics employed and the intensity and ubiquity of Guild promotion (Figure 5.2). 
F-T"' 
the members of the | 
FASHION ORIGINATORS 
GUILD OF:  AMERICA—' :  
announce Special Mid-Winter Open­
ings beginning Tuesday, October 11th 
th e decision to hold these showings is 
embodied in the following resolution: 
SF®W h areas \tht fixation jfey l/t« Fathton Origmttort Guild of Amtric* of tht 
Fall Showing of quality mtrchanditt dtmonttratid t/iet ifidwiftg 
i -needi' of -, tht well dmttd, wp.m»n and the problems.of the rttailtr ir economf- ' 
tt,.and WHEREAS Mere now appears lo fce « firm *nd contuwtd d$m?nd .fjor -, 
• ciMirçgfor, dn additional correctly dated showing featuring mid-winttr marchandait 
N<pW. therefore, iiMnimous fy^ret o/vedtta t tftememSeri of the Fashion QpgmttdFi' Gti/M of America 
m and tf'tr October 11 1932 cririt a mid-winter collection of quality mtrchtndis*particularly suittd and dtsig/led 
for tht fashtonMt woman's mid-winter needs and bt it further RESOLVED that the Spring Showing* Weto*[. 
fore given on or êfceut Noremfaer 1 bn at such deftntd dates as thai! later be fixed by tJ«e Guild. 
vmXt-
iy a dehnite' 
, i Guild is.m recognition of th»' 
p~ lar- c'-ong" m Iho buying otiiiude ol doll>es-( 
zre hos beon o prortounced'i 
o- th» oart si ri public m fovor ol quality.i 
one. inis weicome trend is accompanied by < 
change ol buying habir. Although the loshio^coti-
saous woman is now revenmg lo her former- custom 
. of paying tor-one good dress what she has recently 
been paying for ihioe cheat) ones—the economic 
condition li such however, iHp! she cannot, or does 
not assemble on eniiie wardrobe al one lime, i 
she now buys her wardrobe '.'piece by piece," • 
need arises, or ai the weojher or social octi/ii 
dictate. 
In thé light of thèse circumstances, it is eviden that 
creators and retailers should encourage upholding ihe 
season to and through December. By showing the 
•womon new, timely fashions when she wants ihfem, 
. throughout the season, retailer* and mamifactjrois 
will be able lo maintain a normal-profit for a lenger 
V G U,Hl D 
period. Therefore, it i$ obvious mot itwou'd be sheer 
• tolly for stores to hold private soles and clearcoles 
before the very end of the season. A? ils part in foster-, v 
, ing trade and consumer m'erest in timely apparel, the;'; 
Guild is launching a Mid-Winter Season featuring new.:::-
merchandise thot will inspire the woman «a complete. V 
her wardrobe and:hence stimulate 0 continuance ol : 
normal-business. ' • : •' 
li is logical that through enlightened'c 
tween originators and retail merchants, this lengthen- -
ing of Ihe season can bé profitably, and successfully • 
promoted. .In view of this; members of the Fashion , 
Originators Guild have agreed that October 11th 
would be the .proper dole "for launching new collec­
tions designed expressly to accelerate this new trend 
for the better. With the some goal in mind, the Guild's y 
Spring Showings will also be postponed to a dolt 
considerably later thon that oi previous1 years The 
Guild feels certain thai retailers who collaborate m • 
the furtherance of this program will receive tangible 
benefits in the form of both profiis-and prestige. 
O N  O R I G I N A T O R S  
O F I  A M i é  R l  C  
Figure 5.2 FOGA mid-season showing announcement 
Source: "The Members of The Fashion Originators Guild of America," Women's Wear Daily, 
October 4, 1932, 9. 
The larger and more powerful retail associations such as the National Retail and Dry 
Goods Association (NRDGA) and the Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC) 
avoided joining the Guild's program for two reasons. First, these groups were composed of 
some of the larger, more established retail stores such as Filene's and Lord & Taylor. These 
stores did not need any of the support and promotion of the Guild. Second, the NRDGA and 
AMC primarily represented retail interests. Under the Guild's program, responsibility for 
patrolling and penalty for having pirated merchandise fell squarely on retailers. 
Spokespeople for the NRDGA stated that Guild programs would cause "great inconvenience 
and possible loss and embarrassment to the retailer." These groups were not completely 
opposed to style protection, but hoped for less penalization of the retailer than the Guild 
offered. Later in the Guild's program, many within the NRDGA and AMC would further 
object to the Guild's perceived efforts to "split the ranks of retailers" by "picking on" 
individual stores such as the red-carded Bloomingdale's and Lord & Taylor in New York.48 
The Guild allowed apparel industry executives the opportunity "to recognize that they 
are a part of a great and intricate structure and not just a lot of little czars, each following his 
own will and each helping to destroy or to confuse each other."49 By 1932-33, some of the 
manufacturers and retailers that agreed to cooperate with the Guild included Hattie Carnegie, 
Bergdorf Goodman, Saks Fifth Avenue, Filene's Brothers, Jo Copeland, Milgrim's, Tailored 
Women, Jay Thorpe, Bonwit Teller & Co, Anna McCormick, and Nettie Rosenstein.50 Most 
48 
"Stores Will Test Fashion Guild Ban. The New York Times, February 20, 1936, 38. 
"Design Piracy," The Nation, December 1931, 668; Henry Creange, "Safeguarding Industry Against 
the Pilfering of Ideas," 3-4. 
49 M.D.C. Crawford, "End of Rash Individualism Started Era of Good Trade," Women's Wear Daily, 
January 22, 1936, 4. 
50 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 4442 (1941); 
"Design Protection Gains in Many Lines," The New York Times, sec. 2, May 6, 1934, 19. 
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of these members handled both manufacturing and retailing of their own clothing lines in 
addition to selling the designs of other manufacturers. These companies dealt within the 
upper brackets of ready-to-wear apparel. 
The FOGA was divided into four divisions: the dress division composed of 
manufacturers of ladies and misses' dresses; the coat division, composed of manufacturers of 
ladies and misses' coats; the junior miss division, composed of manufacturers of junior 
misses' dresses; and the sportswear division composed of manufacturers of knitted ladies 
sportswear (Figure 5.3). The FOGA also included a textile and fabric division which 
numbered approximately 100 manufacturers, converters, dyers, and printers of silk and rayon 
fabrics. A "Protective Affiliate" division, composed of non-member ladies' garment 
manufacturers, cooperated in the style protective program of the Guild. Protective affiliates 
dealt in the lower price ranges, between $10.50 and $16.50, and thus did not qualify for full-
membership in the Guild's program.51 
51 
"Firm Admitted to Guild," The New York Herald Tribune, January 16, 1935, 34; Fashion 
Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457-468 (1941). 
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Figure 5.3 FOGA Dress manufacturer member advertisement 
Source: "Rhinestone Resplendence," Harper's Bazaar, November 1935, 24a. 
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Rather than imitate the Chambre Syndicale de Parisienne system of registration that 
allowed for legalized copying, the FOGA attempted to restrict all copying within the United 
States. Guild directors reasoned that copying caused a "regimentation" of styles that 
subverted the "artistic and economic interests" of the United States apparel field.52 To 
facilitate a program to "confront the demoralizing and destructive practice in the trade, 
known as style piracy," the Guild established a system to register the original styles of Guild 
members.53 Registration of original styles was an easy process. Manufacturers submitted a 
slip of paper with a sketch and brief description of their style, and signed an affidavit of 
originality (Figure 5.4). The style was assigned a model number by the Guild, stamped with 
the Guild's logo, and dated to establish priority so the originator could have exclusive retail 
rights. Sketches were not cross-referenced or compared with other registered styles and 
sketches were returned to the manufacturer. Foreign models, generic styles, and licensed 
copies of foreign styles were not subject to registration. The registered styles were kept in 
the National Federation of Textiles, Inc. clearinghouse of styles under the Industrial Design 
Registration Bureau. The period of protection in theory was limited to six months, in 
practice to three.54 
52 
"Restriction of Copying Foreign Models," Women's Wear Daily, April 11, 1935, 2. 
53 
"To Bring Back the Demand for Good Clothes," Women's Wear, March 29, 1932, 9. 
54 
"Queries Cover FOGA Price Range Scope," Women's Wear, April 23, 1936, 31; "Guild's Work 
Good in Upper Brackets," The New York Times, February 23, 1936, 17; Gotshal, Today's Fight for 
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Figure 5.4 Herbert Sondheim registered sketch with the FOGA. 
Source: Courtesy of Special Collections, Gladys Marcus Library, Fashion Institute of Technology. 
Once registered, manufacturers obtained labels for their styles which stated, 
"Registered with the Fashion Originators Guild of America" or "An Original Design 
Registered by a member of the Fashion Originators Guild" (Figure 5.5). According to a 1936 
district court ruling, these labels "came to have a definite significance as indicating that the 
dresses bearing the label represented quality merchandise manufactured according to original 
styles by skilled workers."55 The Guild estimated that members and affiliates registered 
55 
"Complete Text of Master's Report That Upholds FOGA's Style Protection Is No Monopoly," 
Women's Wear, November 10, 1936, 39. 
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40,000 to 50,000 styles a year, and about half of these styles were in the price range of 
$16.75 and up.56 
l A Of 
Figure 5.5 FOGA label. 
Source: From the collection of Jean L. Parsons. 
Ironically, while the Guild worked to promote "bona-fide originators" Rentner 
himself copied imported models.57 His son-in-law and fellow dress manufacturer Arthur 
Jablow expressed to an interviewer in 1982, "It was...We used to laugh about that, how do 
you rationalize that kind of thing? (Organizing a group against piracy and pirating foreign 
styles). All of them were copying from Paris." Following the cease and desist order of the 
Guild, Rentner copied imported models. According to Jablow, 
That's right I remember the 'New Look,' Dior came out in '45; Maurice made the 
best copies of that 'New Look.' He made a taped waistline in a suit that 90% of 
them couldn't do in New York City. And it was very interesting to see how all the 
retailers bought those suits, with the full-flared skirts. And he was the one that 
created that thing. He out-Diored Dior.58 
In order to protect original styles, the Guild enacted a set of agreements known as 
"Declarations of Cooperation" between manufacturers and retailers. These signed 
agreements included clauses that retailers would not knowingly or intentionally purchase 
copied merchandise and that the retailer would return to the manufacturer any copies bought 
56 
"Designs Filed at Peak," The New York Times, sec. 2, September 13, 1936, 8. 
57 
"Fashion Originators to Confer," The New York Times, March 7, 1932, sec. 2, 3. 
58 The New Look actually appeared in 1945. Arthur Jablow, The Reminisces of Maurice Rentner 
From Varying Perspectives, August 1982, The Oral History Collection of the Fashion Institute of 
Technology, New York. 
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through misrepresentation or error. The Guild employed secret investigative shoppers who 
searched member and non-member stores for supposed copies of merchandise. These copies 
were evaluated by a group of retailers, buyers, and merchandise managers, known as "The 
Impartial Retail Arbitration Committee on Style Piracy."59 The arbitration tribunals were 
composed of three individuals, either chosen by the Guild, or by the Guild and the red-carded 
retailer. The arbitration committee rendered the decision based upon visual inspection of the 
garments, and the committee acted by majority vote. The stores' merchandise would be 
removed from sale awaiting the verdict of the guild (without time limitations). The decision 
of the Guild's committee could be appealed. If the piracy committee determined that the 
merchandise was copied, the retailer was advised of the fact by the Guild's "shoppers" and 
requested to return the pirated copy to the manufacturer pursuant to the provisions of the 
warranty. Those retailers who refused to remove from sale items deemed copies were "red-
carded" by the Guild. A "red-card" signified that a retailer had promoted copies, did not 
protect styles, refused to disclose the name of manufacturers from whom alleged copies were 
purchased, or had consistently violated FOGA policy regarding the protection of styles. The 
FOGA also issued red-cards to stores that violated state laws such as operating shops in 
residential homes.60 
Once a month, the Guild sent a list of all non-cooperating, red-carded merchants to 
retailers and manufacturers. Guild members were instructed to show, sell, and ship 
merchandise only to those department and specialty stores who acted in full collaboration 
with the signed "Declarations of Cooperation against Copying." As a result of the activities 
59 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 4330 (1941). 
60 Ibid., 4363; "FOGA Program Called Neither Unreasonable Nor Violation of Interstate Commerce 
Laws," Women's Wear Daily, November 10, 1936, 8, 10. 
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of the FOGA, by the end of 1935, manufacturer membership in the Guild numbered 250 and 
retailer cooperation numbered 12,000 to 12,500 individuals, co-partners, and corporations, 
located throughout 32 states in the United States, but principally in New York City, Chicago, 
and Boston. The red-carded list, by March 20, 1936 contained the names of over 400 retailers 
located throughout the United States. Red-carded retailers included Strawbridge and 
Clothier, Philadelphia; R.H. White and Company, Boston; Ed. Shuster Company, 
Milwaukee; Bloomingdale Brothers, New York; J.L. Hudson Company, Detroit; and The 
Hub, Baltimore. There was a similar restrictive plan for protecting textile styles. By 
agreement, the garment manufacturing members of FOGA refused to buy textiles which were 
not registered in the Industrial Design Registration Bureau. Resigning Guild members were 
not allowed to return to the Guild for a period of six months and were fined a penalty of up to 
$5000.61 
New Regulations and Controversial Policies 
Beginning in April of 1935, two major changes in the Guild's policies raised alarms 
with both retailers and low-price dress manufacturers. First, the Guild expanded its 
guardianship over style piracy to include moderately priced lines wholesaling from $10.75 to 
$16.75. This change was supported by The Dress Creators' League of America, a group of 
ladies' dress manufacturers with wholesale prices in this targeted price range. In 1935, the 
League had become an affiliate of the FOGA and used the Guild's style registration bureau. 
Others in the industry agreed, or at least went along with the extension of the Guild's 
program into these lines, until the Guild began a program in October of 1935 to extend the 
61 
"Guild Extends Shopping Staff," The New York Times, September 1, 1936, 38; "FOGA Adds Four 
Stores to 'Red Card' List," Women's Wear, February 14, 1936, 1, 18; Fashion Originators Guild of 
America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 9 (1941). 
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protection of styles to the $6.75 to $8.75 wholesale price lines. The Guild requested retailers 
sign new declarations of cooperation even in the lowest price ranges. It was at this point that 
the most crucial controversy surrounding the FOGA's policies began.62 
In the latter part of 1936, manufacturers of dresses wholesaling at $3.75 and lower 
were admitted as protective affiliates of the Guild. This extension to lower priced 
merchandise caused an uproar from non-member manufacturers, chain store operators, 
buying syndicates, and others in the dress industry. The primary objection was that the main 
purpose of these firms was to copy and adapt the styles of higher priced dresses for the mass 
market, usually called the popular priced group. Ben Hirsch, president of the Popular Priced 
Dress Manufacturers Group, asserted the Guild system was "based purely on an attempt to 
set up an unwarranted monopoly for self-styled creators."63 A decision to oppose the style 
registration system of the Guild on the basis that it was "monopolistic and illegal" was 
reached by the Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group, Inc. (PPDMG) a group 
representing over 400 jobbers and manufacturers who produced in the $4.75 and under 
categories.64 
Popular priced groups in the protective affiliates of $6.75 to $8.75 withdrew from the 
Guild in September of 1936 (Figure 5.6). Retail stores that refused to participate with the 
62 Before the Dress Creators' League of America collaborated with the FOGA, they used advertising 
and fashion shows to promote their "volume category" wares to retailers. The Dress Creators' League 
of America supported the Guild at the time of the cease-and-desist order by the FTC. Once the FTC v 
FOGA case went to court, little mention was paid to the Dress Creators' League of America in The 
New York Times or in Women's Wear Daily; Samuel Zahn, "League Feels It Has Won Style Niche 
For $10.75 Dresses," Women's Wear Daily, April 3, 1935, 8; The Dress Creators' League of 
America, Inc., Incorporation Papers, November 9, 1932, New York Department of State; Stephen 
Hartman, "Protest Move to Bar Dress Style Copying," The New York Times, September 25, 1934, 32. 
63 The New York Times, December 22, 1935, sec. 3, 1. 
64 Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group, Inc., Incorporation Papers, September 1934, New York 
Department of State; Chas Call, "Pleasing Guilds and Pleasing Chains Two Different Games," 
Women's Wear, November 26, 1935, 14. 
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Guild, or to sign new "Declarations of Cooperation" within 8 to 10 days were "red-carded." 
Furthering their program, the Guild refused to ship any merchandise already on order to red-
carded retailers. By February of 1936, the Guild estimated over $500,000 in orders was held 
by manufacturing members. Many red-carded stores were forced to purchase merchandise in 
other markets,, including those in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.65 
• 
WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT 
ACCEPT ORDERS BEARING 
THE F.O.G.A. STAMP 
We Believe Their 
Method Is Detrimental 
To Reta;!er and Manufacturer Alike 
• 
Popular Priced Dress Mfrs/ Group, Inc. 
1440 BROADWAY, N. Y. C. LOUIS RUBIN, Ewe. Dir. 
Figure 5.6 Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group, Inc. announcement 
Source: "A Statement by the Popular Priced Dress Mfrs.' Group, Inc.," Women's Wear Daily, 
February 27, 1936, 14. 
The second change that caused broad concern over the Guild's practices was when it 
endeavored to formulate a code of fair trade practices that went beyond its initial objective to 
eliminating style piracy by "giving protection, support, and counsel to every group within the 
industry who honestly and competently creates designs."66 The new regulations included the 
prohibition of manufacturing members from the following: participating in retail advertising; 
65 
"Designs Filed At Peak," 8; "Stores Will Test Fashion Guild Ban," The New York Times, February 
20, 1936, 38; "Will Charge Guild with Conspiracy," The New York Times, February 22, 1936, 26. 
66 M.D.C. Crawford, "End of Rash Individualism Started Era of Good Trade," Women's Wear Daily, 
January 22, 1936, 4. 
140 
selling at retail; selling to businesses conducted in residences, residential quarters, hotels, or 
apartment houses; showing manufacturer models in fashion shows not supported by the 
Guild and those who did not solely deal with FOGA members; and the elimination of 
discounts to retailers by urging members to uphold 8% to 10% EOM selling terms.67 
The Guild strongly advised retailers to devote no more than one percent of their 
budget expenditure for advertising and propaganda and that the advertising should accent 
quality merchandise rather than style trends. The Guild asked retailers to accept merchandise 
shipped as late as one month passed the specified delivery date; to extend the fall selling 
season by two months; and to delay early fall clearance sales and special private promotional 
sales. It also forbade Guild members from purchasing imported models.68 These changes 
occurred in part because Rentner believed that women had ceased buying wardrobes but 
rather bought specific outfits based on occasions or the weather. Due to the shift in buying 
habits, women would wait for retailer sales and price promotions to purchase new dresses. 
FOGA auditors reviewed the books of Guild members to ascertain whether they were selling 
to red-carded retailers or violating other regulations or policies of the FOGA. Some 
members were reviewed as often as three times a week to ensure these firms were not 
circumnavigating Guild policies. Violations of policies by Guild members resulted in fines 
of $100 for the first offense and $500 for the second offense. There is evidence that in 1936, 
67 EOM, or end of month, refers to the cash discount and the net credit periods given to retailers. 
Some manufacturers attempted to compete by providing better discounts for early payment. The 
Guild urged manufacturers to give retailers no more than an 8% to 10% discount for EOM. 
68 It is not believed by this researcher that the Guild actively enforced this part of their program 
because members of the Guild, including Maurice Rentner and the Dress Creators League of America 
regularly advertised that their styles were "interpretations of imports." "Announcing the Formation 
of the Dress Creators League of America, Inc.," Women's Wear Daily, December 1, 1932, 14. 
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the FOGA also formulated plans to control chain store buying of popular priced 
merchandise.69 
Retailers considered the Guild's activities an attempt to regulate and limit their 
production, and overall restrict their rights in operating their stores. The Guild maintained 
that, "fair trade practices, in the development of which the large retail organizations 
participated, are designed to protect the ethical retailer, equally with the ethical 
manufacturer."70 The provisions were seen as necessary as, "success even in a bitterly 
competitive industry such as this must not necessarily be achieved by trampling upon the 
rights of others."71 
These two major changes to the Guild's original program against style piracy caused 
industry watchdogs, large retail associations, and the Federal Government to take notice. In 
three courts, the New York Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Circuit Court 
of Appeals of the first district, the practices of the FOGA were upheld. In 1936, the Federal 
Trade Commission began hearings on the Guild's practices which allegedly were in restraint 
of trade.72 In February 1939, after countless hearings held in New York, Massachusetts, and 
69 Women's Wear Daily, October 5, 1932, 18; Women's Wear Daily, September 27, 1932, 15; "Ban 
on Fashion Shows," The New York Times, November 26, 1933, 15; "Guild Avers New Pledge Is No 
Policy Shift," Women's Wear Daily, December 5, 1935, 1; "Guild Not To Copy Models Of Retailers" 
Women's Wear Daily, April 11, 1935, 2; "Guild Warns Against Sales To Consumers," Women's 
Wear Daily, April 9, 1935, 25; Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 
312 U.S. 457-468 (1941); Ira Rentner, The Reminisces of Maurice Rentner From Varying 
Perspectives, August 1982, The Oral History Collection of the Fashion Institute of Technology; 
"Rentner Raps Tactics Used by Retailers," 5, 8; Chas Call, "Pleasing Guilds and Pleasing Chains 
Two Different Games," 14; Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 
U.S. 3952 (1941). 
70 
"Guild Pushes Fight To Protect Styles," The New York Times, February 16, 1936, 9. 
71 
"Rentner Raps Tactics Used by Retailers," Women's Wear, August 9, 1936, 5. 
72 Congress established the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 to exercise administrative control over 
monopolies and objectionable business practices. The statute provided that "unfair methods of 
competition in commerce" and (as amended in 1938) "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
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Pennsylvania, the Federal Trade Commission ordered the "combination known as the FOG A 
to cease and desist" from their monopolistic practices. The ruling was bitterly contested and 
the fight was carried to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. On January 23, 1940, 
that court ruled the Guild had been guilty of unfair practices; that while the Guild's intention 
to suppress style piracy might be justifiable, the means used were illegal.73 The Guild was 
preventing retailers from doing what they had a clear common law right to do: sell copies of 
original dresses. 
Regardless of legal precedent, the FOGA contended that style piracy was unfair 
competition. The Guild argued that, as business owners, they possessed the inalienable right 
to protect their industry from destruction and to prevent the appropriation of their businesses. 
In an appeal of the previous decision to the United States Supreme Court, on March 3, 1941, 
Justice Hugo Black agreed with the decision of the FTC that the "purpose and object of the 
combination, its potential power, its tendency to monopoly, the coercion it could and did 
practice upon a rival method of competition."74 
The activities that brought the FOGA great fame and success also led to the FOGA's 
dissolution. The forced boycotts through red-carding of non-participating retailers violated 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts that made illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or commerce within the United States of America. In addition to this, the 
Guild was found to be an extra-governmental agency and "self-appointed tribunal" that 
prescribed rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate trade. The Guild was found to be 
commerce" were unlawful. When the FTC had reason to believe that any person was using such 
unfair methods or practices, it had the power to issue an order requiring such persons to cease and 
desist. If the order was not obeyed, it could be enforced by court proceedings. Zecharias Chafee, 
Unfair Competition, 53 Harvard Law Review 1289, 1289-1321 (June 1940), 1289. 
73 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 8 (1941). 
74 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission. 312 U.S. 457-468 (1941). 
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an unlawful combination because it involved a concerted refusal to deal with non-
participating retailers. The issue of whether style piracy was good or destructive was not a 
deciding issue in the FOGA v. FTC case. In the appeals process, the FOGA contended that 
the Federal Trade Commission erred in refusing to hear evidence regarding the causes and 
consequences of the FOGA program and of the social and economic conditions in which it 
functioned. The cease and desist order was upheld, the Guild disbanded, and with it the most 
elaborate plan to stop style plagiarism in the apparel industry ended.75 
Although the FOGA was disbanded, the group continued to operate. In June 1941, 
the FOGA outlined a new protection plan that sought "complete legality in eyes of both the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission" to establish some form of style 
protection in the dress industry. The plan for style protection was through speeding up the 
process of acquiring U.S. style patents. To achieve faster adjudication in establishing the 
validity of a patent or claims of infringement, the FOGA proposed prompt reference of cases 
to court-appointed referees or to independent agencies such as the American Arbitration 
Association. Before this plan could be instituted, the FOGA requested the approval of 
interested governmental agencies and the cooperation of retail groups. The most 
controversial FOGA policies, boycotts and red-carding, were eliminated from the new 
75 Other groups within the apparel industry had attempted to end or regulate piracy including the 
Dress Creators' League of America and efforts by the Silk Textile Industry. None of these attempts 
were as elaborate as the FOGA's creation of a registration bureau, issuance of labels, and extensive 
advertising and promotional campaign. "Text of Decision in FOGA Case," Women's Wear Daily, 
March 4, 1941, 14; "FOGA Outlines New Protection Plan on June 2," Women's Wear Daily, May 16, 
1941, 1; "Style Patent Speedup in Proposed FOGA Plan," Women's Wear Daily, June 3, 1941, 1; " 
Official Schedule of showings at which the Guild Houses are Present," Women's Wear Daily, June 
12, 1941, 25; "FOGA Approves Modified Style Piracy Plan," Women's Wear Daily, October 24, 
1941, 1; The New York Times, March 30, 1930, sec.8, 1; The New York Times, February 22, 1936; 
The New York Times, January 7, 1935, 3; "Design Piracy Curb," Business Week, January 12, 1935, 
10. 
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protection plan. The FOGA continued to advertise as a group in trade papers such as 
Women's Wear Daily. On January 8, 1941, the FOGA in collaboration with the Fashion 
Group presented "New York's Fashion Futures" that featured furs, hats, shoes, accessories, 
and dresses produced and advertised by New York retailers and manufacturers. 
Rentner, the chairman and creator of the FOGA, continued to try to foster the 
interests of the garment industry through his membership with the New York Dress Institute. 
This Institute was started in 1941 to "make New York City the world's fashion center and to 
maintain New York City's leadership in the dress field." Rentner also served on an advisory 
board of the Fashion Institute of Technology. Upon his death, his business, Maurice Rentner 
Inc., merged with his sister's Anna Miller & Company. Miller's head designer, Bill Blass 
became vice-president and then owner of the firm. Blass organized the company under his 
own name in 1970. Upon his death in 1958 at the age of 69, Maurice Rentner's lawyer 
stated, "The mystery of his achievements can only be understood in terms of the artist who's 
bound by no rules and violates the accepted standards." In his obituary, it was estimated that 
at least sixty percent of the industry's top executives had at one time worked for Rentner.76 
The National Recovery Administration Hearing: The Style Piracy Debate 
According to Maurice Rentner, the "devastating evils growing from the pirating of 
original designs" destroyed the interests of manufacturer, retailer, consumer, and of labor.77 
The Guild maintained that it was trying to protect ethical retailers and manufacturers, but to 
other factions the issues were considerably less clear-cut. The arguments both for and 
against the Guild's efforts can be characterized as falling into two broad areas: technical 
76 
"Maurice Rentner is dead at 69," The New York Times, July 8, 1958, 27. 
77 Rentner, 114. 
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issues and cost/benefit issues. The former hinged on the difficulty of actually defining what 
constituted an "original design." The latter were complex and multifaceted, as they raised 
issues that involved fair labor, the relationships between retailers and manufacturers, and the 
rights and privileges of the consumer. Arguments often overlapped or were contradictory. 
One of the primary sources concerning the debates on design piracy is the National Recovery 
Administration's Hearing on the Codes of the Dress Industry. As seen in the NIRA 
arguments, the issue of defining an original style was certainly the most difficult in terms of 
actual regulation and control of presumed copies. However, FOGA members, the press and 
participants in the NIRA hearings also debated the social implications and consequences. 
This section will examine these arguments for and against control of style piracy, using the 
NIRA hearing as a focal point. 
Competition and Regulation of Originality 
A program of the New Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), passed in 
1933, gave the force of law to any "code of fair competition" set up by a trade association. 
Industries were authorized to set up regulations concerning the regulation of wages, working 
conditions, production, and prices, for President Franklin Roosevelt's approval. The 
provisions varied across industries, and all were presented at Code hearings to explain the 
provisions or to show the need for the codes. During the time of the NIRA, the courts largely 
kept out of decisions regarding unfair competition, one of the key features in arguments both 
for and against style protection, leaving defendants to the opinions of the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Better Business Bureau. 
Under the NIRA, the style piracy problem was worked out in the code of each 
separate industry, and no uniform style code was established. Of the first 300 approved codes 
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of the N.R.A., 62 contained fair practice provisions dealing with piracy of style including the 
cotton textile industry, lace manufacturing, corset and brassiere trade, leather, knitting, silk 
textile, dress manufacturing, millinery and dress trimming, rayon and silk dyeing printing, 
and hand machine embroidery.78 
Participants of the National Recovery Administration's Hearing on the Codes of the 
Dress Industry included such key FOGA organizers and proponents as Maurice Rentner, 
chairman of the FOGA; Samuel Zahn, chairman of the Dress Creators' League of America; 
and Irene Blunt, executive secretary of the National Federation of Textiles and sometimes 
called the "first lady of style protection."79 Although the Supreme Court found the National 
Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in May 1935, stating that the creation of code 
authorities was an unlawful and unconstitutional exercise of power, the concepts of 
originality, adaptation, and copying relative to style piracy provide critical insight into the 
attitudes of leading apparel insiders.80 
Originality and Adaptations 
The combination of elements that resulted in an original style, and the point at which 
an adaptation became a copy, was passionately contested by presenters at the NIRA hearings. 
It was generally agreed that adaptations were acceptable, and a normal aspect of fashion 
circulation. Maurice Rentner maintained that trends could be imitated, but it was a specific 
combination of elements that set original creations apart. The difficulty lay in the 
78 Kenneth Dameron, "Retailing Under the N.R.A. I.," The Journal of Business of the University of 
Chicago (1935): 1-26; Zecharias Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harvard Law Review 1289, 1289-
1321 (June 1940); Karl Penning, "N.R.A. Codes," Journal of the Patent Office Society (1934): 189-
203. 
79 Sylvan Gotshal, Today's Fight for Design Protection, 3. 
80 For more information on the N.R.A. see: Chafee, 1289-1321; Karl Penning, "N.R.A. Codes," 
Journal of the Patent Office Society (1934): 189-203; Robert Himmelberg, The Origins of the 
National Recovery Administration (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976). 
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understanding that all designers were in some sense "adapters," and that some ideas were the 
result of "spontaneous generation." Designers were inspired by similar fashions and trends 
in life. An example of this was widespread use of the decorative motifs from King Tut's 
tomb, popular in many styles in the early 1920s.81 
The Guild had, in fact, established a relatively undemanding method of registering 
styles within its Registration Bureau. In their defense, Rentner contended that 
Style takes in the material which the designer thinks up, a certain color, a 
combination of the material designed by the textile house, and other trimmings that 
were decided by other houses, which the designer takes and puts together and 
creates a style. It may be an imitation but it is an original so far as combining these 
things together.82 
He conceded, however, that "no fashion creator will assert that everything about every dress 
he offers is new" and that the controversy over style piracy was "a conflict of individual 
interest."83 
Explicating the need for the FOGA in the early 1930s, Andrew Goodman of Bergdorf 
Goodman legacy stated, 
The philosophy of the FOGA thing was in some degree to protect creativity; to 
protect the artist, the person who developed new styles. In this business the legal 
protection for fashion is cumbersome and unworkable. In France now it is 
understood that the creativity of the designing artist should be protected. In this 
country the person who is protected is the copyists, the schemer, the sharp guy who 
sends his designers to showings with sharpened pencils and they run out to the 
men's room and quickly make sketches. The man whom our laws protect in this 
guise is the man who preys on the talents of others, and it has an immoral attitude.84 
81 Meiklejohn, 303. There are numerous articles in Women's Wear in 1922 and 1923 related to failed 
attempts to copyright designs based on tomb images and artifacts and even attempts to gain copy right 
of the name itself. 
82 Rentner, 105. 
83 Rentner, 113. 
84 Andrew Goodman, Fashion Institute of Technology Special Archives. 
148 
Although the FOGA sought to change these conditions in the United States through creation 
of a system to protect original styles and designers, Rentner never popularized the name of 
any of his designers, but rather advertised under his company name. Rentner relied on one 
design assistant throughout the nineteen thirties and nineteen forties to realize his creations, 
yet his son-in-law Arthur Jablow and his half-brother Ira Rentner who worked with Maurice 
in the garment business could not remember her name. She was described only by Ira 
Rentner as "a big, fat lady, but she was a good designer."85 One of the more interesting 
aspects of the FOGA policies was the sheer invisibility of designers. Officers and members 
of the Guild were manufacturers and retailers. Seldom promoted and rarely mentioned, 
designers, the ones creating the original styles, were nearly invisible in the Guild's fight to 
protect and popularize original styles.86 
Entitlement to Fashion 
As fabric quality and technology improved in the twentieth century, piracy allowed 
consumers of diverse social and economic levels to enjoy the latest styles and keep up with 
the newest fashions. While some viewed this as a positive result of style piracy, others 
believed the purchasers of high priced originals should be protected from seeing themselves 
"walking down the street" in a reproduction of inferior quality. 
According to the Guild, women purchased apparel for the following reasons: 
"utilitarian, 15%; sanitation and health, 15%; and fashion, 70%."87 Style was considered by 
most in the industry to be of "overshadowing importance," and as a result, there were 
85 Ira Rentner, "Memoirs of Maurice Rentner from Varying Perspectives" Oral History Project of the 
Fashion Industries of FIT, Fashion Institute of Technology Special Archives, New York. 
86 Some manufacturers were also designers in the 1930s, such as Hattie Carnegie and Jo Copeland. 
Even the sub-designers who worked for these companies were rarely, if ever, mentioned in Guild 
advertising. 
87 
"General Rather than Specific Style Appeal Urged," Women's Wear, October 10, 1932, 32. 
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frequent debates about origins of fashion and style change.88 As early as the 1890s, style and 
fashion change had become the driving forces in growth of both the women's ready-made 
clothing industry and the large department stores. By the 1930s, however, it seemed clear to 
manufacturers where and how style diffusion, if not origination, occurred, through style 
piracy. What was not clear was whether it was generally beneficial or detrimental to the 
industry or to the consumer. 
One of the issues that arose in most arguments against any attempt to control copying 
at the lower price points centered on the "ethical" need to provide women of lower incomes 
with fashionable clothing that did not set them apart. Copying practices in the industry led to 
the widely held belief that fashion flowed rapidly from high priced styles to the bargain 
basement. This presumably led to a democratization of style that allowed women of all 
classes to wear the latest fashion, even if it wasn't in the highest quality. If dresses were not 
allowed to be copied due to FOGA policies, consumers would be assured that cheap 
imitations would not be created and sold. This would allow the highest classes a means of 
showing their wealth through their inimitable clothing. 
According to those who opposed style protection, style piracy was needed because 
copying produced a diversity of style variations that ultimately gave the consumer more from 
which to choose.89 Hence, moderate and lower price firms contended that they provided a 
service to low income women. The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group felt any laws 
or regulations that would stop style piracy would be harmful to the majority of American 
women. As quoted in The New York Times, a Popular Priced representative stated, 
88Meiklejohn, 303. 
89 Sachar, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, Hearing on the 
Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry. 
150 
The masses of American women have always demanded and received styles that are 
comparable with those worn by their rich sisters. [The anti-piracy movement] is 
seeking to deprive Judy O'Grady of her just right to dress as well for as little money 
as does the colonel's lady.90 
Throughout the FOGA cases, courts consistently found that style piracy was a socially useful 
form of competition since style piracy made the latest fashions readily available to lower 
91 income consumers. 
In the NIRA hearing, Samuel Zahn was asked whether he or members of his league 
"ever considered the fact of style piracy from the consumers' viewpoint, that is, why should 
not the stenographer or the shop girl wear a dress just as beautiful as the society leader." To 
this question, met with applause by the audience as recorded by the stenographer, Zahn 
replied "dresses of a $3.75 style can be prettier than a dress that sells at $10.75." He 
continued, stating that members of the Dress Creators League of America 
came to the conclusion that the people who buy $3, $4, $6, $7 merchandise are 
entitled just as much to originality as the people who buy $50, $60, or $100 
merchandise; that there is no reason why the stenographer should be embarrassed 
when she walks down the street and meets the same dress, even though the other 
person paid much more than she. There is no reason why a woman of limited means 
should not have originality in her dress as well as the woman who paid a large 
amount of money.92 
While Zahn may have been soliciting audience endorsement, his statement is 
representative of the ambiguity of the style copying issues. Indeed, the women who bought 
lower price dresses probably did not want to see other women wearing the same style, even if 
she paid only a few dollars for her dress. Membership in the Dress Creators League of 
America was confined to those houses that concentrated upon "individuality of design" 
90 S. Hartman, "Protest move to bar dress style copying," The New York Times, September 25, 1934, 
32. 
91 
"Style Piracy is Socially Desirable Lower Court Held," Women's Wear Daily, March 4, 1941, 9. 
92 Zahn, 36, 38. 
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accomplished through the maintenance of "extensive designing staffs."93 For the majority of 
low price dress manufacturers, however, the cost of hiring a designer and making "original" 
styles was prohibitively expensive. Meiklejohn also observed that there was a possibility of 
dress becoming a "badge of class distinction" if all copying was prohibited. In other words, 
women of limited means preferred to dress in styles that were as similar as possible to the 
high end designer dresses.94 Partly at issue was the fact that there was certainly not the same 
customer for both cheap and more expensive dresses, and "consumers of better quality 
products are unwilling to wear models that are common and cheap."95 
These consumers of better dresses were also a focus of the Guild and the Guild's 
protective affiliates in the issue of copying, but for a different reason. Zahn offered a 
counterpoint to his above argument. This was the idea that "a woman does not object when 
she sees a copy of a dress of at least the same quality that she has purchased. It is seeing the 
same dress of a cheaper quality that she objects to."96 A woman of higher income or the 
"discriminating consumer," under copying conditions, was unable to purchase distinctive 
styles with any assurance that the style would not be copied and the uniqueness immediately 
ruined. Women became dissatisfied with an original style when they saw copies, and 
dissatisfied with the retailer who sold her the style. The original higher priced garment 
would be returned to the retail establishment. This lowered the net profit of the retailer, and 
decreased the number of reorders the original manufacturer would receive. According to 
Clay Meyers, the optimum retail situation in terms of profit was to be able to have a dress 
93 
"Announcing the Formation of the Dress Creators League of America, Inc.," Women's Wear Daily, 
December 1, 1932, 14. 
^Meiklejohn, 337. 
95Magee, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, Hearing on the 
Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 19. 
96 Zahn, 43. 
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sell so well that a reorder could be placed. If retailers had to exist and make profits on the 
"constant turnover in styles with the odds and ends that are left, the markdowns which we 
take to meet competition on the next corner, in the next block, we will be lost."97 Hence the 
arguments concerning benefit or loss to the consumer became entangled with retailer's 
concerns about both profit and store image. In all of these debates, consumers' opinions 
were never made known, but rather commercial interests spoke (supposedly) on their behalf. 
Style and Economic Issues 
The problem of style piracy was generally acknowledged to be a price issue. Only 
when the copy was marketed in the same price bracket as the original did the issue of 
property rights become more important than the issue of price. Copying shortened the life of 
a product to the distributor, to the retailer, and to the customer. As copies inundated the 
various price lines of the dress industry, higher priced merchandise was knocked off and 
"killed."98 The higher priced merchandise would be returned to the retailer by the 
disgruntled consumer and the retailer would thus cancel remaining orders or not place re­
orders. The protection of styles could potentially eliminate rapid design changes, which in 
turn would lengthen the seasons of operations and avoid wastes resulting from the rapid 
turnovers.99 The assumption was that the waste that resulted from the shortened lifespan of a 
garment, and the frequent turnover of fashions, was ultimately reflected in higher prices and 
poorer quality. This was considered a tremendous economic disadvantage to consumers and 
97 Clay Meyers, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, Hearing 
on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 242. 
98 A low priced copy was frequently said to "kill" the higher priced dress, in that no more sales of the 
higher end dress occurred. 
99 Johnson and Fitch, 8. 
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businesses through the lowering of standards, both in the quality of the goods and in the 
conditions of workers. 
This position was underlined by the contention that the "pernicious practice of piracy 
contributed substantially to the bankruptcy of many concerns engaged in original style 
creation."100 Copies of successful lines were invariably sold at a lower price than the original 
dress lines, as copyists saved on product research, development and production costs, and 
avoided the pitfalls of producing unsuccessful lines. But they regularly produced 
merchandise of inferior quality and materials. There was a loss of incentive to create and 
invest in designing original goods. Many manufacturers did not intend to spend money on 
creation and designing costs, when copying was so easy and profitable. 
As copying occurred at all price ranges in the dress industry, the Guild felt justified in 
extension of its program of protection into the lowest price merchandise. In the existing 
business climate, the manufacturers of high quality and high priced merchandise assumed 
that it was the copiers who made their businesses vulnerable, while those who sought self-
preservation copied simply to stay in business.101 In reality, however, there were other 
economic factors at play that made higher priced businesses vulnerable to business failure, 
including the demand and the need due to the Great Depression for lower priced dresses by a 
large number of consumers. 
The Debate over Labor and Employment Issues 
Labor issues and the general economic health of the industry provided the framework 
for a compelling argument in support of copy regulation. According to those who sought to 
100 
"Complete Text of Master's Report that Upholds FOGA's Style Protection is No Monopoly," 10. 
101 Johnston and Fitch, 132. 
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eliminate piracy, style protection not only lengthened the lifespan of a style, it also 
encouraged creation of original garments. As a result, there would be an increase in the 
number of attractive pieces on the market at any one time. Protection would also have the 
effect of "selling a larger volume of the dresses because the woman who wears the dress 
desires to keep in style."102 The argument was that consumer demand would, in turn, be 
stimulated, benefit the industry as a whole, and therefore avert insolvencies. Employment 
would also be stimulated, as the array of creative, original, quality merchandise, even in the 
lowest prices, would have an "emotional and decorative appeal so essential to maintain the 
level of production.. .that would afford employment to many thousands of dress workers" in 
the United States industry.103 
As already stated, style pirates were able to eliminate work/style processes. In order 
to undersell the original manufacturer, pirates used less labor and paid lower wages. 
Machine labor also was substituted for hand labor. According to Zahn, it was labor that was 
victimized severely by piracy. By reducing the number of man hours per dresses it was 
possible to reproduce an original style at a lower price. He stated that in his firm's price 
range of $10.75 to $16.75, "from three to four man hours are ordinarily required, this being 
five to six times as much as is consumed in the production of copies."104 
Conversely, those critics of style protection stated that the growth of the fashion 
industry was in fact due to the ability of lower price manufacturers to supply affordable 
fashionable merchandise. The rapid turnover of styles not only increased the volume of 
business generated by the industry, but also permitted consumers of all economic means to 
Zahn, 48. 
103 Rentner, 111. 
104 Zahn, 33. 
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participate in the fashion process. Lower price manufacturers also pointed out the economic 
infeasibility of employing designers to create original merchandise. As stated by fashion 
writer Chas Call, originals in lower prices "would be nice," but the main purpose of these 
firms was "bringing out some nice copies of slightly higher priced dresses."105 Since 
salability of dresses was based on overall elements of a trend, who in fact benefited from 
design protection? According to Zahn, fashion individuality strengthened the selling appeal 
of his merchandise. The protection of original goods could potentially decrease the number 
of new firms who relied on copying to survive, and save the better firms from insolvency.106 
Meyers suggested that piracy also hurt designers and aspiring designers. He stated: 
We have three colleges in Pittsburgh that are developing stylists, designers, 
technicians. Those girls will all be looking for something to do. The most pitiful 
thing in my experience is the great number that are coming in and looking for work, 
capable, excellent, clever people. I think piracy is narrowing down this field.107 
Others agreed with Meyers. There was an increase in the number of designers hired in the 
mid-1930s, which Meiklejohn suggested was the direct result of design protection measures, 
as the "cheap firms" were forced to hire designers. On the other hand, some firms purchased 
styles from free-lance designers, a practice that left them open to victimization. As one 
stated, "Once seen, style ideas are so easily stolen that few free-lance designers are ever paid 
for all the creations they show to manufacturers."108 With this said, the Design Creators 
105 Call, 37. 
106 Zahn, 37. 
107 Meyers, 240. 
imCostume Design (N.Y.: Federated Council on Art Education and the Institute of Women's 
Professional Relations, 1936), 14. 
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League of America, organized in 1934, issued a call to the FOGA that if so consulted they, 
the designers, could actually do something about eliminating style piracy.109 
The sale of copied merchandise at lower prices had one other effect on designers - the 
original merchandise was no longer salable. This was a primary motivating force in the rapid 
turnover of styles. According to Zahn, original manufacturers needed approximately 20 to 
25 new styles per week in order to stay ahead of style pirates.110 Other designers described a 
work environment that demanded as many as 1500 new models a year. Conversely, these 
factors were suggested as contributing factors in the "complete dependence of some 
industries upon foreign sources for styles."111 
Quality Considerations 
According to Rentner, the loss of billions of dollars in available business in the dress 
industry was caused by the standardization of styles and the depreciation of quality in 
women's garments. Copying, considered "the bane of the dress industry," caused women to 
"drift away from quality original merchandise."112 Supporters of the provisions against 
piracy and other abuses in the trade, felt manufacturers who competed in terms of quality 
rather than price, would "stay in business longer, have a more decent existence, [make a 
more] legitimate profit by changing a dress style a little so he does not kill the sale of the 
other man, and will not have to sweat his labor."113 According to Irene Blunt, Director of the 
Industrial Design Registration Bureau of the Silk Association, copyists saved on producing 
109 No ideas were offered in this article or other articles publicizing the Design Creators League of 
America addressing exactly how design piracy could be solved by the designers themselves. Women's 
Wear Daily, December 4, 1935, 11. 
110 Zahn, 41. 
111 Johnson and Fitch, 135. 
112 
"Fashion Originators to Confer Shortly with High Grade Stores," Women's Wear Daily, sec. 2, 
March 7, 1932, 3. 
113 Keating, 27. 
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costs through the cheapening of fabric, "by making it of less satisfactory construction, by 
using cheaper dyers, and printers."114 
F. Eugene Ackerman, president of the Forstmann Woolen Company of New Jersey, 
went so far as to say that style piracy had "made it necessary for textile manufacturers to 
make cheaper and cheaper and more and more shoddy fabrics in order to meet the demand 
for prices" dictated by the demands of style pirates.115 He went on to say that piracy had so 
ruined the textile industry, that "legitimate manufacturers and merchants today are obligated 
to advertise and guarantee against shoddiness."116 According to Miss Ruth O'Brien, chief of 
the Division of Textiles and Clothing of the Bureau of Home Economics of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, in a speech before the Boston Conference on Distribution: 
One fact which seems to stand out clearly is that many consumers have money and 
need to buy but are very skeptical about getting their money's worth. It is chiefly 
because consumers have no measure of quality that they are misled into buying 
inferior products, often with the result that inferior goods drive superior goods off the 
market.117 
Whether or not these were justifiable issues in the control of style piracy, the fact that 
competition had become based to a large extent on price (and therefore quality) was clearly 
affecting the overall organization of the industry. 
Arguments for and against piracy revolved around the ideas of style and economic 
issues and quality concerns. The FOGA seemed most concerned that women were turning 
away from FOGA produced higher priced merchandise because styles were quickly copied in 
114 Irene Blunt, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, Hearing 
on the Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 37. 
115 Eugene Ackerman, speaking on November 15, 1934 to the National Recovery Administration, 
Hearing on The Code of Fair Competition for the Dress Manufacturing Industry, 337. 
116 Ackerman, 339. 
117 Ruth O'Brien, Boston Conference on Distribution (Boston: Retail Trade Board, Boston Chamber 
of Commerce, 1934). 
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lower priced imitations. The FOGA also stated that piracy caused a lessening of quality 
standards throughout the apparel industry because companies were forced to save on costs of 
production to compete with pirates. The Dress Creators League of America, sought to protect 
lower priced goods from piracy. Their arguments for protection seemed to indicate that lower 
income consumers deserved original, exclusive styles as much as their wealthier 
counterparts. 
Did the FOGA Monopolize the Industry? 
Although the Guild was judged a monopoly by the FTC, the Guild's effective control 
over the dress industry is somewhat unclear. According to the master's report of William 
Filene Sons Co. v. the Fashion Originators Guild, in the spring of 1936, Guild members 
accounted for only 130 of the 2,130 dress manufacturers in New York and produced only 6% 
of the total 84,000,000 dresses manufactured in 1935. In contrast, the Supreme Court, in the 
case of the Fashion Originators Guild v. the Federal Trade Commission, found that in 1936 
Guild members sold more than 38% of all women's garments wholesaling from $6.75 to 
$10.75 and more than 60% wholesaling at $10.75 and above.118 
In the Court's opinion, the Guild's power was great because both competition and 
demand for dresses by the consuming public made it necessary for most retailers to stock at 
least some of the Guild members' products. This opened them up to the demands of the anti-
piracy program instituted by the Guild. The power of the Guild was strengthened by the 
cooperation of members of the National Federation of Textiles, who elected to sell their 
products only to those garment manufacturers who in turn agreed to sell exclusively to 
118 WM Filene's Sons Co v. Fashion Originators Guild, 90 F.2d, 556 (1937); Fashion Originators 
Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457-468 (1941). 
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cooperating retailers. Manufacturers were certainly responding to demand for cheaper 
clothing in the beginning years of the depression and felt threatened by any action that would 
limit their ability to supply that market. One estimate from the period indicated that over half 
(55%) of dress manufacturers produced at the $3.75 and under price category.119 
Reactions following the FOGA ruling were varied. According to an informal poll of 
National Retail and Dry Good Association (NRDGA) members, 88% indicated the Guild 
should confine its activities to style protection and 75% indicated the Guild activities and 
original style protection program should be confined to merchandise $16.75 and more and 
that dresses less than $10.75 should not be regarded in the area of style protection.120 
Maurice Spector, head of the Blum Store, called the decision "unfortunate for the dress 
business. It will remove the incentive to create, and the piracy situation will stifle the 
country's designing genius, which needs some sort of protection."121 Others in the dress 
industry believed the FOGA overstepped its bounds. One leading New York retailer stated, 
"While the Guild has done excellent work, it possessed too much power, and the exercise of 
such power resulted in greater evil than those sought to be eradicated."122 Possibly, by the 
late 1930s, the guild's programs were no longer representative of the industry as a whole.123 
The difficulty of identifying and controlling copies at the lower price points may ultimately 
have become insurmountable. 
119 Costume Design, 28. 
120 
"Hits Garment Practices," The New York Times, October 29, 1936, 46. 
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Summary 
The Guild's program of self-regulation against style piracy was short-lived. While 
the case of the FOGA v. the Federal Trade Commission is still considered a pivotal case in 
legal proceedings, it has ultimately become a footnote in the history of the style piracy debate 
within the apparel industry itself. It was important to bring together the two histories, of the 
legal case and of the apparel industry, for complete insight into protection problems.124 The 
FOGA attempted to guard against action that would curb the freedom of the artist, and fought 
continuously against regimentation and the stifling of new ideas, but it was the need for 
wide-reaching control within these programs to support American design that violated the 
Sherman and Clayton Anti-trust legislation. Efforts by the apparel industry to curb piracy 
failed largely due to the ambiguities and controversies inherent in a system of style 
protection.125 
124 The history of the apparel industry is often misunderstood or not completely taken into account in 
legal reviews. In a Harvard Law School article, the author states that in the past "American designers 
traditionally did not copy each other," and argues that it is contemporary technology that makes 
copying so fast, easy and widespread. This is clearly not the case when the historic record is 
examined. See Christine Magdo, "Protecting Works of Fashion from Design Piracy," LED A at 
Harvard Law School, http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/36/MAGDO.html, retrieved May 18, 
2004. 
125 Rocky Schmidt, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 861, 
861-880 (1983). 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research was to examine the concept of style and design piracy 
within the historical context of the American ready-to-wear apparel industry. The study of 
the arguments for and against piracy within the early U.S. apparel industry provided crucial 
ethical, economic, and social implications relative to protecting works of fashion for their 
originality. Through an analysis of journalistic coverage in trade and popular fashion 
periodicals, pertinent legal records, economic and census data, governmental hearings, 
archival sources, and the case study of the Fashion Originators Guild of America, this 
research demonstrated the relationships between American perceptions about access to 
fashion, the developing ready-to-wear-establishment, and piracy. The precise time 
boundaries of this research were 1910 though 1941. These years encompassed the rise of the 
ready-to-wear industry and coincided with the beginning of the trade publication Women's 
Wear Daily. The year 1941 marked the end of the Fashion Originators Guild of America 
court case that decided their program of industry self-regulation against piracy was illegal. 
Summary 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the women's ready-to-wear apparel 
industry grew rapidly. Changes in the need and availability of apparel as well as technical 
advancements that speeded mass production allowed for a wide variety of styles, quantities, 
and prices of women's ready-to-wear clothing. Increased opportunities for consumption 
through the retail medium of department stores and expanding societal roles of women 
intensified the tempo of fashion. Women desired, needed, and were more able to afford and 
acquire fashionable clothing. Department stores and manufacturers catered to the need for 
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more clothing by rapidly producing, promoting, and selling garments that contained elements 
with only small stylistic changes. 
These rapid style changes stimulated clothing sales and profits by encouraging 
obsolescence and premature replacement of goods. Remaining "in fashion" became a more 
important motivator for purchasing clothing than did reasons of durability or quality of 
materials. The public compulsion for continual style creativity, evinced in the number of 
styles introduced each season by various manufacturers, was encouraged by the ready-to-
wear women's apparel industry. Firms operating on very little capital and with few 
employees were able to enter the apparel industry and achieve relative success by imitating 
the fashionable styles produced by other manufacturers and designers. There was great 
multiplicity of similar looking styles. Due to advances in the quality of less expensive 
materials, such as rayon, manufacturers were able to produce comparable styles in a wide 
variety of quality and price. This resulted in less obvious visual differentiation between social 
and economic classes. 
As the women's ready-to-wear apparel industry grew in value and number of 
establishments, there were ardent attempts by industry individuals and organizations to 
bridge the gap between ready-to-wear mass production and the establishment of creative 
style leadership. While this leadership had traditionally come from France, America, 
specifically New York, had developed many of the essential elements necessary for a 
creative fashion center. There was a plethora of designers, unexcelled technical skill in the 
needlecraft industries, expansive retail outlets, and a quickly developing garment district. 
There were great debates, however, concerning the appropriateness and ability of the United 
States to become a center of fashion and of style leadership. France, due to laws that 
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protected style originators as well as a rich artistic heritage, created the most fashionable 
styles. Yet, economic considerations, such as rising duties on French goods and a need to 
promote U.S. economic interests, propelled the U.S. ready-to-wear apparel industry to create 
and support creative design talents. Numerous proposals were discussed to support and 
encourage emergent creative talents in America. These included a call to teach design 
students independence from Paris, the establishment of style libraries and museums for 
American designer inspiration, and a plea for U.S. retail stores to use advertising to promote 
American fashion. 
Historically, the U.S. copied from the French. However, as the women's ready-made 
industry expanded rapidly after the 1890s a trickle-down process of copying within the 
United States became a widespread practice. One of the most peculiar characteristics of the 
women's dress trade was the rapidity with which rival firms copied higher end 
manufacturers. As a style was copied at successively lower prices, the market was flooded 
with cheap imitations of higher end goods. Original dress manufacturers were forced to 
produce with such "multiplicity and at such frequent intervals" that rival competitors would 
"lag behind."1 As the twentieth century progressed, techniques for creating fashionable 
styles became increasingly streamlined for U.S. manufacturers. Rather than spending money 
on custom duties and paying for the authorization to copy Parisian styles, American 
manufacturers began the practice of copying garment styles from rival U.S. firms. 
Style piracy affected the structure of the apparel industry. One of the greatest 
complications of the style piracy dilemma, however, was that few parties agreed to the 
1 Julius Henry Cohen, Law and Order in Industry: Five years Experience (New York: The MacMillan 
Co., 1916), 88. 
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implications of these changes. Proponents in favor of style protection believed piracy 
resulted in great economic losses and disadvantages to the manufacturer and retailer, since 
imitators of styles were able to produce cheaply with fewer risks of creation. Proponents 
believed the practice of piracy which promoted the fashionability of clothing rather than 
durability features, created inferior quality goods to the detriment of consumers. Further, 
consumers who paid for high-priced originals had no guarantee that their garments would 
remain exclusive and not copied in all price ranges within weeks. Paid minimum wages for 
long hours, employees couldn't learn styles fast enough to master new techniques and details 
accelerated by the promotion of rapid style change. 
Those industry members opposing style protection argued that the growth of the dress 
industry was due to the affects of piracy: the ability to supply fashionable merchandise at low 
prices and the frequent changes of fashion, which caused obsolescence of articles before their 
actual utility was exhausted. They contended the frequent turnover of styles, caused by 
copying, accounted for the sizable volume of business done by the apparel industry. 
Manufacturers who opposed style protection and produced in the lower price points, worried 
that ending piracy would destroy their ability to create fashionable goods at cheap prices. It 
was, after all, their purpose to copy the latest high-fashion, high-price styles into garments 
lower income consumers could afford. 
In many ways, the style piracy debate intensified as a result of the Great Depression's 
impact on women's consumption habits. During the Depression, thousands of able-bodied, 
willing workers were unemployed. Accustomed to buying ready-to-wear in a variety of price 
and quality levels, women chose to purchase less-expensive garments rather than cease 
buying altogether. The shift in consumer demand from high priced to low priced dresses 
caused a fundamental shift in the competitive relationship of the dress industry. More high 
priced than low priced firms went out of business. To meet consumer demand, firms 
specializing in the lower price brackets grew dramatically and higher-priced firms simply 
could not compete. 
In this climate, the Fashion Originators Guild of American incorporated (FOGA) in 
1932. The FOGA was a trade association of leading, higher-priced dress manufacturers and 
retailers who cooperated in an attempt to eliminate design piracy. The FOGA created a style 
registration bureau that recorded members' original styles; produced identifying FOGA 
labels to be sewn into garments; and formulated rules and policies for retailer and 
manufacturer members in order to protect original merchandise. The Guild extensively 
advertised and publicized their program for style protection in the trade press, specifically, 
Women's Wear Daily. The Guild, with thousands of retailer-manufacturer members 
throughout America, was highly effective at safeguarding against piracy. However, changes 
in the Guild's original agenda, primarily the inclusion of lower priced manufacturers and 
retailers in their style protection program, caused great controversy. Lower priced 
manufacturing groups banded together to fight against the Guild. The Federal Trade 
Commission and the United States Supreme Court in 1941 deemed the FOGA's actions 
monopolistic. The Guild was ordered to cease and desist, ending one of the most effective 
and controversial industry attempts at self-regulation against piracy. 
Protection of women's apparel against style piracy was quite difficult. First, 
protection of styles against piracy was contradictory to the concept of fashion. Without the 
social process of imitation, the lucrative business of the women's ready-to-wear apparel 
industry could not exist. There must be copies if there are to be fashions, and thus the fashion 
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industry. The most paradoxical feature of the style piracy debate was that those who 
complained about piracy seemed to demand on one hand the continuation of the social 
custom of rapidly changing fashions because it provided them constantly new markets for 
styles, and seemed to demand on the other some sort of monopoly control over the process. It 
became an inescapable conclusion that proponents of style protection were trying to provide 
the copies themselves. 
Second, an objective criterion for determining product originality was difficult. To 
distinguish the old from the new, the original from the adaptation, the adaptation from the 
copy, and the obvious from the unobvious, was nearly impossible. These problems were 
multiplied in the women' ready-to-wear apparel industry which placed thousands of different 
styles in production each season, each conforming to the prevailing fashion in varying price 
and quality levels. Women plainly sought clothing that was within the range of 
fashionability, yet met their requirements of affordability. 
Today, the ease and speed of piracy has reached new proportions in the age of global 
communications, as copies often reach stores before the originals and at a fraction of the cost. 
Large apparel producers continue to use price to compete, able to keep wholesale costs low 
for some of the same reasons that existed in the 1930s. They eliminate at least a portion of 
the cost of developing original styles and patterns. While some designers still attempt to fight 
the problem, others compare it to the process of sampling in the music industry. According 
to Tom Wolfe "copying became referencing and the stigma was removed." Joan Kaner 
observed that "today's knock-off houses provide good value and style," making it a better 
buy than "overpriced" designer houses that spend a lot on advertising and fashion shows.2 
The legality of "creatively borrowing" others' ideas has produced such Internet websites as 
Anyknockoff.com and Designer Style for Less. These sites do not come without 
controversy, however. In a summer 2003 article in the popular press magazine, USA 
Weekend, Mitch Clow, international trade specialist for the U.S. Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection, suggested the possibility that at least some apparel firms producing 
counterfeit and pirated apparel "fund organized crime and terrorism."3 While the apparel 
industry continues to debate the rubric of "referencing," the FOGA was an important early 
case highlighting the ethical, economic, and social considerations of a program of industry­
wide self-regulation. 
2 Teri Agins, The End of Fashion: The Mass Marketing of the Clothing Business (New York: William 
Morrow and Co., 1999); Cathy Horyn, "Is Copying Really a Part of the Creative Process?" The New 
York Times, April 9, 2002, 1. 
3 Staci Wood, "Buying Knockoffs is a Slippery Slope," USA Weekend, July 27-29, 2003, 17. 
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